

A BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE
71st INFANTRY DIVISION, PA


71st INFANTRY DIVISION, PA

By

LT COL BRUNO M CATALAN, PA

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1973

A BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE
71ST INFANTRY DIVISION, PHILIPPINE ARMY



by

LT. COL. PRIMITIVO M. CATALAN, PA

First Edition

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City

1973

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AFP CODE OF CONDUCT

I am a Filipino soldier. *I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.*

I am a Filipino soldier. *I will fight all forces that would destroy the freedom and independence of the Filipino people.*

I am a Filipino soldier. *I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees of my lawful superiors at all times.*

I am a Filipino soldier. *I will uphold the supremacy of civilian authority over the military in war or in peace.*

I am a Filipino soldier. *I will live and die in the true Filipino tradition of valor and honor, duty and loyalty.*

To all these, I pledge my life, my treasure and my sacred honor.

FOREWORD

This is a brief account of the organization, administration, and operations of one of the ten reserve infantry divisions of the Philippine Army that gallantly fought the enemy during the 1941-1942 Japanese invasion and conquest of the Philippines.

Covering the significant activities of the 71st Infantry Division, Philippine Army, this volume portrays vividly the indomitable courage, esprit de corps, and unflinching devotion to duty of officers and men, who tenaciously held on to their battle positions from December 1941 to 9 April 1942 when Bataan fell. Far from being complete this work can serve as the foundation of a second edition when more pertinent facts about the division have been found.

So that a more comprehensive history of the unit could be prepared, all concerned — particularly the surviving officers and men of the organization — are urged to send to the Office of the Chief of Military History, GHQ, AFP any additional information, data, or corrections to be made, if any, in this volume. Despite its apparent incompleteness, however, this historical work by Lieutenant Colonel Primitivo M. Catalan, Deputy Chief, OCMH, is a valuable contribution to Philippine Military history.

PRIMITIVO C. MILAN
Colonel, PC (GSC)
Chief of Military History, AFP

Quezon City
1 June 1973

P R E F A C E

This volume covers all significant activities of the 71st Infantry Division, PA from 23 August 1941, when the personnel of its first element, the 71st Infantry Regiment, were called to active duty by Headquarters Philippine Army; the Division's role in the defense of Luzon until Bataan's capitulation on 9 April 1942; the organization and operations of the Negros Force up to its surrender on 20 May 1942; and the 73d Infantry's participation in the defense of Mindanao.

Of great significance to the Philippine war effort against Japan during World War II was the organization of the 1st Provisional Guerrilla Regiment, one of the first units to undertake guerrilla warfare against the Japanese forces in the Philippines. The 1st Battalion, 71st Infantry Regiment, 71st Infantry Division became one of the nuclei of this organization which was granted an Army of the United States status. Even for this outstanding feat alone, the 71st Division deserves the accolade of the nation.

In writing this historical volume, the author had been handicapped in the collection of data due to the paucity of primary source materials and the loss of official records during the war in the Philippines. Much of the materials incorporated herein are pieces of information gathered from old documents available in the OCMH; historical books about the war in the Pacific; interviews with some of the officers and men of the 71st Infantry Division; and personal diaries, memoirs, sworn statements, letters and unpublished accounts of key personnel of the organization.

Grateful acknowledgement is hereby accorded to all who, directly or indirectly, had contributed to the publication of this work: Col. Primitivo C. Milan, PC (GSC), Chief of Military History, AFP for professional advice and encouragement; Col. Ambrosio P. Peña, PA (Ret), for factual editing of the manuscript and furnishing most of the annexes; Maj. Froilan B. Alviar, PAF, Administrative Officer, OCMH, for the proof-reading of the manuscript; and all the officers, enlisted men and civilian employees of OCMH, for assistance in the preparation of the manuscript. I would also like to make special mention of the Office of The Adjutant General, AFP and the Philippine Veterans Administration, Manila for their cooperation in making available all records pertinent to this project.

Special gratitude is due to TSgt Bonifacio A. Ventura for typing the manuscript; to Misses Eva M. Quiban and Erlinda G. Briz for preparing the illustrations; to MSgt Valentin Obedencio for the photographs; and to TSgt Aurelio R. Sagun for the collection of some of the source materials.

P. M. CATALAN

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The greatest obsession of the Filipinos in the last decade of the nineteenth century was their political emancipation from Spain whose rule over the country was characterized by rampant abuses, oppressive acts and corrupt practices. Sacrificing so much of their worldly possessions, their lives and property, their rights and freedom over three centuries, they had fought hard, won their independence, and were happy that their period of subjugation had come to an end.

With the coming of the Americans in 1898, the Filipinos honestly believed that they were on their way to obtain what they had aspired for. General Emilio Aguinaldo and his revolutionists collaborated with the American troops in the hope that the United States would recognize Philippine independence after the fall of the Spanish rule in the Philippines.

But the Filipino-American alliance did not last very long. The Filipino leaders believed that they were cheated by the Americans when the latter sent more occupational troops to the Philippines. The revolutionists thought they were in again for another foreign rule. President Aguinaldo would rather risk the destruction of the Philippine Republic than submit to a new master. Thus military rule was imposed in the country and it took the Americans almost three years to control the Filipino insurgents.

The Philippine Commissions

After the capture of Aguinaldo on 23 March 1898, the fires of Filipino resistance again to flicker away. Earlier in January 1898, President McKinley appointed Dr. Jacob G. Schurman Commission to investigate conditions in the provinces, the Commission, leaders of the Revolution laid down the States recommended the withdrawal of areas and that civil government take over affairs.

In March 1900, President McKinley Commission headed by Judge William

General Schurman
in September
of major general
December 1941?
Quezon City: Manila
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The Philippine Commissions

After the capture of Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901, at Palanan, Isabela, the fires of Filipino resistance against the United States began to flicker away. Earlier in January 1899, U.S. President William McKinley appointed Dr. Jacob G. Schurman to lead the First Philippine Commission to investigate conditions in the country. As most of the leaders of the Revolution laid down their arms and peace was restored in the provinces, the Commission, upon its return to the United States recommended the withdrawal of military rule in the pacified areas and that civil government take over the administration of public affairs.

In March 1900, President McKinley appointed a Second Philippine Commission headed by Judge William H. Taft. The Taft Commission

arrived in the Philippines on 3 June 1900. Unlike its predecessor which was merely an advisory body, the Taft Commission was authorized to exercise both executive and legislative functions under certain restrictions.¹

Commissioner Luke E. Wright, Vice Chairman of the Commission recognized the fact that the administration of public affairs, including the restoration and maintenance of peace, was a proper function of civil government. He recommended that an Insular Police Force patterned after that of the Canadian Mounted Police be organized to insure the success of the civil government in the Islands.

On 18 July 1901, the Commission enacted Act 175, which became the basis for the creation of the Philippine Constabulary on 8 August 1901. Henry T. Allen, USMA, Class of 1882, a regular captain but at the time a lieutenant colonel of cavalry, U.S. Army Volunteers in the Philippines, was appointed its first chief, and subsequently became brigadier general. The principal mission of the Constabulary was to maintain peace and order throughout the archipelago.

From 1904 to 1916 the Constabulary had been most concerned in curtailing serious crimes like murder, robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling and in campaigning against the lawless elements in the country. As such, it gained recognition as a national institution.²


In 1921 Governor General Leonard Wood foresaw the need for a Philippine military force. He recommended that steps be taken immediately to organize and train a Philippine Army. However, his proposal failed to draw the attention of the United States Government. Likewise, the proposal was not acceptable to the Filipino leaders because they believed that the security of the Philippines was the responsibility of the United States.

The worsening international situation, particularly in the Far East where the Japanese launched a war of aggression against China cut short such lukewarm attitude. The looming world crisis and the assurance of a forthcoming independence had awakened in the Filipinos a consciousness for military preparedness.

The first of the efforts towards this goal consisted of the passing in 1934, by the Philippine Legislature of House Bill No. 735, providing the creation of a Bureau of National Defense. Governor General

¹ With the termination of military government on 4 July 1901, Commissioner Taft became the first Civil Governor of the Philippines, and Commissioner Wright became Vice Governor. The title was later changed to Governor General by an Act of the U.S. Congress, 6 Feb. 1905.

² Col. Ambrosio P. Pena, *Bataan's Own* (Quezon City: Munoz Press Inc., 1967), p. 23.



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First American Civil Governor

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Frank Murphy vetoed the bill due to budgetary limitations. However, he pointed out that further consideration of the problem of national preparedness would make it possible for the Philippine Government to avail itself of the knowledge and aid of experts equipped by years of experience and study in the technical aspects of the military defense of the Philippines.

