

February 20, 1942.

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ON MAIL ROOM 16E
A12-1/ND16 (2-20-42)
1942 APR 26 AM 10 34

From: The District Intelligence Officer.
 To : The Director of Naval Intelligence.
 Subject: War Diary.
 Enclosure: (A) Subject document.

1. As the District Intelligence Officer's diary from December 8 to December 25, 1941 was kept in such minute detail that each days log consisted of 4 or 5 single spaced typewritten pages only summarized extracts are submitted for that period.

2. It is felt that during this period, especially during the first week of the war the District Intelligence Office rendered one service in particular which more than compensates for the effort devoted and expense incurred from the inception of the office. During the year prior to the war the District Intelligence Office established close liason with all branches of the Army with the result that the well known "DIO" was the principal, and in many instances the sole, Army-Navy disseminator of liason information. Such information should have flowed to and from the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but by direction of that office no effort was made to change the flow through the District Intelligence Office during the first 10 days of the war. The District Intelligence Office had four telephones in constant use during daylight hours and two officer manned phones at night. The diary shows an average of 60 items daily and does not include many messages and matters handled without being logged.

3. Many contacts daily, by phone and messenger, were handled with the following organizations: USAFFE, Philippine Dept, Army Air Corps Headquarters, Air Corps Warning Service, Philippine Constabulary, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet particularly operations and intelligence officers, Commandant Sixteenth Naval District, Fort Director, Cable and Radio Censorship, U.S. High Commissioners Office, Export Control Administration, Radio Communication Companies reporting bombings at sea, Press Associations reporting flash news and requesting news, individuals reporting Japanese in hiding or unauthorized short-wave radio sets or flashing lights during blackouts.

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4. The District Intelligence Officers' wide acquaintanceship in the Army was used in Army-Navy-Marine Corps procurement or exchange of rifles, gasmasks, bullet proof helmets etc. The Intelligence Office's cordial peace time relationship with the Philippine Constabulary and the Customs Service resulted in procurement of guards for the Commander-in-Chief's office, additional guards for the Port Area, the elimination of civil service rules (which had caused lack of discipline) applying to Harbor Police, the arming of customs lighthouse patrol vessels and the accomplishment of other ends which seemed desirable at the time.

5. The cordial relations with the Army, the Constabulary, and other U.S. and Commonwealth Government offices were established by former D.I.O. ~~(REDACTED)~~ Commander K.L. HILL, USN (RET.) whose wide local acquaintanceships and full time service as the D.I.O. were invaluable in founding an office which had to expand so rapidly to fulfill its mission.

M. C. Cheek
M. C. CHEEK.

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

1942 APR 26 AM 10 35

- Dec. 8: Censorship of cable and radio traffic was made effective at 0600 local time, 3½ hours after Pearl Harbor. All active personnel was on duty at 0700 from which time both the Intelligence and the Censorship offices functioned 24 hours daily until withdrawn from Manila.
- All cables except to Guam interrupted.
- Camp John Hay, Baguio, bombed this morning by 27 planes.
- Dec. 9: Nichols Field, Manila Area, bombed during air raid from 0300 to 0722.
- Dec. 10: Japanese landings reported at Vigan and Aparri, North Luzon.
- Cavite heavily bombed by 54 planes some of which later bombed Nichols Field.
- Dec. 12: Enemy landing at Legaspi. Enemy men-of-war and transports reported off North Luzon, West Luzon, and Batangas in South.
- Dec. 13: Cable to Guam out of commission, strange signals received.
- Nichols Field bombed again.
- Dec. 14: In compliance with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet orders, organized and dispatched on yacht Gem (seized by D.I.O. Dec. 12) a force of 40 men who seized the French liner Mareshal Joffre. Majority of the Joffre's crew were landed as some were known to be pro-Vichy and others were not agreeable to serving under the changed status of the ship.
- Northern part of Manila Bay bombed. It appears from this bombing, compared with that of Cavite and Nichols that accuracy depends largely on the squadron leader and that all bombs will either be hits or close misses or otherwise wide misses. All bombs fell in the bay today, quite a distance from shipping.
- Dec. 15: Following one of several air warnings, the second today, which cause the loss of many hours of office work arranged to move censorship to the basement of the Insular Life Building (7 story structure) and to move the Intelligence Office from the Port Area to the Commonwealth Finance Building.

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Dec. 16: Numerous reports daily of flares and flashing lights in the city and on the bay during blackouts, also of suspected radio sets and suspected persons. District Intelligence office has taken over some of the functions of Army G-2 in combatting subversive activities while G-2 is busily engaged in rounding up aliens and suspects.

At the request of the Constabulary have contacted organizations concerned in an attempt to stop firing on patrol launches by sentries and by vessels in the harbor. Otherwise patrol launches will always be "out of order" as they were today.

Dec. 17: The Army has not as yet established mail censorship, consequently all questions regarding mail on incoming and in transit ships must be handled by the District Intelligence Office if at all. Have directed that such mail be landed and held unless previously censored by British.

Protested to Army G-2 that failure to censor local radio broadcasts (which can be picked up in Japan, China and sometimes in the U.S.A.) results in negation of our censorship of Press dispatches.

Requested Army G-2 to discontinue long wave broadcasting by local companies as have learned from Pan American Airways that their pilots used Manila long wave communication stations as beacons and assume that enemy may do the same.

Dec. 18: A family consisting of a Britisher, his Japanese wife and 3 sons who are suspected operators of a short wave radio set near Cavite Navy Yard were taken into custody by the District Intelligence Office personnel and Constabulary.

Dec. 19: Sangley Point bombed twice by 25 to 27 bombers.

Dec. 20: Communications with HongKong ceased today.

Nichols Field and Paranaque, Manila Area, heavily bombed.

Dec. 22: After being advised by Philippine Department G-2 that the Army is preparing to evacuate Manila was suprised to find that no one in the Commander in Chief's office knew of this plan. USAFFE G-2 stated that no such plan was being considered.