Senate President Manuel L. Quezon took the advice of Governor Murphy and requested the U.S. Secretary of War to recommend congressional amendment of a public law enacted in May 1926, which provided for the detail of United States Army, Naval, and Marine Corps officers to assist the South American republics. The amendment sought should make the law applicable to the Philippines.³

After his election as President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in November 1935, Quezon went to the United States to discuss with Washington authorities the subject of Philippine national defense. While in Washington, he took occasion to see General Douglas MacArthur, who was then serving an unprecedented term of five years as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. When President Quezon asked him if the Philippines were defensible, General MacArthur answered that, "any place could be defended if sufficient men, munitions and money were available, . . . that it would take a full ten years and much help from the United States if it were to be successful."⁴ When further asked if he would be willing to undertake the job, MacArthur replied in the affirmative.

With this assurance, President Quezon arranged with President Roosevelt for the detail of General MacArthur as head of a Philippine Military Mission. General MacArthur was duly relieved as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and detailed as Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government in September 1935. It was his fourth tour of duty in the Philippines.⁵

³ Capt. Ambrosio P. Pena, "Growth and Development of the AFP Traced," The Manila Times, Manila issue of December 21, 1951.

⁴ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 102.

⁵ General MacArthur first came to the Philippines after his graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1903. His second tour of duty was as brigadier general in command of the U.S. Army's District of Manila, (1922-1925). His third stint was as a major general commanding the Philippine Department (1928-1930), the highest command echelon of the U.S. Army in the Far East. He was retired in September 1937, but was recalled to active service on 26 July 1941, in the rank of major general. He was promoted to lieutenant general by the next day and on 18 December 1941, he was promoted general. (Col. Ambrosio P. Pena, *Bataan's Own* (Quezon City: Munoz Press Inc., 1967), p. 3).



HONORABLE LUKE E. WRIGHT
He recommended the establishment of an organization to be charged with the maintenance of peace and order in the Islands.

It was through MacArthur's efforts as well as those of his principal assistants, Majors Dwight D. Eisenhower and James B. Ord,⁶ that Commonwealth Act No. 1, otherwise known as the National Defense Act, was drafted and passed by the National Assembly and approved by President Quezon on 21 December 1935.

The Philippine Constitution adopted in March 1935 mandated in no mistakable terms that, "The defense of the state is a prime duty of government and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service."⁷ Thus was clearly enunciated the right of government to conscript its citizens into the military and the responsibility of each citizen to defend his country as well.⁸

Under the provisions of Section 18 of the National Defense Act, and pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Executive Order No. 11 dated 11 January 1936, the Philippine Constabulary was abolished and its units became the nuclei of the Philippine Army. President Quezon recalled to active duty Col. Jose de los Reyes, a retiree of the Philippine Constabulary, in the rank of brigadier general and designated him Acting Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army.

On that day, the Philippine Army was activated and placed under the direct control of the President of the Philippines in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the nation.⁹ The President exercised his command through the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army.

Meanwhile, it was deemed inappropriate that the Constabulary, which had been integrated into the Army should exercise police functions. On 26 October 1936, President Quezon approved Commonwealth Act No. 88 creating a State Police Force, which nationalized all police forces in the country into a separate organization. The Army was thus confined to purely military functions.

On 23 June 1938, after over a year of unsatisfactory existence, President Quezon recommended to the National Assembly the abolition of the State Police Force and the reconstitution of the Philippine Con-

⁶ Eisenhower and Ord, both of the class of 1915, USMA, were promoted to Lt. Col. in July 1936 while on duty in the Philippines.

⁷ Art. II, Sec. 2, Philippine Constitution.

⁸ This principle was also expressed by General Luna when he said in February 1899: "All Filipinos had an inalienable right to defend our soil."

⁹ Art. VII, Sec. 11 (2), Philippine Constitution 1935.



BRIG. GEN. HENRY T. ALLEN
First Chief of Constabulary

*U.S. Army Photo
Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obedencio*

stabulary as an organization, distinct and separate from the Philippine Army.¹⁰

In 1939 the Department of National Defense was created under CA No. 438 and implemented by Executive Order No. 230, dated 31 October 1939, as the President's executive agent in matters relating to national defense and security matters.

In line with the concept of civil supremacy over the military, the formulation of defense policies was placed in the hands of the Council of National Defense presided over by the President, with the following as members: the Vice-President, all cabinet members, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, and six other members appointed by the President.¹¹

¹⁰ In instituting this change, President Quezon proposed to the members of the National Assembly that the Constabulary be separated completely from the military sections of the Army to carry out police functions that devolve upon the Central Government. Thus while every officer and man in the Constabulary would be identified with the Army, he would receive his basic disciplinary training therein, and would be the possessor of those military traditions and customs that place a premium upon personal gain. The organization as a whole would be definitely separated, theoretically and practically, from the defense forces of the nation.

¹¹ Commonwealth Act No. 438, and Executive Order No. 230, series 1939.

. . . Our program of national defense must serve notice upon the world that the citizens of these Islands are not to be subjugated, that conquest of this nation cannot be accomplished short of its utter destruction, and that that destruction would involve such staggering cost to an aggressor, both in blood and gold, that even the boldest and the strongest will unerringly mark the folly of such undertaking.

— President Manuel L. Quezon



PRESIDENT MANUEL L. QUEZON
Father of Philippine National Defense

CHAPTER II

THE CITIZEN ARMY

As contemplated in the National Defense Act, the Army would train 21-year old Filipino males at an average annual rate of 40,000 so that at the end of the Commonwealth period in 1946, there would be a reserve force of 400,000 officers and men.

The Regular Force provided the training cadres that manned the more than a hundred Philippine Army Training Camps (PATC) all over the Philippines. The trainees went through the five and one half months training and upon completion of same, they were all assigned to the Reserve Force. Assignment in a reserve unit was based on the residence of the trainees.

It was General MacArthur who devised the reserve buildup, patterned after the Swiss citizen army concept. His training program started almost from the scratch. There were no campsites, no barracks and no available training cadres. There was, however, a detailed blueprint of the Filipino citizen army as contemplated in the National Defense Act, a little money, and a little of military tradition. But the enthusiastic response of the Filipinos was one sure sign of making the program a success.

In April 1936, by presidential proclamation as required by Commonwealth Act No. 1, thousands of 20-year old male Filipinos trooped to the registration centers. The number of registrants exceeded by more than four times the quota of 40,000 trainees due to be trained starting in January 1937. It was a heterogeneous group consisting of college and high school graduates, students, sons of farmers and affluent parents, and illiterates.¹

After the campsites were acquired, barracks were built and essential facilities such as a running water system, electricity, and bath and comfort rooms were installed. Many of these facilities were later to become a novelty to the big majority of the trainees who came from the rural areas and small towns.

In January 1937, the first batch of trainees born in the months of January to June 1916 reported to the 128 cadres distributed through-

¹ Interview with Col. Ambrosio P. Pena (Ref.), 10 January 1973.



GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
Military Advisor to the Philippine Commonwealth and later Commanding
General of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFPE)

*U.S. Army Photo
Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obedencio*

out the country. After training for five and one half months, they were graduated. The second batch, born in the months of July to December 1916, reported in July and graduated in December 1937.

At the PATC's the trainees were at once oriented with their new role as citizen-soldiers and of the discipline expected of them. In the mornings they were given both theoretical and practical training in the basic military subjects common to all the arms, services and branches of the army. These included Customs and Courtesies of the Service, Military Hygiene and Sanitation, Military First Aid, Interior Guard Duty and Close Order Drill.

There were also evening classes for the illiterates, to teach them at least to read and write. But it was not all military studies. In the afternoons they were engaged in various activities. Aside from the routine of policing and improving the landscape of the camp, they were engaged in some useful vocations such as carpentry, gardening, poultry and hog raising.

Athletics was a must for everyone. Unit intramurals were held regularly. The best athletes were selected to compose the regular team for bigger competitions. One night of the week, the trainees had entertainment or amateur programs in which they competed in singing, acting or boxing. Prizes in kind or money, usually donated by the camp commander and his junior officers, were given to the winners.

Army life was indeed a novel experience for a good many trainees, and their association with one another favorably generated a spirit of camaraderie. It was quite an exhilarating experience to witness the Army's new role in the democratization of the young Filipino. But more importantly, the training program was geared to produce not only good, efficient soldiers but also a conscientious and useful citizenry.²

While the training progressed, specialization set in. Under the contemplation of the law, there was at least one infantry cadre in every province except Batanes. In each military district, there was established one engineer cadre and one medical cadre. However, the latter was converted for use of the infantry since there were not enough trainees who could be profitably trained for the medical corps within the military districts. In view of this shortage, medical trainee instruction was centralized at Camp Muprhy and at the PATC, Fort McKinley, with the military districts furnishing their respective annual quota of medical trainees.