ENCLOSURE (A) 2.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

- Dec. 23: Advised by the Commander-in-Chief that USAFFE advised the Commander-in-Chief that the Army is evacuating Manila, which is to be declared an open city.
- Dec. 24: Ordered by Commandant to proceed to Corregidor tomorrow with District Intelligence Office naval personnel, excluding officers attached to Branch "D" as censorship is considered a non-combattant activity which can function in an open city.
- Dec. 25: At 1500 departed for Corregidor. In compliance with orders all secret, confidential and ordinary files, documents, and booklets (excluding only officer personnel records) were destroyed. Office equipment was turned over to the Censorship office or left in custody of the Philippine Commonwealth Finance Department. There are no facilities for transporting files and records or for storing after arrival at Corregidor.
- Dec. 26: 55 transports and supply ships in Lingayen Gulf. Enemy forces advancing from North Luzon and from Atimonan on the east coast where 40 to 50 transports in Alabat Sound.

Corregidor heavily bombed.

With the exception of the District Intelligence Officer the District Intelligence Office has ceased to function. The District Intelligence Officer is maintaining contact with the Army while other I-V(S) officers have been assigned to various non intelligence duties.

- Dec. 27: Manila declared an open city.
- Dec. 29: Censorship officers under Lt. Worcester (Cable Censor Manila) capably and successfully cleared Pasig River of interisland ships, tugs and other craft which drew heavy bombing by the enemy on Dec. 27 and 28. Commendable assumption of authority and action by non-nautical Branch "D" Officers.

Corregidor bombed. 1000 marines in barracks Middle Side ordered to the ground floor and outside when air raid warning sounded. The barracks had several direct hits, one going through three concrete floors but not a man was killed and the most serious injury was a broken leg caused by falling while running. This bombing clearly indicated the hazard of being in a building under two or three concrete floors.

ENCLOSURE (A) 3.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Dec. 31: Branch "D" censorship officers arrived Corregidor in compliance with Brig.Gen. Marshall's orders to whom (Branch "D") Lt. Worcester had been directed to apply for instructions as to date and hour of evacuation of Manila.

Army Corps I, Gen. Wainwright in southern Pampanga holding line while Corps II, Gen. Parker completed withdrawal from southern Luzon passing in rear of Corps I to MLR north of Abucay, Bataan, to westward. 26th Cavalry doing fine work but one unit cut off at Klondike, on Baguio road. 31st Infantry astride road near Olongapo.

Raiding party sent to Sangley Point and Cavite under Lt. Champlin, destroyed remainder of stores, radio, etc.

Jan. 1: Manila clear of U.S. Naval Forces except Hospital staff and patients; believe small units of Army not yet out.

Fires seen in Manila.

Jan. 2: Japanese at City Hall Manila. People looting food stores, probably with consent of authorities and owners.

Jan. 3: Corregidor bombed.

Jan. 4: USAFFE forces moving into positions on MLR (Main Line Resistance) running from $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Abucay, Bataan, west and south to Pandan Point. Enemy forces concentrating in south-western Pampanga.

Mariveles Section Base and U.S.S. CANOPUS bombed, some casualties.

Jan. 6: Corregidor bombed eight times today. Cloudy, enemy flights over many times, usually hidden by clouds.

Jan. 7: Important enemy activity in Gulf of Davao. 3 cruisers and 18 DD's there. Enemy occupied Davao City, Digos and USN minor base on Malalag Bay.

Army observation posts on Corregidor and Bataan report an aircraft carrier 40,000 yards offshore. This is cited as one of several similar reports. It seems that any distant vessel sighted by an Army observer is an aircraft carrier.

Enemy now in contact with our MLR in eastern Bataan.

ENCLOSURE (A) 4.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 9: Made my first trip to Bataan; with Col. Willoughby, USAFFE G-2, first to Headquarters Phil. Dept. where renewed contact with officers of G-2 as constituted during past several months. At Mariveles Section Base Comdr. Bridgett organizing a Naval Battalion of aviation, torpedo, ammunition depot and Canopus personnel plus about 135 marines who man A.A. batteries. Fine spirit prevails.

Jan. 14: Corregidor bombed twice today. One bomb killed 31 men who had not taken proper cover. Light so-called bomb shelters are more hazardous than a foxhole, a ditch or even level ground away from trees.

Enemy radio station believed (by RDF) to be in saddle just east of Mt. Mariveles peak. This is on line of strange radio located by Cavite in mid-December. Platoon of Marines unsuccessfully searched suspected hill side.

Jan. 15: Notes on visit to Bataan front area - January 14, 1942:

Army Base Hospital at Limay. Comdr. Smith, USN (MC), Lt. Fraleigh (DC), one Navy Nurse and 3 phm's here attending 14 Navy patients burned and wounded. All cheerful and recovery assured. Food is ample but they could use more yeast, coffee and beef. About 45 patients received daily, seriously wounded only; less serious are sent on to BH #2, Southern Bataan. About 50 patients evacuated or discharged daily. The hospital is composed of a number of Nipa walled houses with tin or thatched roofs, 1500 beds.

Second Corps Headquarters, Gen. Parker, Corps Staff most anxious to obtain additional officers, preferably with artillery experience to relieve officers who have been on front line duty for 15 days without relief, with not more than 3 or 4 hours sleep daily, consequently mental and physical exhaustion. 301st F.A., communication wires broken 13 times; 5 of these interruptions by clean plier cut. This F.A. unit and others badly need communication wire (40 miles considered standard necessary per battery; only 5 miles available in P.I. per battery).

C.O. of 21st Inf. stated that Dec. 15 his Regiment was 1700 strong; today 400. He believes that about $\frac{1}{2}$ of the 1300 were casualties and that the other half became stragglers, some returning home, Others taking to the hills. A few have drifted back.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 15: Notes on visit to Bataan front area - January 14, 1942 (Cont'd)

11th F.A. is well pleased with 4 - 3" naval guns.

Food supplies are ample for the time being although all the troops are on so-called half rations which means 2 meals per day and theoretically $\frac{1}{2}$ full ration. However all HQ's visited have a great variety of food in abundance. Troops in front line positions are sometimes actually short of food owing to transportation difficulties. Our Army is sponsoring a fishing fleet off the east coast of Bataan and a few caribou have been killed for food. I saw scores of caribou grazing and there must be at least a few thousand in Bataan. The front line Infantry Commanders of Philippine Units complain of lack of Rice. From captured and dead Japs it seems that each soldier carries his own ration; a sock-sized bag of uncooked rice, tea and a few small cubes of concentrated food.

On the Eastern front ground between our MLR and OPL has, in some places been lost and retaken several times. Our troops are handicapped on both defensive and offensive by lack of air power. Enemy observation planes and bombers are over our lines almost continuously. Under such conditions our artillery cannot be fired while enemy planes are overhead (except when the objective warrants disclosing battery position). There is no A.A. defense at the front.

Japanese attacks are invariably made at night preceded by artillery fire which seems to be designed to tempt our batteries into replying and disclosing positions. If our batteries reply enemy artillery is concentrated upon them and Jap infantry advances. When the enemy is driven back to his lines a number of snipers (members of an elite special service corps) are left behind and begin to harry our troops as soon as our lines are reestablished. These snipers use 25 and 22 caliber rifles; they are experts at camouflage; carry nets to hold branches or leaves of foliage or to hold straw or cane in place. Snipers are evidently instructed to pick off Americans. The 57th Infantry has lost a large percentage of its American Officers and all units complain of losses and hazards by snipers. In addition to sniping, the enemy leaves men behind to infiltrate back to our artillery positions to signal battery locations. There have been several instances of tracer bullets and flares being used to spot batteries. A large number of snipers have been killed by our forces.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 15: Notes on visit to Bataan front area - January 14, 1942(Cont'd)

A lieutenant of the 57th Infantry and a marine pvt. who had permission to visit the area for 3 days undertook a sniper hunt and bagged so many that both have been recommended for the D.S.C. by the Col. of the 57th. (Later: The lieutenant got the D.S.C. but the marine has not) The same lieutenant went some distance into enemy lines and set fire to a village which was being used by enemy artillery and tanks. By prearrangement our artillery opened up 5 minutes after they saw a flame in the village and between incendiary and artillery fire the village was destroyed. I understand that the marine was concerned in this affair, by manning a telephone on a wire probably run out into enemy territory. The lieutenant is being recommended by his C.O. for a Medal of Honor.

Enemy troops, sometimes both in front of and in rear of our own lines, while in tree top positions take up the call ^(in Tagalog) "Ikaw Ay Mamatay" which means "You are going to die". The C.O. of a front line infantry regiment says that this call makes his superstitious troops rather nervous.

A few evenings back our forces adopted a password having too "LL"'s in it, therefore unpronounceable by Japs. One American went out a short distance in front of the MLR in a quiet sector and by shooting everyone who could not pronounce the password got 4 Japs, including 1 civilian.

There is a general belief in our front area that the GPF's, (155 mm) have not only given an excellent account but have saved our forces from severe losses or worse. An officer who has particularly distinguished himself, (USNA, 1924 man) had orders to abandon his 155's on the beach of Batangas. Instead he rustled his own trucks and tractors from civilian sources and hauled his guns out of the sand, got them up and around Manila and into Bataan, where a few days ago this battery broke up an enemy tank attack. The officer has won 2 citations and a promotion.

One of the 155's had an accident suitable for Ripley. The shell had just been rammed home when a bomb fell a short distance from the gun muzzle and blew a rock into the gun which was tightly wedged into the rifling; neither shell nor rock being removable by ordinary means.

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SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan.16: Learn from USAFFE reports that ground I went over the 14th about one mile in rear of front line was taken by the enemy the 15th, following a disgraceful retreat by our 51st Div. The Filipino Captain of Co. G, 51st Inf. Regiment led his company in full flight to the rear upon opening of a light artillery barrage by the enemy. The panic spread to all this regiment, to the 53rd Regiment and even to the reserve (52nd) Regiment a mile in rear of the front. Machine guns, rifles, ammunition and equipment were abandoned - and the former were turned on the disorganized 51st Div. by the enemy. This division, recruited in Southern Luzon provinces, is one of the poorly trained, all-Filipino-officered new divisions. Such a unit presents a striking contrast to the Scout regiments which have been organized for many years.

Jan.19: Three Motor Torpedo Boats were sent on missions last evening, two to Subic Bay area where a transport was reported to be in Port Binanga Bay and one to reconnoiter the Cavite coast near Ternate where about 1000 enemy troops are engaged in an undetermined activity.

The Port Binanga expedition was highly successful for one MTB and possibly disastrous for the other; one sank transport with torpedoes and got away under fire without a scratch; the other is missing, 16 hours overdue. (See Jan. 20 and 21).

I joined the Army CAC observer on the MTB trip along the Cavite coast. The MTB approached the coast and ran along at about 2,000 yards distance, looking for signs of enemy activity. Tunneling in the hill at the mouth of the small river at Ternate had been reported, also the presence of several 3" guns and some large "3 metres long" guns. Between Ternate and Naic we opened up with a .50 calibre M.G. on a group of 6 or 7 Japanese standing on the beach. They ducked back into the trees, our shots went too high. (Followed by tracers, just at dusk). On the return trip we gave another burst, more to give the port gunner a chance to use his gun than to strafe unseen Japs. A suitable location for spotting 12 inch mortar fire from Ft. Frank was selected; nothing of note occurred - (so far as we knew at the time but see January 28th notes).