² Interview with Col. Ambrosio P. Pena (Ret.), 10 January 1973.



Brig. Gen. JOSE DE LOS REYES
First Chief of Staff, Philippine Army

Centralized training for field artillery and coast artillery was conducted at Camp Dau (later renamed Camp del Pilar), a separate camp under the direct supervision and control of HPA. Located inside the Fort Stotsenburg³ Reservation in Pampanga, Camp Dau was furnished U.S. Army-loaned pieces such as the 2.95-inch and 75-mm. and control instruments. It was an ideal artillery training camp furnished with facilities, prime movers and firing ranges available at Fort Stotsenburg, a regular Philippine Scout Cavalry and Field Artillery post. Beginning in June 1939, the coast artillery trained at Fort Wint, on Grande Island, a regular U.S. Army Coast Artillery post.

Although the initial plan was to train forty thousand men annually this was never realized on account of the continuing fiscal problem faced by the government. After the two semi-annual training courses in 1937, military instruction could be provided to only 36,601 men. Then in 1938, only 33,437 trainees were added to the Reserve Force.⁴ And with the gradual reduction in its yearly appropriations, the Army's capability to conduct trainee instruction was correspondingly reduced until the quota was cut by more than half of what the Army was originally set to train.⁵

It must be stated that from 1921 up to January 1937, the main source of reserve officers were the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) units established in four institution of collegiate level,⁶ and in 1936 the Reserve Officers Service Schools (ROSS). But the number of graduates could hardly fill the requirement of a growing trained reserve, especially when the latter would be organized into "Infantry divisions, additional separate regiments, battalions, companies and similar separate units as the President may authorize . . ."⁷

Foreseeing the need for commissioned officers in the Reserve Force, a number of selected trainee-graduates with at least a high school education could pursue the prescribed theoretical course of training for six months to qualify them as probationary 3d lieutenants. For the practical phase of their training, they were assigned with regular troops for another six months at the end of which they were commissioned as 3d lieutenants in the Reserve Force.⁸

³ Named in honor of Col. John Stotsenburg, who was killed in action in 1899, at Plaridel, Bulacan during the Fil-American war.

⁴ President Quezon, Third Annual Report, 1938, p. 10.

⁵ General MacArthur's Reminiscences, p. 115.

⁶ These schools were the National University, San Juan de Letran College, Liceo de Manila and University of the Philippines, under the supervision of the U.S. Army.

⁷ Commonwealth Act No. 1, Sec. 32.

⁸ Commonwealth Act No. 1, Sec. 34.

There was also prescribed a training for a number of selected trainee-graduates to qualify them as non-commissioned officers of the Reserve Force.⁹

Before the end of the first training period (January to June 1937), Army headquarters activated the School for Reserve Commission. Two of such schools were for the infantry, one established at the PATC at San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac to train those from Luzon, and the other at Camp Keithley, Lanao, to train the personnel from Visayas and Mindanao. Another SRC, established at Camp Dau, was to train the qualified personnel of the field artillery and coast artillery. However, when the trainee instruction for the coast artillery was later transferred to Fort Wint, another SRC was established there.


The training program was continuously conducted every year until the national emergency upset it in 1941. But by this time the Philippine Army had already organized ten reserve divisions, one per military district.

The Military Districts/Divisions

To efficiently carry out the provisions of the National Defense Act, the Philippines was divided into ten Military Districts, each under the command of a district commander from the Regular Force. The territorial organization of the districts was as follows:

- 1st Military District — Northern Luzon with headquarters at Baguio, Mountain Province;
- 2d Military District — Northern Central Luzon, with headquarters at Tarlac, Tarlac;
- 3d Military District — Central Luzon, north of Manila, with headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga;
- 4th Military District — South Central Luzon, including Manila, Mindoro and Palawan, with headquarters at Lipa, Batangas;
- 5th Military District — Bicol Peninsula, including Masbate, with headquarters at Legaspi, Albay;
- 6th Military District — Panay and Romblon Islands, with headquarters at Iloilo, Iloilo;
- 7th Military District — Negros and Siquijor Islands, with headquarters at Bacolod, Negros Occidental;

⁹ Commonwealth Act No. 1, Sec. 44.




- 8th Military District — Cebu and Bohol, with headquarters at Cebu, Cebu;
- 9th Military District — Leyte and Samar, with headquarters at Tacloban, Leyte;
- 10th Military District — Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago, with headquarters at Cagayan, Misamis Oriental.

For the purpose of national mobilization in case of threat of external aggression, it was contemplated that the reserve force of the Philippine Army would be constituted into infantry divisions.¹⁰ As a matter of fact, these divisions were drawn up on paper just as soon as enough men were trained and included in the rolls of reservists. For uniformity, these divisions were given numerical designations which would identify them with the districts from which their personnel had come. Thus in 1941, when the Philippine Army was inducted into the USAFFE, it had ten reserve divisions; the 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st Divisions, belonging to the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th Military Districts, respectively.

In the case of the 71st Division, the first digit 7 stood for 7th Military District, while the second digit 1 indicated that this division was the first to be organized from among the reservists of the 7th Military District. Similarly, in the case of the 81st Division, the first number 8 represented the 8th Military District, while the second digit 1 denoted that this was the first division organized in the district.

¹⁰ Commonwealth Act No. I, Art. V.



GENERAL MACARTHUR after inducting the Philippine Army Air Corps (PAAC) into the the USAFFE on 15 August 1941

“Only those are fit to live who are not afraid to die.”

CHAPTER III

CREATION OF THE USAFFE

In view of the latest international development, the U.S. War Department favorably considered General MacArthur's recommendation for the establishment of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, better known as the USAFFE.¹

Thus on 26 July 1941, under pertinent provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, President Roosevelt called into the service of the United States Army "all the organized military forces of the Government of the Philippines" and ordered that they be merged with the United States Army. General MacArthur was recalled to active duty and was designated Commanding General of the USAFFE.²

After his assumption of command, General MacArthur evolved a general plan for the integration of all armed forces in the Philippines. It envisioned a progressive incorporation of the reserve divisions of the Philippine Army into the service of the United States, but until an actual outbreak of hostilities it would not include those echelons which were engaged in the normal yearly training activities. This would enable the Philippine Army to continue its uniform development in accordance with the national defense program of the Commonwealth and at the same time muster for prompt American Army training and service the components of the Commonwealth forces. The Constabulary would not be taken over with the exception of certain selected elements.³

The plan also envisioned the immediate construction of barracks at strategic localities to house the thousands of reservists mobilized as well as the intensive development of new airfields for the expanding air force. All Philippine elements which would come under American control would maintain their national integrity. They would

¹ Annex "E"

² Annex "F"

³ In July 1941, HPC activated the 1st and 2d PC Regiments out of the General Service Troops at Camp Crame, Quezon City, while the 3d PC Regiment was organized at Camp Keithley, Lanao in September 1941. These three regiments were inducted into the USAFFE prior to the war. On 6 Jan 42, the 4th PC Regt, which was constituted by all PC units withdrawn to Bataan together with the 1st and 2d PC Regiments were formed into the 2d Regular Division, PA, while the 3d Regiment remained in Mindanao.

retain their uniform, their own scale of pay and their own promotion list. Their training however, would be under the immediate direction of the officers of the U.S. Army. On muster into the USAFFE service, they would be paid and supplied by the American government.

The Philippine Army was placed on war-footing since events in Europe and especially in the Far East portended that eventually the United States and the Philippines would be involved in the conflict then raging. The United States must buttress her defenses in her far-flung frontiers if she was to insure the security of her territories. Toward this end, the American military planners moved fast in an effort to race against time.

Initially, it was planned that all the divisions of the Philippine Army, patterned after the American Army's triangular division, would be called for duty with the USAFFE, their activation to be effected progressively until all of the divisions would be at full strength. American officers, including some from the Philippine Scouts, were assigned as inducting officers. To synchronize the training of the units inducted, there was a number of U.S. Army personnel assigned to each of the PA Divisions as instructors and unit advisers, generally on the basis of one officer and two enlisted men per battalion or to special companies, such as the medical and combat companies.


The first regiments of each division were inducted on 1 September 1941, and after induction training immediately began. The second regiments reported in November, while the last regiments were mobilized on 15 December.

With the ten divisions having been mobilized, they were assigned cantonments at the following places: 11th Division at San Fabian, Pangasinan; 21st Division at Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac; 31st Division at San Marcelino, Zambales; 41st Division at Tagaytay, Cavite; 51st Division at San Pablo, Laguna-Rosario-Lipa, Batangas; 61st Division at Dingle, Iloilo; 71st Division less the 73d Infantry at Camp O'Donnell, Capas, Tarlac; 81st Division at Carmen, Bohol; 91st Division less the 93d Infantry at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija; and the 101st Division at Malaybalay, Bukidnon.


In line with his concept of ground defense, in November 1941, General MacArthur divided his Fil-American forces into four major tactical commands. These were the North Luzon Force under Brig. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr. later relieved by Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright; the South Luzon Force under Brig. Gen. George M. Parker, Jr.;⁴ the Visayas-Mindanao Force under Col. William F. Sharp;⁵ the Harbor Defense under Brig. Gen. George M. Moore for the defense of Manila Bay and Subic Bay.

⁴ Promoted to Major General on 18 Dec 41.

⁵ Promoted to Brigadier General on 18 Dec 41, and to Major General on 2 April 1942. Moore and King also became Major General, 18 Dec 41.



GENERAL PARKER inducting Filipino troops into the service of the USAFFE on 17 November 1941.



U.S. Army Photo
Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obeden

The most important defense preparation to be undertaken in the Philippines was the organization into major tactical commands the ground forces, which would constitute the main striking force of the USAFFE. By far, however, the most serious problem that had confronted General MacArthur was the command setup of the ten Philippine Army reserve divisions, which were in the process of mobilization. There was a dearth of general officers who could be assigned as division commanders; likewise, there was not one colonel of field artillery available for assignment as regimental commander of any of the ten field artillery regiments of the Philippine Army divisions.⁶ Field grade FA officers in the Philippine Army were sadly lacking and in fact, there were only seven of them, six of whom were Philippine Scout officers who had accepted commissions in the Philippine Army, in assimilated ranks of one or two grades higher than their ranks in the U.S. Army.⁷ But the highest command these officers had ever had was a battery. Then, too, only three of them could be reassigned to field artillery units.

Under this circumstance, General MacArthur had to draw from among the senior American colonels on duty with either the U.S. Army's Philippine Division or the Philippine Department for assignment as Philippine Army division commanders. When this source was exhausted, MacArthur had to draw from the Philippine Army Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim, the first Filipino graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, class of 1914, who was then the incumbent deputy chief of staff, PA, and three senior colonels, Luther R. Stevens, Guy O. Fort, and Mateo M. Capinpin, for assignment as division commanders. Although Americans, Stevens and Fort were old-timers of the Philippine Constabulary. Lt. Colonels Nemesio Catalan, Amado Martelino, and Victor Z. Gomez were also drawn for reassignment as field artillery commanders.

On 29 September, a Division Staff School was activated at Camp Allen in Baguio, with Col. Clifford Bluemel, the most senior American officer due for assignment as a PA division commander, named as commandant, assisted by Colonels William E. Brougher and Albert M. Jones, to be joined later by Col. Clyde A. Selleck. To this school were detailed as student officers all of the future division commanders, their chiefs and assistant chiefs of staffs as well as the commanders of the field artillery regiments. The course of instruction on command and staff procedure was abbreviated to enable the officers in attendance to take over their respective commands and assignments as had earlier been scheduled.

⁶ Interview with Col. Ambrosio P. Pena (Ret.), 10 January 1973.

⁷ As of November 1941 the officers were: Colonels Fidel V. Segundo and Salvador F. Reyes, Lt. Colonels Nemesio Catalan, Alejandro D. Garcia, Victor Z. Gomez and Amado Martelino, all of the PS, and Lt. Col. Calixto Duque, PA.

At the time USAFFE headquarters was organized, the Philippines became a beehive of military activities. In July, the U.S. Army had 19,748 combat troops in the Philippine Department which was composed of the 31st (US), 45th (PS), 57th (PS) Infantry Regiments and the 23d, 24th 88th FA (PS) and four Coast Artillery Regiments, the 59th, 60th, 91st and 92d CAC. However, with the activation of the USAFFE more American units arrived. Among these were an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, two tank battalions, and other miscellaneous support and service elements. With these new arrivals, U.S. Army troops in the Philippines totalled 31,095 officers and men. Later, more American servicemen came to reinforce the Air Force units.

At the outbreak of the war there were 35 Flying Fortresses (B-17's) and 240 fighter aircrafts of the U.S. Army Air Corps operating in the Philippines. These were organized under the Far East Air Force Command commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry B. Claggett who was later relieved by Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. The Philippine Army Corps with its twenty aircrafts and 500 officers and men was attached to this command.⁸

The US Asiatic Fleet under Admiral Thomas Hart provided the Naval Complement.⁹ Comparatively substantial though it seemed, the Asiatic Fleet was no match for the Japanese combined fleet. Thus, Washington naval authorities conceived that in the event of war, the U.S. Fleet would retire south of the Philippine waters and join up with the ABDA Powers (Americans, British, Dutch and Australia). It was deemed that their combined strength would give them a fighting chance against the Japanese naval forces.

On 23 December, General MacArthur activated the Bataan Defense Force to prepare the grounds of Bataan for a last-ditch stand as envisioned in War Plan Orange 3.¹⁰

⁸ Louis G. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, OCMH. (Washington, D.C. 1953), pp. 32-33.

⁹ The US Asiatic Fleet consisted of the flagship, *Houston*, the heavy cruiser, the light cruiser, *Marblehead*, 13 destroyers, 17 submarines, 24 PBV aircrafts, 4 seaplane tenders, 7 tenders, 7 gunboats, 6 minesweepers and for its ground force, the 4th U.S. Marines.

¹⁰ When asked by a friend if his troops were ready, General MacArthur was quoted to have replied: "We are doing everything humanly possible with what we have at our command. We need more. But my men are every inch fighters; they will contest every foot of the ground. We must not fail. Too much of the world's future depends on what may happen here. These islands may not be the door to control the Pacific; they may not even be the lock to the door — but surely they are the key to the lock that opens the door for America. I cannot allow that key to be lost." (Francis T. Miller, *General Douglas MacArthur*, (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Co., 1945), p.200.)

CHAPTER IV

THE 71ST DIVISION ORGANIZED

Like the other nine Reserve Divisions of the Philippine Army, the 71st was organized on paper from the personnel of the 7th Military District. Before it became a Division, the 7th MD was composed of seven (7) infantry cadres and three (3) special cadres — one (1) Engineer, one (1) MG, and (1) Medical. The personnel came from the provinces of Occidental Negros, Oriental Negros and the island of Siquijor.

Pursuant to orders issued by Headquarters, Philippine Army dated 4 August 1941, the first batch of officers and key men of the 71st Division was called to active duty on 23 August 1941.

71st Infantry Regiment

The first call constituted the full complement of the 71st Infantry Regiment. They were inducted into the USAFFE on 1 September 1941, at Fabrica, Occidental Negros by Lt. Col. Donald Van Bonnet, who was assigned as Commanding Officer of the same unit. The following officers composed his staff and battalion commanders: Major Duran, Executive Officer; Maj. Jacinto Aguila, Adjutant & S-1; Lt. Bienvenido Padilla, S-2; Lt. Epifanio Liberal, S-3; Capt. Simeon D. Yra, S-4; Capt. Guillermo Nakar, CO, 1st Bn; Capt. Jose V. H. Banzon, CO, 2d Bn; Capt. Fernando Nicolas, CO, 3d Bn.

After induction into the USAFFE, some of the elements of the regiment moved to Mambucal, Negros Occidental, while others remained at Fabrica. Then they began a two-and-a-half months training with U.S. Army officers and enlistedmen as instructors.

In September 1941, the 71st Regiment was ordered to Luzon, cutting short the training of personnel. The Regimental Staff and Hq & Hq Co left Bacolod aboard SS *Don Esteban* on 13 September, arriving in Manila two days later. They proceeded by rail to Camp O'Donnell, Capas, Tarlac and became the first occupants of this historic camp. The rest of the Regiment left Pulupandan on aboard the SS *Corregidor*. Upon completion of movement to Capas, the whole regiment resumed training.

72d Infantry Regiment

The officers and key men of the 72d Infantry Regiment, 71st Division were called to active duty on 28 August, at the Philippine Army Training Camp in Magallon, Isabela, Negros Occidental and were inducted into the USAFFE on 1 September 1941, by Captain Pahl, US Army.

Immediately after induction, the unit began training in infantry and artillery tactics. However, before the end of October, the key enlistedmen were sent to the different mobilization centers to organize the three battalions. The 1st and 3d Battalions were organized in Magallon, while the 2d Battalion was organized in Mambucal. To complete the strength of the 72d Infantry, recruits were inducted on 1 November 1941. Some days later the 3d Battalion moved to Tanjay, Negros Oriental for training.

Like the 71st Infantry, the 72d sailed for Luzon arriving at Camp O'Donnell, Capas, Tarlac for cantonment. Training was resumed upon arrival thereat.