Jan.22: The 19th the Admiral directed me to go up western Bataan to try to locate or get word of MTB 31 and her 2 officers and 11 men missing after the expedition to Binanga Bay last night.

ENCLOSURE (A) 8.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 22: Cont'd.

Left Mariveles Section Base at 0830 the 20th with a petty officer armed with an A.R. Proceeded to Corps I (Gen. Wainwright's) H.Q. where no word of MTB 31 or crew. Went on to 91st Infantry C.P. where learned that Lt. DeLong and 9 men of MTB 31 had landed this morning in two bancas at Eman Pt., about 2500 yards inside our lines. After feeding and clothing the navy party who were exhausted and hungry the 91st sent them on their way south to Mariveles. (They probably passed me while I was at Corps I Headquarters) This leaves one officer and two men unaccounted for. The party of ten were fortunate in landing exactly where they did as not only the enemy was further north but also our own (Filipino unit) troops who were naturally on the alert for enemy landing parties; while 1000 yards further south was another Filipino unit noted for their "itchy-fingers-on triggers"; lastly an American officer, Capt. Cockburn, 91st Inf., happened to be on the beach and held fire of his troops. Lt. DeLong, not knowing that he was behind our lines crawled along the beach until he and a Filipino soldier met and greeted each other "Hello Joe". DeLong's first landing from the wrecked "31" was in enemy territory where he eventually found and took possession of the two bancas.

While at the 91st Inf. H.Q. the 20th, I learned of 3 men killed while attempting to land from a banca 400 yards behind our line and therefore proceeded to the 1st Infantry H.Q. near kilometer 171; the 1st being on the line on the left (seaward end) of our front. Col. Dumas of the 1st was most helpful in trying to determine whether the 3 men killed were our 3 Navy men or Japanese or Filipino. The Filipino Lieutenant who had been on the beach at the time said he was sure they were Japanese - but I was not sure.

Col Dumas said I could take a look or he would send out runners but that anyone going to the beach would be in the open and exposed to enemy small arms fire during a 400 yard walk (or run!). I was "on the spot" as I had no desire to walk a quarter of a mile within machine gun range of the enemy with no available cover and on the other hand had said runners should not be subject to the risk as the problem was purely Naval. I was saved from making a decision and from appearing to be "either "yellow" or "a fool" (according to an Army Officer who said "They are all dead anyway") by a telephone call that two

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SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 22: Cont'd.

Japanese rifles had been found in the banca and that some of the men who had been on the beach felt sure the banca crew were Japanese. I returned to the 91st to spend the night and await a report on identification under cover of darkness of one of the 3 bodies which was lying on the beach near an isolated group of our machine guns.

In the early morning of the 21st the 1st Inf. telephoned that the body on the beach where the 3 men attempted to land yesterday is Japanese.

After breakfast I set out to visit our northernmost and best artillery observation post, near Km post 173, with the idea of recommending that a naval officer be stationed there to obtain and transmit more accurate and detailed information on ship movements in the China Sea area from Subic Bay southward to Lubang.

The front line (of our infantry) is at Km. post 174. At Km. 163 I was stopped by a sergeant who had been stationed there to stop Gen. Wainwright, Corps Commander, in particular and everyone else as well, with advice that enemy snipers and a machine gun blocked the road at Km. 167. Gen. Wainwright arrived shortly afterwards while I drove back to return Col. Carters car and get one sent up by Comdr. Bridgett - which had another petty officer with a machine gun. With the two well armed navy men I drove north again to Km. post 164 where we caught up with a patrol of 20 to 25 Philippine Army troops which we joined, afoot. Half a mile up the road I found Gen. Wainwright who chatted pleasantly while we waited for enemy planes overhead to complete their mission of observation, and bombing. The party of 30 or so including the Gen. his aide and ever present ex-Texas-cowboy-orderly, and we three navy men then advanced in the old drill book "street riot" formation with particular caution at bends in the road. At Km. post 167 one of our detail was shot as soon as he rounded a curve in the road; two others were shot soon thereafter, probably by the same sniper. After about a half hour a small battle - of riflemen, machine guns and one trench mortar was heard around the bend for about 15 minutes then silence, broken by an occasional rifle shot. Since we were not getting anywhere with the handful of men and as the P.A. troops were young recruits the General decided to leave for the nearest telephone to organize a force to clear the road, and ordered me and my two men to accompany him, which I was quite willing to do after two hours of

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SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 22: Cont'd.

hugging the roadside cliff or kneeling in the ditch with cocked pistol in hand when shots rang out or sounds came from the thick forest which bordered the road.

Later. This road cut which took place about an hour before I attempted to get through to the Command Post where I had been the preceeding day was not at first accepted as a serious situation, although the road was the sole line of supply to the front. All communications (except by runner) were cut by the enemy on the 21st and neither the road nor other communication lines were ever reopened. An enemy force at first estimated at 40 or 50 snipers was actually a well trained battalion of 450 troops (Army estimate) who cut off 5,000 of our infantry and artillery and brought about the withdrawl of the entrie U.S. Forces in Bataan to the last or "Reserve Battle Line". Of the 5,000 officers and men 4,000 had gotten back to our lines a week after the road was cut, by mountain trails and along the shore, all on foot.

Two 155's, eight 75's, thirteen 2.95 mountain guns, scores of machine guns, thousands of rifles, a hundred mules, motor transportation units and all stores including ammunition were left on the line. Scout units retired and reformed at prior strength while some of the new Philippine Army units lost 40 percent of their strength - largely by desertion evidently.

The Navy Section Base, Mariveles, has been bombed and strafed so often and the men of the Naval Battalion under Comdr. Bridgett have been so well indoctrinated in simple self-protection measures that air raid warnings create little commotion although the terrain is flat and open. The men have learned that while trees which border the Base offer shelter from the enemy's view as well as the sun the bombs are detonated by branches, and fragments spray downward on their shallow trench "fox-holes".