The 72d Infantry had been under three commanders namely: Col. Lloyd Biggs from 1 Sep-29 Dec 41; Col. Irving Campton, from 30 Dec-15 Feb 42; and Col. Virgil N. Cordero, from 16 February to the day of surrender on 9 April 1942. The battalion commanders were Major Caswell, 1st Bn; Captain Sofronio Jimenia, 2d Bn; and Captain Johnson, 3d Bn. The regiment had a total strength of 98 officers and 1747 EM.

71st Division Headquarters

On 1 November 1941, Colonel Van Bonnet organized the 71st Division Headquarters. Seventeen days later, Col. Clyde A. Selleck¹ together with some officers who finished a one-month course of instruction at the Division Staff School in Baguio City arrived in Camp O'Donnell.

¹ Basically trained as a field artillery officer, Selleck must have been sadly frustrated with this deplorable situation, particularly of the artillery. Born in Vermont in 1888, Selleck entered the U.S. Military Academy at the age of eighteen. He graduated in June 1910 and was commissioned as 2d lieutenant of field artillery. During World War I, he was promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel, which rank was made permanent only in October 1934, and was promoted to colonel in April 1939. Colonel Selleck was quite familiar with the citizen army concept, for as a major he was assigned with the U.S. Militia Bureau from June 1927 to 1931.

In 1926 Selleck completed the Advanced Course at the Field Artillery School, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Shortly before his assignment with the Militia Bureau, he graduated from the Command and General Staff School, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was one of the few regular officers of the U.S. Army detailed to attend, and from which he graduated, the American top military education institution, the Army War College. (Interview with Col. Ambrosio Pena (Ret), 10 January 73)



Brig. Gen. CLYDE A. SELLECK
Commanding General, 71st Infantry Division, PA

U.S. Army Photo
Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obdenoio

Colonel Selleck assumed command of the 71st Division, PA, and designated the following as staff officers: Maj. William O. Collins, Adviser; Col. Salvador F. Reyes,² Chief of Staff; Maj. Juan C. Relosa, ACofS, G-1 & Adj. Gen.; Maj. Felix Maniego, ACofS, G-2; Lt. Col. Pedro San Diego, ACofS, G-3; and Maj. Severino Obaña, ACofS, G-4; Lt. Col. Daniel Victoria, Div. QM officer; Lt. Col. Manuel de Luna, Div. Surgeon; Capt. Leonardo Lucena, Div. JAG; Capt. Jose Miranda, Div. Chaplain; Capt. Artemio Malabayabas, Div. Supply Officer; Capt. Santiago Ledesma, Div. Provost Marshal; 1st Lt. Jaime Mascardo, Div. Finance Officer; Capt. Hector R. Franco, Div. Engr. Officer; 1st Lt. Cipriano Flores, Div. Vet. Officer; and Capt. Luis Alba, Div. Comm. O. Appointed as Aide-de-Camp was 3d Lt. Francisco Gallego but was replaced later by 2d Lt. Juan F. Hernandez.

The 73d Infantry Regiment

The 73d Infantry Regiment was organized on 25 August 1941. Three days later, seventy-eight officers led by Capt. Juan K. Taduran and some 20 key enlistedmen were called to active duty at Camp Leon Kilat and inducted into the USAFFE on 1 September 1941, by Capt. Eugene B. Hicker. After induction, the regiment moved to Magallon for specialized training while some of the key men were sent to Fabrica.

On November 1941, the 73d Infantry Regiment was mobilized to full wartime strength and the new personnel were inducted into the USAFFE on 15 December. Maj. Robert H. Vessey was assigned commanding officer and the following officers as his staff and battalion commanders: Capt. Stephen M. Byars, Ex-O; 2d Lt. Monico V. Ausejo, S1 & Adj; 2d Lt. Alfredo Tomada, Asst Adj; 1Lt. Perfecto Arribas, S-2; 1Lt. Emilio P. Arboleda, S-3; Capt. Leodegario Ramos, S-4; 2d Lt. Timoteo S. Oracion, Asst. S-4; Capt. Stephen M. Byars, CO, Hq Bn; 1Lt. Simplicio O. Mamicpic, Ex-O & later CO Hq Bn; 1Lt Albert F. Chase, CO, 1st Bn; 1Lt. Jack M. Lare, CO., 2d Bn; 2d Lt. John W. Stephens, CO, 3d Bn; and 3Lt. Simeon Figalan, Signal Officer.

² Col. Salvador F. Reyes, of Ilocos Sur, chief of staff of the 71st Division, was also a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, class of August 1917, whose graduation was advanced by nearly ten months on account of the United States' entry into the World War I, in April 1917. Commissioned as 2d lieutenant of infantry following his graduation, he was promoted up to the temporary rank of captain, which rank he held up to 1922. By Congressional acts of June 30 and September 14, 1922, he was honorably discharged as captain of infantry and was extended a new appointment as 1st lieutenant on 18 November 1922. He later transferred to the field artillery and was promoted to captain, 6 January 1927; to major, 1 July 1936. In that year, although still in the active service of the Philippine Scouts, he accepted a commission in the Philippine Army with the assimilated rank of colonel. Prior to his detail in the Division Staff School, Colonel Reyes was deeply involved in military training of the Filipino young men, as he was assigned Superintendent of ROTC. (Interview with Col. Ambrosio P. Pena (Ret.), 10 January 1973.

On 7 January 1942, the Regiment was attached to the 81st Division, PA in Mindanao. The 1st Battalion took the SS Luzon direct to Iligan, Lanao, while the 2d and 3d Battalions boarded MS *Agustina* from San Carlos, Negros Occidental passing through Tagbilaran, Bohol and then to Iligan. The 73d participated in the defense of Mindanao until the date of surrender.³

71st Field Artillery Regiment

The officers and key men of the 71st FA were called to active duty on 28 August at Camp Leon Kilat, and were inducted on 1 September, by Colonel Van Bonnet. After induction, they were sent to Pulupandan where they boarded the MS *Princess of Negros* for Luzon. They arrived at Camp del Pilar, Fort Stotsenburg Reservation at Dau, Pampanga on 3 September, where they had a two-and-a-half months training.

However, even before the course was finished, some of them were sent back to Negros to receive the rest of the regiment who were later called to active duty to complete the strength of the unit.

At Camp del Pilar, the 71st FA was fully organized under Maj. Halstead C. Fowler as commanding officer. With him were three American officer-assistants namely: Maj. Lynman F. Mears, Lt. Tate and Lt. Platt. Other officers were: Capt. Carmelo Z. Barbero, Regt'l Ex-O; 2Lt Antonio San Agustin, S-2 & S-3; 3Lt. John Lim, S-4; 3Lt. Napoleon Nasal, Motor Officer, 3Lt. Isidro Gatmaitan, CO, Hqs Btry; 3Lt. Gregorio Katimbang, CO, 1st Bn; 1Lt. Eriberto Ignacio, CO, 2d Bn; and 2Lt. David Lopez, CO, 3d Bn. The 71st FA Regiment got priority in the Division's allocation of arms and equipment.

As finally constituted, the components of the 71st Division were inducted at the place and date as follows:

Units	Place of Induction	Date of Induction
71st Inf Regt	Fabrica, Negros Occ	1 September 1941
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73d Inf Regt	Tanjay, Negros Oriental	15 December 1941
71st Div Hqs	Binalbagan, Negros Occ	17 November 1941
71st Div Sv Trps	Binalbagan, Negros Occ	17 November 1941
71st Mtr Trans Co	Binalbagan, Negros Occ	17 November 1941
71st FA	Isabela, Negros Occ	24 November 1941
71st Med Bn	Binalbagan, Negros Occ	1 December 1941

³ Participation of the 73d Infantry in Mindanao is discussed in Chapter XIII.

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71st FA	Isabela, Negros Occ	24 November 1941
71st Med Bn	Binalbagan, Negros Occ	1 December 1941

³ Participation of the 73d Infantry in Mindanao is discussed in Chapter XIII.

By 17 November all of the headquarters of the ten Philippine Army reserve divisions were activated in their assigned cantonments, upon assumption of command of their respective commanders: Col. William E. Brougher, 11th; Col. Mateo Capinpin, 21st; Col. Clifford Bluemel, 31st; Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim, 41st; Col. Albert M. Jones, 51st; Col. Bradford G. Chynoweth, 61st; Col. Clyde A. Selleck, 71st; Col. Guy O. Fort, 81st; Col. Luther R. Stevens, 91st; and Col. Joseph P. Vachon, 101st Division.

On 9 December, President Quezon authorized the promotion of Stevens, Fort and Capinpin to brigadier general, while the American division commanders were promoted to brigadier general on 18 December. The 71st Division had its cantonments and training area at Camp O'Donnell, Capas, Tarlac, a U.S. military reservation.

General MacArthur had foreseen that should war come the most decisive actions would be fought on Luzon. He had therefore shifted the 71st and 91st Divisions from the Visayas to Luzon. The third infantry regiments of these two divisions, the 73d and 93d, were still in the process of mobilization during the last week of November and were not able to join their parent units on Luzon as their movement to Luzon became untenable following the outbreak of war on the second week of December.

Training, Supply and Equipment

While the task forces of the USAFFE, the North Luzon Force, South Luzon Force, and Visayas-Mindanao Force were in the process of organization, it became evident that the artillery pieces requisitioned earlier in August were not at all forthcoming from the United States. Thus General MacArthur deferred the activation of the Coast Artillery Command, intended for the protection of the Philippine inland seas and straits, particularly in the Visayas and Mindanao, although the latter had been established as early as August. USAFFE headquarters had to improvise measures to resolve the shortage of trained field artillery personnel and the fact that the Philippine Army had only forty-eight 75-mm. guns, very few of which were provided with speed adapters. A special Table of Organization and Equipment was therefore prepared so as to utilize as effective as possible the Philippine Army's field artillery regiments.

While it was true that the new special table of organization, equipment and distribution for the PA field artillery regiment retained the three battalions, each was only authorized a headquarters and headquarters battery and two firing batteries instead of three. Moreover, instead of providing the same type of armaments for the battalions the new table of organization and equipment provided for the 1st battalion to be equipped with 75-mm. guns, the 2d battalion

with 2.95-inch guns, and the 3d battalion with 81-mm. mortars. The regimental strength was reduced by approximately twenty-five per cent of its normal requirement of officers and enlisted personnel.⁴

Fortunately for the 71st Division, along with the 21st, 41st, and 91st Divisions, it was given the highest priority in the mobilization program largely on account of their future employment in the defense scheme of Luzon. The 21st and 41st Divisions were to be employed in the provinces of Pangasinan and Batangas, respectively, along the beaches of Lingayen Gulf and Nasugbu Bay, the most likely landing areas in the event of an invasion of Luzon. The 71st and 91st Divisions, on the other hand, were constituted into the reserve force of the USAFFE. Each of the field artillery regiments of these four divisions were allocated at least sixteen 75-mm. guns, most of which were mountain guns (pack), the total of which comprised more than one-half of the number of artillery pieces in the Ordnance depot of the Philippine Department. As a consequence, the 61st, 81st, and 101st FA Regiments could not be issued a single artillery piece, but had to be equipped with machine guns and rifles just as the infantry regiment. The 11th, 31st, and 51st FA regiments had each at most enough places to equip two firing batteries. Later, on Bataan most of the artillery battalions were equipped to fight as infantry.⁵

Best Cadres

While still in Negros the elements of the 71st Division had vigorous training. It is worthwhile to mention here that the officers and EM cadres of the 7th MD were adjudged by Army Headquarters as the best cadres in the entire Philippine Division. For several years, the 71st Engineers (Cadre No. 4) under 1Lt. Pedro J. Bitanga was rated as the best not only in the 7th Military District, but among all Engineer cadres in the country.⁶

During the training period in Negros, the ten cadres were given ratings to determine their relative standing among the cadres.⁷

As early as the date of induction, the 71st Division had encountered problems of supply and equipment. These became greater upon their arrival in Luzon. The cantonment at Camp O'Donnell was far from complete. There was only one good road inside the camp. The others could only be used by pedestrians and not by vehicles.

⁴ Interview with Col. Ambrosio P. Pena, (Ret). 10 January 1973.

⁵ Interview with Col. Ambrosio P. Pena (Ret). 10 January 1973.

⁶ Annex B

⁷ Annexes A, C, & D.

The housing area for the 71st Infantry was only about two-thirds finished, while that for the 72d Infantry was only partially started. There were a few building materials for a hospital and barracks for the troops but these were inadequate.

There were no other buildings except for a small bamboo shack to house the Red Cross personnel. There were only two small sheds used as the mess hall and another small building to store the equipment.

There were no water facilities. Two wells had been drilled and two concrete tanks were built but only one small pump was operating. There were not enough pipes to supply water to even half of the camp. Showers were still in the planning stage.

Latrines were of the open pit variety. The area was badly littered and contaminated with the refuse of the workers.

Electricity was not available. The only lighting in camp was by lanterns and candles—a great fire hazard in bamboo shacks with grass roofs. There was only one telephone line connecting the Division Headquarters with higher headquarters. Interior communication was also inadequate.

Food was procured locally by each unit until the Division QM took charge of the consolidated messing of personnel.

Not a piece of furniture was supplied — no tables, chairs, filing cabinets, blackboards or beds. Everything had to be made in rush.

There were no fields for close order drill instructions or physical training. There were no ranges for small arms.

The 71st Infantry personnel were equipped with Enfield rifles and a few light machine guns. There was terrible shortage of ammunition and hand grenades. There were heavy MGs but without carts, 2 Stokes Mortars also without carts, a minimum of wire and field telephones and antiquated radio equipment.

There was only one staff car and no other means of transportation in the 71st Infantry. In fact, the whole Division had only two sedans, two staff cars, one jeep, one 1/2 ton truck, three ambulances and 15 cargo trucks.

The 71st FA had only sixteen British 75-mm. guns and eight 2.95-inch mountain guns. It had no unit equipment and lacked fire control instruments, telephones, wires and radio. Cadres trained at Camp del Pilar did not have service practice nor training in combined problems with the Infantry.⁸

⁸ Interview with Col. Ambrosio P. Pena (Ret.) 10 January 1973.

The 71st Engineer Battalion, the best unit in the Division while still in Negros, had practically no combat training in their new cantonment. Instead, they worked on roads inside the camp. The Engineers had a fair amount of organization equipment, but that they had no transportation facility.

The 71st Medical Battalion (Ambulance) which had training at Fort McKinley had been reorganized. But it could not operate efficiently as it had only 3 ambulances and practically no other organizational equipment.

All troops wore a distinctly training uniform—pitch helmets, cotton shirts with half sleeves, khaki shorts, a pair of blue denim fatigues and cloth-shoes with rubber soles. Most had a raincoat; all had one Ilocano blanket each.

No steel helmets or intrenching materials were ever issued. Identification tags were improvised from ammunition shells.

Such was the grave problem of the troops even as they girded for war. But the men had high morale, all aware that they were doing it for the service of the country.

MORALE

The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul, are everything. Unless the soldier's soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and fail himself and his commander and his country in the end.

It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the issue. It is morale that wins the victory.

Morale is the state of mind. It is steadfastness and courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. It is élan, esprit de corps and determination.

It is staying power, the spirit which endures to the end — the will to win.

With it all things are possible; without it, everything like planning, preparation and production, count for naught.

— General GEORGE C. MARSHALL

CHAPTER V

WORLD WAR II

Japanese Bombings

At 0230 on Monday, 8 December 1941, Headquarters USAFFE officially announced that Pearl Harbor in Hawaii had been seriously attacked by planes and submarines from unknown bases. In Hawaii it was Sunday morning on 7 December. But war did not become a reality in the Philippines until the bombing of Davao by naval planes which took off from the Ryujo, a Japanese carrier. Then at 0800 a large formation of hostile aircraft was reported over Northern Luzon from the China Sea flying southward.

The U.S. 20th Pursuit Squadron was then at Nielson Field; the 17th Pursuit Squadron which was based at Clark Field was on reconnaissance over Northern Luzon; the 21st was at del Carmen Field, Rosales, Pangasinan; and the 3d Pursuit Squadron was at Iba, Zambales.

The formation was later reported to have altered its course, flew north towards Baguio, bombed Camp John Hay and then flew towards Formosa. At high noon, 1217, the enemy dropped tons of explosives at Clark Field. The bombing lasted for fourteen minutes. Clark Field was demolished.¹

The attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States Congress to a special session on the next day, 8 December (9 December in

¹ A gruesome pen-picture of the raid on Clark Field was written by Lt. Col. Allison Ind, Intelligence Section of the Far East Air Force, USAFFE as follows: "The first wave of enemy aircraft had hardly lifted itself away from the rising pall of flame-charged smoke when the next wave roared into the kill. This time it was not so much the bombs as the strafing. With a din of worlds colliding, the gun of the defenders and the bombs and guns of the attackers blazed heat and lead into each other. The screams of the hurt rose even above the crash of battle. Not all came from American and Filipino victims. Again and again the steaming tracers from the ground defense guns drilled their hot way into and through Nipponese ships and their occupants, and together they crashed to the earth. Twice, two of them plunged their flaming comets into the ground at identical moments." (Allison Ind, Bataan: The Judgment Seat, The McMillan Company, New York, 1944, p. 100.)

the Philippines). After hearing President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's message Japan was declared an aggressor nation.²

With the declaration of war against Japan, the United States ordered all her armed forces to defend her interests in the Pacific. The Philippines immediately cast her lot with the United States in the war which was to attain global proportions.