In the open a 2½ feet deep by 18 inches wide fox-hole dug in an L shape with each leg 4 feet long affords excellent protection for 2 men from the bombs used by the enemy (usually 100 lbs), which hit not closer than 6 or 7 feet.

ENCLOSURE (A) 11.

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Jan. 22: Cont'd.

A Filipino ship's cook 2nd class who had been enticed away from his tree sheltered fox-hole to one in the open had two bombs fall, one on either side, each about 6 feet distant, which caved in his trench and spattered him with clods. After the bombing he reported to his commanding officer, with a happy grin on his face, a dent in his tin hat and various skin abrasions, "Look Captain, I do what you say and no hurt". It seems that no concussion results from nearby bomb hits when men are below the line of fragments sprayed from hits on open ground.

Jan. 23: Action off Luzon Pt. 0420-0445 January 23:

Motor Torpedo Boat, USN, encountered and sank two enemy landing boats. Another of our patrol launches sank a third. Motor Torpedo Boat used two .50 cal., two .30 cal., M.G.'s. and six rifles; later especially valuable in keeping enemy head down when turned to bring disengaged side to bear. Our launch had one .50 cal., Marlins and rifles.

Characteristics of enemy landing boats:- All metal hull, 40-foot length, armored shield fore and aft, forward shield hinged, bow of boat blunt spoon shape, one Diesel engine, four machine gun mounts. Only boat boarded did not have machine guns aboard consequently assume mounts for use by passenger troops. Normal crew - seven men (according to captured diary) but boat boarded believed to have had only 3. Capacity about 35 troops with equipment.

One non-commissioned officer and one man captured, latter died in Battan hospital, former will probably recover.

High power of enemy .25 cal. rifle noted. One bullet pierced the side of Motor Torpedo Boat control bridge, passed through aluminum cabinet, an officer's ankle and lodged in other foot.

Uselessness of hand grenades:- Grenades obtained from Army stores thrown in boats did not seem to be effective and two found in boat boarded had not fragmented. (THIS was second instance of similar nature).

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SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 29: Col. John Clement, USMC, and I called at various H.Q.s in Bataan on Jan. 26 and 27, giving particular attention to the operations of the Naval Battalion under Commander Bridgett against enemy forces on Longoskawayan and Lapiay Points (Lat. 14-35N; Long. 120-27-30E). This operation was undertaken by the Naval Battalion (although this area was not assigned to the Navy) as there was an enemy force of unknown strength threatening the Naval Base as well as communication lines vital to the Army but no defending Army unit. The Naval Battalion was engaged in jungle warfare on the hills from Fucot southward and on the points named for 24 hours daily from Jan. 23rd to the 27th when relieved by a battalion of the 57th (Philippine Scout) Infantry. While ably led and composed largely of a fine group of naval technical ratings and marines the Naval Battalion lacked land warfare training, artillery, trench mortars, field kitchens and the usual equipment available to Army or other normally equipped land units.

Later:- The force of 300 or more was wiped out eventually, and judging from the graves and decomposed bodies the Naval Battalion must have accounted for many enemy casualties.

On the night of the 26th Longoskawayan Point was bombarded by Ft. Mills 12 inch mortars after the Naval Battalion withdrew to a line across the point or peninsula from bay head to bay head. (This was the first hostile shot by a fixed emplacement U.S. Coast Artillery gun since the Civil War). The bombardment was not followed up by the Naval Battalion due to our detachment on Longoskawayan mistaking another detachment on Lapiay Point for an enemy force which would attack our Longoskawayan force in the rear. The latter withdrew to the hills.

As the 57th had not made appreciable progress in clearing the point by the 29th a joint Army-Navy bombardment and infantry attack was arranged for the morning of the 29th. Ft. Mills shelled the point with 12" (rather ineffectually); the U.S.S. QUAIL most effectively fired 95 rounds of 3 inch into the caves and draws on the point; mountain gun and trench mortars fire was poured in by units with the 57th Infantry, which went in to mop up - but found a few enemy troops still alive and full of fight.

(Later: This is the third instance of the Army failing to quickly recognize the seriousness of infiltrations behind our lines. First, the disastrous affair at Km. post 167 of Jan. 21st - 24th and second, their estimate of 40 to 50

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enemy troops landing in Aglaloma Bay from 10 boats, an estimate which was eventually revised to 450 men after the D.I.O. pointed out that 10 landing boats can carry a battalion. (Three weeks were required to clean up the Aglaloma Bay Area).

Prisoners information and translations of diaries taken from prisoners and dead:- (Comments in parenthesis in following paragraphs are by D.I.O.-16)

(a) Pvt. Kawakami Yukio, 33rd Inf. Reg. 30th Brigade, 16th Division. Captured near Mariveles. Captives statements: Called to active duty Oct. 1, 1941; left Nagoya Nov. 20th in 16th Div., on transports; stayed at Caroline Islands 5 days then his (33rd) regiment sailed for Legaspi, P.I. where they landed. (Date unspecified but understood to be about Dec. 12) Was moved by land to Olongapo where his company of 70 men and two other companies embarked in boats for a destination unknown to him but believed to be somewhat north of Longoskawayan Point (Mariveles) where he landed Jan. 22nd in company with about 200 troops. Prisoner gave a regimental organization as follows:

3 battalions of 4 companies each.
1 heavy M.G. Co.
Each Company - 4 section, each with one 37 mm.
Each Company - 12 light M.G.s and two 75's.

(b) Pvt. Hirochi Yamanaka - 10th Independent Engineer Reg. Captured by M.T.B. while badly wounded in landing boat in action off Luzon Point on Jan. 23rd. Called to active duty in Sept. 1941; sailed from Hiroshima Nov. 19th; stopped at Formosa and sailed Dec. 8th; landed at Vigan Dec. 10th. Unable or unwilling to talk much.