Earlier in September 1941, a fighter-bomber task force from the Japanese Navy, named the Taiwan Flotilla, was organized and started training. It was all the more intensive because there was to be land-based assault, which meant considering the factors of air raids, fuel for fighting and for reserves, as they would be required to fly nonstop for some 1,000 to 1,200 miles.³

In November, indicators of Japanese naval movements towards the Philippines and Hawaii were already obvious. The relation between the United States and Japan had become so worse that General Douglas MacArthur, American military commander in the Far East and Admiral Thomas Hart, American Naval Commander in the Pacific had been warned by Washington to prepare for any eventuality.

On 2 December 1941, the first Japanese reconnaissance planes were sent over the Philippines. On 4 and 5 December, the Japanese planes returned and took photographs of Clark and Iba Fields, and of other major installations over Manila. Japanese photographs over Clark showed thirty-two B-17 bombers, three medium-sized aircrafts, and seventy-two fighter planes. But the Japanese were not alone in the game. American planes flew over Formosa during the period.⁴

To facilitate the seizure of the Philippines and other objectives in Southeast Asia, Japan had to gain mastery of both the air and the sea. This was to be accomplished by simultaneous air strikes on selected targets. The objectives of these air operations were: firstly, to neutralize the United States Pacific Fleet and thereby gain control of American lines of supply and communications, and secondly: to reduce the allied advance bases to facilitate seizure of strategic areas and islands. The destruction of the U.S. Fleet and the Naval Base

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CAPTAIN JESUS VILLAMOR
The Best of the Filipino Aces during World War II

in Hawaii would secure the first objective, while air attacks on U.S. bases in Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines would secure the second. All these aerial attacks were to be launched simultaneously to effect surprise and minimize Allied opposition.⁵

The destruction of the airfields in the Philippines had been a much-debated issue. Principal responsibility for having the planes caught on the ground and for their poor dispersal on the airfields had never been established. Suffice it to say that when the Japanese flew over Clark Field at noon of 8 December, they caught the Americans flatfooted. When the enemy raiders left, Clark Field and the planes based there went in shambles, flaming and smoking.

Filipino Aces

The first Japanese plane casualties during World War II in the Philippines were inflicted on the hostile air formation that attacked Clark Field. 2d Lt Randall Keator, one of the officers in the pursuit flight which intercepted the enemy, recorded this exploit. Alone, he attacked the nearest three planes and quickly brought down two of them until his gas and ammunition ran low, and he went down in flames himself.

On 10 December, Zablán Field at Camp Murphy, Quezon City was raided by enemy planes. Despite overwhelming odds, five P-26's led by Capt. Jesus Villamor of the Philippine Army Air Corps, took off under heavy strafing and engaged the enemy. In this battle, one enemy plane was shot down in aerial combat and another was destroyed by ground fire. For this feat, Captain Villamor was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism which was a conspicuous example of courage and leadership.

Another ace, 2d Lt. Cesar Basa, also of the PAAC, engaged the enemy planes in another dog fight. He was returning from mission when his plane went out of gas and he bailed out. While getting down he was surrounded by seven Japanese Zeroes and was shot down.⁶

The Philippine Army Air Corps was cited for performance of armed reconnaissance, courier and interception missions under heavy odds.⁷

Also among those who were cited was 1st Lt. Osmundo Mondoñedo. He attacked the Japanese landing force at Legaspi on 12 December, which then was covered by fifty-four enemy aircrafts.

⁵ The War Against Japan, Published by U.S. Military Academy, 1948 pp. 9-10. Another good source is Gordon W. Spranne's article "Tora, Tora, Tora," the untold story behind Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Readers Digest, November, 1963.

⁶ Annex S.

⁷ Jose D. Ramos, "History of the PAF," PAF Magazine, I (May, 1948), pp. 28-30.



GENERAL JONATHAN M. WAINWRIGHT
 Commanding General of the North Luzon Force and later of the
 United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP)

*U.S. Army Photo
 Reproduced by MSgt. V. Ober...*

USAFFE Troops Mobilized

The USAFFE's ground force was well dispersed and tactically deployed. But with its air arm crippled, the commanders could only guess where the enemy's next blow would land.

On 3 December 1941, the USAFFE which was formed on 26 July 41, had been completely organized under the command of General MacArthur.⁸ His staff was composed of Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Richard K. Sutherland as Chief of Staff; Col. Richard J. Marshall⁹ as Deputy Chief of Staff; Col. Charles P. Stivers as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1; Col. Charles A. Willoughby as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. Allan C. McBride as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3; Col. Constance L. Irwin as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4; Brig. Gen. Edward P. King, Artillery Officer; and Col. Carl H. Seals as Adjutant General.

Aside from being CG, USAFFE, General MacArthur was also the Commanding General of the Philippine Department. The members of his staff were Col. Allan C. McBride as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and Lt. Col. P. A. Brawner as Assitant Chief of Staff, G-4.

Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright was in command of the North Luzon Force (NLF). It was composed of the 11th Division, (PA); 21st Division, (PA); 31st Division, (PA); 31st Infantry Regiment, (US); 192d Tank Battalion, (US); 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry Regiment (PS); 26th Cavalry Regiment, (PS); 23d Field Artillery Regiment; 83th Field Artillery Regiment, (PS); and 66th Pack Troop, (PS). Later the 71st Division, (PA) and 91st Division, (PA) were also assigned to the NLF.

The North Luzon Force was assigned the most critical sector in the country, including part of Central Plain, Lingayen Gulf, the Zambales Coast and Bataan Peninsula. Later the Bataan Defense Command was created during the early phase of the general withdrawal of the USAFFE in order to defend Zambales and Bataan.

Brig. Gen. George M. Parker was in command of the South Luzon Force (SLF). Under it were the 41st and 51st Divisions, (PA); an FA Battery; 194th Tank Battalion (US); 86th Field Artillery Regiment (PS); 1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment, (PA); and later 1st Regular Division, (PA).

The SLF was given the responsibility to defend the general area south and east of Manila. It had the same broad mission as the NLF.

⁸ Combat History Division, AFWESPAC, *Triumph in the Philippines, I* (Manila, 1946), pp. 41-44.

⁹ Colonels Marshall and McBride and all the Division Commanders who were still colonels were promoted to brigadier general on 18 December 1941.



BRIG. GEN. GEORGE M. PARKER
Commanding General, South Luzon Force and later
of the II Philippine Corps

*U.S. Army Photo
Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obedencio*



BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM F. SHARP
Commanding General, Visayas-Mindanao Force

*U.S. Army Photo
Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obedencio*

Brig. Gen. William F. Sharp was in command of the Visayas-Mindanao Force (VMF). Its elements consisted of the 61st Division, (PA); 81st Division, (PA); and 101st Division, (PA); two companies of the 45th Infantry Regiment (PS); and 3d Philippine Constabulary Regiment; the 73d Infantry of the 71st Division, (PA); and the 93d Infantry Regiment, 91st Division, (PA).

The VMF had the mission of defending these two major islands or geographic subdivisions. The security of airfields was its primary role and its secondary mission was to prevent landings of hostile raiding parties, paying particular attention to cities and essential public utilities in Visayas and Mindanao.

Brig. Gen. George M. Moore was the commander of the Harbor Defense Command at Corregidor. His unit was composed of the 59th Coast Artillery Regiment, (US), the 60th Coast Artillery Regiment, (US), and the 91st and 92d Coast Artillery Regiments, (PS). The 4th US Marine Regiment and the 16th Naval District, although stationed in Corregidor, were not under the operational control of General Moore or of the USAFFE.

On 10 December, two days after the attack on Clark Field, the USAFFE ground troops were tactically disposed in Luzon as follows:¹⁰

The 11th Division (PA) was deployed along the Lingayen Gulf beaches while the 21st Division (PA) was on the beaches around Bolinao on Dasol Bay. The 31st Division (PA) covered the Central Plain from Dasol Bay to Subic Bay. The 45th Infantry Regiment (PS) and a battalion of the 1st PC Regiment (PA) were in Bagac. The 71st and the 91st Divisions (PA) were in Camp O'Donnell, Tarlac, and Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, respectively, as reserves. The 1st Regular Division, (PA) was along the beaches of the Batangas coast. The 51st Division (PA) was disposed to stop enemy landings from Mauban to Atimonan, Tayabas. The 61st and 101st Divisions (PA), were deployed in the Visayas-Mindanao sector to oppose enemy action in any of the major islands within their areas of responsibility. Other units were held in reserve to meet possible paratroop landings at any point and to provide a mobile striking force.