(c) Non-Commissioned officer. Captured in Mariveles. Sailed from Nagoya Dec. 1st direct to Lamon Bay, P.I. and landed at Meubon, Tayabas, Dec. 12th. Moved by land to Olongapo, thence by one of six boats with 250 troops to Longoskawayan Point (Mariveles Area). He does not remember day. (Assumed to have been about Jan. 20th)

(d) 2nd Lt. Namakawa, killed Pucot Hill by Marines on Jan. 23rd, diary extracts:- Sailed from Japan Nov. 19th; arrived Pulao Dec. 1st; sailed for Legaspi, P.I. Dec. 8th; landed at Legaspi Dec. 12th; reached Olongapo in three trucks Jan. 16th.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 29: (d) Cont'd.

Jan. 17 Left Olongapo at 0900 only to find the bridge one kilometre outside destroyed. Succeeded in getting across after noon. Followed along shoreline, and at three o'clock began construction of four rafts out of steel drums. Construction required eight hours.

Jan. 18 We had planned to start out at 0700, but having found a boat near the beach, our start was delayed until 1000. We got along much better now that we had this with us. On the way water started getting into the Commander's (boat or raft), so we all went ashore and took a rest while it was being repaired. Two artillery platoon rafts and myself decided to get going just as we were. The tide helped us along and we were set in the direction of ---- at a rapid rate. We completely lacked ----, which would not do at all. The oars broke and we became crazed with fear. At last we just managed to make the shore. It was just two o'clock. The boat containing the main force eventually joined us because of the same tidal current. At 1500 we set out again but were forced back as soon as we got beyond the point. A very trying night was about to fall upon us. The chief worry was that our boats would become separated and that we would fall prey to the enemies on the fortress. Finally, after the greatest difficulty, we succeeded in groping our way to a bay (Kinalalakan Bay Lat. 14-25-30 Long. 120-27-55; between Longaskawayan and Lapiay Points) in which there was a river mouth. This was at 2200, and here we stayed.

Jan. 19 Since it was now low tide again, we could not go out, with the result that a full day had become wasted. We waited ten hours for the tide, and then it was hard to do anything because of darkness. Just getting beyond the point was a feat in itself. The artillery raft did succeed in getting out, but the powder raft seemed to have run aground. ----

Jan. 20 We arrived at 0230 and went over to the powder raft. By 0400 we were all together again, and our artillery and powder had not been harmed. But our rafts were useless. We slept here seven hours. Then the second in command and 2nd Lt. ---- went out to reconnoitre, one going up the mountain (? Pucac or next southard hill) and the other along the coastline. Seven or eight of us took advantage of this and went foraging. It was decided to take the road. (Main artery southern Bataan Bases to Corps I occupying western half of Bataan.) The guns on the fortress are firing at ships. It is very evident, for they are doing their firing right before our very eyes. They do not seem to be able to hit a thing, though at 1110 one vessel seemed to have been destroyed; we saw it sink. (Ft. Mills

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SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 29: (d) Cont'd.

14" rifle test shots fired this date, shells falling in open sea 20,000 yards to west of southern Bataan. The sinking was an hallucination, no targets seen from Ft. Mills). We could hear talking and sounds of gunfire on the mountain. (Doubtless A.A. fire and bombing at Mariveles). They seem to be going at it rather strongly on the front.

(e) Translation of torn pages from a diary kept by an unknown enemy soldier killed in Mariveles area and who was evidently in the same unit as Lt. Namakawa. "Dec. 20 we left Naga (Carmaines Sur, P.I.) at 3:00 o'clock". Jan. 19 While waiting for a favorable tide, we rested and went ahead with other preparations. At about 0200 we entered the bay. Because the powder boat was washed up on the beach, we, with the help of others, did ---- with the powder.

Jan. 20 I arose at 0700. The powder ----. We shall have to take (the raft ?) apart and carry it or else build (another ?);

Jan. 21 By night the tide ----. We made progress with the building of the (raft ?). The sound of the shells on the front line ----.

Jan. 22 This afternoon we made preparations for leaving. We plan to leave at 2400. Large motor launches will come and make a landing in the face of the enemy, and operating behind the enemy's back, will carry out their duty of destroying the defense works of the retreating enemy; in short, the enemy will not have any defense line at all. At about 1130 (date not mentioned) we arrived at (Longoskawayan or Lapiay Point) by motor gunboat. (Probably meant motor landing boat).

Equipment of Japanese soldier on sniping or infiltration duty:-

- (1) Bullet proof helmet, sometimes with woven straw cover for sun protection and camouflage.
- (2) Head net, dark green "cheese cloth" for camouflage (very effective in P.I. forests). Also good protection from insects.
- (3) Body net, fishnet mesh, about 3½ feet square, dark green, for meshing forestry leaves and branches or sugar cane to camouflage body.
- (4) Gas mask, best made item in equipment excepting munitions. (Sample submitted ONI)

ENCLOSURE (A) 16.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 29: Cont'd.

- (5) Wicker basket haversack, small and cheap.
- (6) Small (about 1 lb.) bag uncooked rice.
- (7) Cardboard box of small sweets.
- (8) Bag of biscuit, small and something between our hardtack and soda cracker.
- (9) Compressed ration of unpolished rice, wheat, sugar and dried plums.
- (10) Can of salt salmon.
- (11) Bottle of food pills, concentrated dried plums.
- (12) Packet of 10 "stomach health" pills.
- (13) Poison remover packet, a powder to be mixed with water, the paste to be applied to poisoned parts of the body.
- (14) Telescope (or gas mask ?) non-frosting discs, to be pressed on lenses in cold weather with non-freezing liquid.
- (15) Kakki or blue denim uniform, .25 calibre rifle, grenades.

Jan. 30: Army observers on Corregidor and in Bataan are continually reporting aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, large transports and landing boats in the offing. Any vessel seen at a distance of 38,000 to 42,000 yards is reported as an aircraft carrier as the masts and stack or stacks are not visible, hence a "flat top", hence a carrier. No aircraft carriers have been near western Luzon. Yesterday a 3 stack light cruiser was sketched by a Naval Reserve Officer and it is evident that either a light cruiser or (usually) a merchant ship is on patrol about 20 miles off shore from Subic Bay to Luban.

Jan. 31: Army observers and units on the eastern Bataan front have reported that one or more field pieces, 75's probably, mounted on barges have on three nights fired on our troops from a point in Manila Bay about 5 miles east of Pandan Point, the front line. Last night I went out on the Luzon which was given the mission of locating and destroying the barges, which are supposedly towed into position by midnight and withdrawn at 0130 or 0200. The Luzon cruised the area until after 0200 without sighting anything afloat. It is believed that Army observers may have mistaken patrol vessels exchange of recognition signals for flashes of guns.

A rare view of land warfare was afforded by the Luzon's position directly on line with no-mans land. Artillery flashes from both sides could be seen while the most unusual feature was machine gun tracer bullets arcing in both directions simultaneously. A Fourth of July exhibition in appearance, a death dealing combat in fact.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Jan. 31: Cont'd.

Earlier in the evening of the 30th two enemy planes appeared over the Luzon, apparently searching for something as they made no effort to bomb or straff the ship although they circled so closely that the Luzon opened fire three times. Possibly they were looking for the Seawolf which two days ago was inadvertently reported by TCO in plain English as "surfacing two miles east of Corregidor". Enemy planes were over this area most of the forenoon of the 30th.

Last night four mines in the Army mined area and on a direct line from the western tip of Corregidor to Monja rock exploded - without known cause. These four mines were not adjacent to each other, each being in a different group, 600 yards apart.

Feb. 4: In Bataan on Feb. 2nd and 3rd complying with the Commandant's order to place a liason officer with Gen. Wainwright, Corps I, who wants to expedite naval assistance when needed to clear out enemy forces along Corps coastline. The General, like most Army officers, has little knowledge of the functions, capabilities and limitations of the various types of naval vessels or the Navy as a whole or, in particular, the small naval unit in this command. According to the average Army officer 12 knot mine sweepers should be used to bombard enemy occupied points regardless of the enemy's air control and the presence of a cruiser or destroyer; MTBs should be used to fight landing boats and our small converted yachts and ships boats should be distributed in the bays and along the beaches of the Armys coast line - where our own forces nightly fire on every object seen afloat within 8,000 yards.

At Gen Pierce's 71st Div. H.Q. there seemed to be a better understanding of the disadvantages as well as the advantages of naval cooperation against enemy pockets on points of land where the Army had fought hard to gain the ground which would have to be evacuated to permit land and sea bombardment. A company officer from the units operating on Quinauan Pt. was sent for and expressed his objection to support from the sea and his belief that the enemy would be mopped up within 24 hours. (Later: Two jury armored Navy launches were finally brought up on Feb. 7 and assisted in cleaning out practically all enemy troops on the point on the morning of the 8th).

ENCLOSURE (A) 18.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Feb. 4: Cont'd.

This attitude disposed of the Corps Commanders original idea of an immediate attack by a minesweeper with 3 inch and an MFB with .50 calibre.

The 71st H.Q. Staff and men in the field are enjoying experimental cooking methods with Japanese food supplies, eating hard bread, and smoking cigarettes dropped in 15 parachutes which fell in our area instead of on the narrow strip of the point still held by the enemy. A note accompanying the "gifts" from the sky said, "You understand we cannot send you much. Here is some food and cigarettes". The enemy parachutes are being collected for delivering medical supplies and ammunition to the 26th Cavalry unit which was cut off in late December and is still operating in Neuva Vizcaya and Benguet.

A mosaic map of Bataan taken from enemy dead in the Quinauan area shows enemy objectives clearly; namely, a thrust between Corps I and Corps II to the westward and occupation by landing forces of a section of the only road on western Bataan. Success would cut off most of Corps I. On the mosaic map was a notation "This road must be cut" - at a point 7 to 8 miles (30 km by winding road) in the rear of our front line. This well made map and others captured indicate that prior to the war the Japanese had thoroughly mapped all parts of the Philippines in which operations might take place. U.S. Army officers have stated that the Japs have more accurate and more detailed maps than our own. The commanding officer of each small enemy detachment carries a map or a good sketch of the area in which engaged.

An enemy activity in the vicinity of Ternate, Cavite, was bombarded today by Ft. Drum with 12 inch mortars and by Ft. Hughes with 6 inch.

Feb. 5: According to a report by two Americans (formerly Cavite Navy Yard employees) who came in today from their free lance espionage activities in Cavite Province, the firing on Ternate yesterday was not very effective although a considerable number of Japanese (and unfortunately 21 Filipinos) were killed.

ENCLOSURE (A) 19.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Feb. 6: At 0850 this morning three or more enemy guns on the Cavite coast near Ternate opened fire on Corregidor, Ft. Hughes, Ft. Drum, Ft. Frank and vessels, mostly Inshore Patrol, anchored in the South (Corregidor) bay. Shelling continued until noon. The Luzon had a direct hit in the vacant Admirals quarters; no casualties, minor damage, believed to have been a 75 although most of the shells are presumed to be 105 mm.

Ft. Drum, the "Battleship" rock was hit many times but was not seriously damaged and casualties were limited to those wounded by a premature (muzzle) explosion of one of their own shells. The enemy shifted targets so many times that it seems he was ranging for future shelling - probably in conjunction with air or land attacks or both. Aside from the three other forts, the gunboat anchorage and the south bay some shells were placed on the south dock, on "Topside" hill of Corregidor and on the Navy's communication tunnel and facilities.

The only counter action today was shelling by Ft. Hughes, Ft. Drum and Ft. Frank, all apparently ineffective. Today's shelling marks an era in the siege of Corregidor.

Feb. 7: Monkey Point (Eastern Corregidor, Naval Communication area) and the south dock area were shelled by one gun firing at 2 minute intervals from 0900 to 1000 from Cavite Province shore. The shells are set for immediate contact detonation; one hit in the road 50 yards from the principal Navy Tunnel entrance made a hole about the size of a tin hat but sprayed fragments over a considerable area. One soldier and a Filipino workman were injured during the hours shelling. This is either nuisance or ranging shelling.

Feb. 8: Both Army observers and the Navy liason officer in Bataan report sighting a cruiser of the Atago class in Subic Bay today; also a transport. As the cruiser is believed to be staying in Subic only a short time an attack with MTBs will be made tonight.

The Quinauan Pt. enemy force was at last wiped out this morning by a land and sea attack; the latter being conducted by Lt. Comdr. Goodall with two launches armed with .50 and .30 calibre M.G.s. Three Navy petty officers (including Smith, C.E., able D.I.O. investigator for the past year) were killed and 15 officers and men including Lt. Comdr. Goodall were wounded when the launches were bombed and staffed, after completion of their mission, by six enemy planes. 272 enemy dead were counted on the point, 400 believed killed (including those buried by the enemy) and 8 prisoners taken.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Feb. 8: Cont'd.

It seems that our Army is continually making plans to retreat; it is believed by this D.I.O. that the almost continuous falling back from Damortis in the north and from Tayabas in the south, beginning the first week of the war, to the reserve battle line in Bataan reached January 26th has been bad for morale and has effected the thinking and action of the higher as well as the lowest ranks. Possibly no other course was open to an Army which had to occupy Bataan to defend Corregidor and which was composed largely of raw recruits with junior officers who at worst were political appointees and at best without experience or tradition or leadership characteristics.

On or about Dec. 15th a D.I.O. officer was shocked upon being consulted by a banker in connection with the desire of a prominent U.S.A. General to destroy his security certificates which were held in the bank concerned. On Feb. 1st another Naval Officer (who has transmitted his enthusiasm and confidence to hundreds of officers and men) was surprised - "knocked-for-a-loop", he said - while in a Command Post upon hearing a Corps Commander and a Division Commander discuss the necessity of an immediate decision by USAFFE regarding the line of retreat from the present line of battle.

Ft. Frank fired 48 rounds of 12" mortars into enemy battery positions on the Cavite coast today and having the advantage of spotters with TCO sets near the enemy it is reported that at least one battery was destroyed.

Feb. 10: Ft. Drum was under fire again. Fts. Mills and Drum shelled enemy artillery positions to the south.

Last night enemy guns of 105 mm or possibly larger calibre were fired from the shore in or near Manila and some observers reported shell fire from the Bay north of Cavite. This strange enemy operation cannot be satisfactorily explained.

Feb. 11: More shell-fire in Manila Bay 10 miles east of Corregidor last night. No U.S. units concerned.

A D.I.O. special employee, a Filipino, arrived from a weeks trip from Mariveles to Pampanga - Manila - Cavite Province, returning via Ft. Frank. (Manila newspapers of Feb. 8th created a mild sensation on Corregidor.)

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SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Feb. 11: Cont'd.

The special employee reported several military targets, although only one within shelling range and we have no planes (except five P-40s) to bomb the others. He was unable to obtain any information regarding the Naval Hospital staff and patients or the condition of about 3,000 American men, women and children (from age 4 to age 60) interned at Sta Tomas University, Manila.

Army G-2 prefers that the D.I.O. restrict operations in enemy occupied areas, consequently any D.I.O. agents will be instructed to concentrate on establishing communication with the Naval Hospital - as the Army has not done so.

Six P-40s engaged six Japanese planes in a dog fight over Corregidor and vicinity today; one P-40 lost and the Army reports four or five of the enemy shot down. (Later:- Army reports all six enemy planes destroyed.) D.I.O. believes number enemy planes actually destroyed in this area to be about 60 percent of number reported.

Feb. 12: Ft. Frank (Carabao Island) shelled from Cavite coast which was shelled by Ft. Mills (Corregidor).

Feb. 19: Returned from five days in Bataan as liason officer at Corps I, H.Q. situated on the GPF artillery line in accordance with Gen. Wainwright's desire to be near his front, which he inspects frequently.

On the 17th, Corps I celebrated the destruction of the last of four enemy forces within the western Bataan lines which had at one time necessitated the use of all Corps I and a portion of USAFFE reserves. Three coast landings by the enemy and an infiltration of a regiment through the lightly held mountainous Tuol River sector were evidently designed to cut off Corps I, as indicated on a captured mosaic map. The Tuol River area was cleared the 17th after about 1,000 enemy troops had been killed in two small neighboring areas. On the 18th the area looked as though it had been devastated by a cyclone; the dense jungle growth excepting trees of some size had been cut to the ground by M.G. and mortar fire. One 15 inch diameter tree had been felled by M.G. bullets chewing half through the trunk.

ENCLOSURE (A) 22.

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DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER'S WAR DIARY
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Feb. 19: Cont'd.

Fighting was at such close ranges that no artillery could be used. Detachments from various Philippine Army units engaged in the Tuol River battle acquitted themselves with honor. A battalion of Igorotes particularly distinguished itself.

While at a front line battalion C.P. the Battalion Commander inquired regarding the long overdue arrival of a prisoner he had ordered sent to the post. All officers present had the thought one expressed to the effect that the prisoner would never arrive. Filipino soldiers have seen some of their captured fellowmen dead from Japanese bayonet wounds, with hands tied to trees, and today's incident is not the first heard of Japanese prisoners disappearing while enroute to the rear.

Feb. 21: Nine I-V(S) officers were included in a Naval detachment which departed for the Southern Philippine Islands today. Subject to the orders or permission of the unit commander, these officers were instructed to take up zone intelligence duties on the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, Leyte, Samar and possibly Mindanao where there are two U.S. (Phil.) Army Divisions.