The 71st Division which was initially sent to Luzon as a USAFFE reserve, was at first attached to the South Luzon Force on 1 November 1941. However, on 25 November, it was transferred to the North Luzon Force.

¹⁰ Combat History Division, *Triumph in the Philippines*, (Manila, 1946), p. 46.



BRIG. GEN. GEORGE M. MOORE
Commanding General, Harbor Defense Command

U.S. Army Photo
Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obedencio



LT. GEN. MASAHARU HOMMA
Commanding General of the Japanese Invasion Forces in the Philippines

*U.S. Army Photo
Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obedencio*

CHAPTER VI

THE JAPANESE LANDINGS

The Giant Pincers

As directed by the Imperial Japanese Staff the invasion forces would strike directly in Luzon where the bulk of the American and Filipino troops were concentrated. The **Fourteenth Army** under Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma was given this assignment. To implement this directive General Homma divided his assault force into two groups: the main assault force known as the **Tsuchibasi Force** (named after its commander, Lt. Gen. Yuichi Tsuchibasi, CG, **48th Division**) which was secretly staged off Formosa was to land in Northern Luzon along Lingayen Gulf and the secondary force, the **Morioka Force** (named after Lt. Gen. Sasumo Morioka, CG, **16th Division**) secretly staged off the Palau Islands was to land at Lamon Bay in Southern Luzon.

For the Northern Luzon flank, the security mission was to be executed on 10 December, by two task forces. The first was the **2d Formosa Regiment** of the **48th Division** known as the **Tanaka Detachment** (named after Col. Toru Tanaka, regimental commander) which consisted of about 2,000 men was scheduled to land at Aparri and Gonzaga in Cagayan province. The other task force, also of about 2,000 men was constituted by the rest of the **2d Formosa Regiment** called the **Kanno Detachment** (named after Colonel Kanno, 3d Battalion Commander).

Simultaneously, the Southern Luzon flank was to be secured on 12 December at Legaspi, by the **Legaspi Task Force** of about 2,500 men of the **16th Division**, the **Kimura Detachment**, (named after the division infantry commander, Maj. Gen. Inaoki Kimura).

With the two flanks solidly held, the two main landings would be launched. With the **Tsuchibasi Group** at Lingayen on 22 December, and the **Morioka Group** at Lamon Bay on 24 December, constituting the giant pincers of the Japanese, General Homma planned to overwhelm the Philippines in fifty days.

The **Fourteenth Army** consisted initially of the **48th Division**, the **65th Brigade** and five extra detachments of one regiment each including artillery, tanks, anti-tanks and infantry, besides aerial sup-

port by the 5th Air Group with a complement of about 400 planes of various types (fighters, bombers and heavy bombers) and naval forces, adding up for the complete assault of more than 100,000 men.¹

Landing at Batanes

The first Japanese unit to take possession of Philippine soil was the **Batan Task Force** that landed unopposed on Batan Island in the Batanes Group at dawn of 8 December. This was timed with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Meeting no opposition, the task force occupied the capital town of Basco and on the next day, the Basco air strip was ready for use of the 5th Air Group of the Japanese Army to land support to the Fourteenth Army's ground operations.²

Simultaneously with the Gonzaga-Aparri landing, the Kanno Detachment effected landings at the mouth of the Abra River in the vicinity of Vigan airport. The enemy shrugged off the opposition offered by the Ilocos Sur Constabulary under Maj. Sergio Laurente, Provincial Commander, and Vigan fell into the hands of the enemy.

In this battle, the PC lost one officer, 2d Lt. Juan Basa and seven enlisted men. Lieutenant Basa became the first Filipino officer who was killed in ground combat operations during the war. Major Laurente was subsequently captured and flown to Taipeh, Formosa where he was kept as a prisoner of war.³

The Japanese next seized Laoag on 12 December. After this victory, the Kanno Detachment proceeded south in pursuance of its mission to support the main Japanese landing at Lingayen.

Meanwhile, the Tanaka Detachment at Aparri started moving south. Resistance offered by the 2d Cagayan PC Company under Capt. Ali Al-Raschid was brushed aside. Heavier resistance was offered by the 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry, 11th Division, PA commanded by Capt. Paulino Ventura which effected a surprise attack on the Japanese at Tuguegarao. However, Japanese reinforcement arrived and the defenders were forced to withdraw.⁴

On its way south, the Kanno Detachment met resistance. It was ambushed by a platoon of the 13th Infantry, 11th Division, PA, north of Tagudin, while two battalions, one each from the 11th and

¹ Later in March 1942, the 4th Division which was held in reserve in China arrived as additional reinforcement.

² Louis G. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, OCMH, 1953, p. 105.

³ Col. Ambrosio P. Pena, *Bataan's Own* (Quezon City: Munoz Press Inc., 1967), p. 39.

⁴ Col. Uldarico S. Baclagon, *The Philippine Campaign* (Liwayway Publications, Inc., Manila, 1952) p. 38.

12th Infantry Regiments together with elements of the 71st Infantry maintained a defensive at Baroro River, near Bacnotan north of San Fernando, La Union. Earlier, in a separate action, the Kanno Detachment attempted to leap-frog over this defensive line to Balingasay Point at the tip of the Lingayen Gulf, but this was foiled by the defenders.

Landings in Bicol

On 12 December, the Kimura Detachment consisting of one regiment (less one battalion of the 16th Division) landed at Legaspi, Albay and in two days the enemy force had seized the length and breadth of the Bicol Peninsula.


Proceeding to the north, the invaders met considerable resistance from USAFFE units. South Luzon Force headquarters ordered the demolition of all bridges to delay the enemy advance. The defenders engaged the enemy at the towns of Aloneros and Sumulong, situated at the narrow neck of land connecting the Bicol peninsula with the rest of Luzon. Two companies of the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry, repulsed a Japanese assault and chased them back six miles down the road. Unfortunately, these Filipino units were cut off on 24 December, when another Japanese force landed at Atimonan, Tayabas along the shores of Lamon Bay.

Landings at Lamon Bay were launched at 0130 on 24 December at three areas: Siain, Atimonan, and Mauban. The enemy received negligible resistance from elements of the 52d Infantry, 51st Division under Col. Virgil N. Cordero, at Atimonan and no opposition at all at Siain.

It was another story at Mauban. The enemy force which landed at 0200 met small arms fire resistance by the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 1st Regular Division commanded by 1st Lt. Godofredo Mendoza. The Filipinos held fast even when the next wave of Japanese infantry landed at daylight. They rushed at the enemy and engaged them in close combat. When loss of ammunition forced them to withdraw, there were only 150 men left of its original 500.⁵

Even as General Wainwright's North Luzon Force was fighting heroically to stop the Japanese from debauching into Central Luzon, other hostile landings were effected on the beaches of eastern Tayabas on 24 December. The opposition put up by elements of the 1st Regular Division (PA) commanded by Brig. Gen. Fidel V. Segundo, and of the 51st Division (PA) under Brig. Gen. Albert M. Jones,

⁵ This force was mainly led by young graduates of the Philippine Military Academy. Lts Jose Javier and David Pelayo both of PMA Class 1940 performed well in this fight.



THE GIANT PINNACLES

hastily assembled and rushed to these new beachheads were readily overwhelmed in spite of their gallant stand. After brief encounters the defending troops were withdrawn to avert their annihilation.⁶

The Japanese force at Atimonan started moving along Highway No. 1 until they were encountered by the 2d Battalion, 52d Infantry, 51st Division at Silangang Malicboy. Enemy reinforcement however, forced them to withdraw towards Pagbilao after a brief fight.

Survivors of Lt. Mendoza's unit joined the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry under Capt. Honorato Ramos which held its line at Sampaloc against strong Japanese Infantry-Artillery-Air attacks. Captain Ramos, while rallying his men, was killed during an aerial bombardment. At 0300 on 25 December, the 1st Infantry Regiment under Capt. Alfredo M. Santos was ordered to withdraw.

Landings in Mindanao

Meanwhile in Mindanao, the enemy landed at two points in December 1941. One battalion detached from the 16th Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Inaoki Kimura was given the mission of securing Davao and Jolo. Of these units, two reinforced battalions of the Miura Detachment (named after Lt. Col. Toshio Miura) were assigned to seize Davao City. A composite force of about 2,000 Army and Constabulary troops under Col. Roger B. Hilsman withdrew from the beach and put up a stiff defense on the high grounds overlooking the city.⁷


The unexpected heavy Filipino resistance compelled the enemy to temporarily divert to Davao the force that originally was assigned for the Jolo landings. The next day Maj. Gen. Shizuo Sakaguchi dispatched his Jolo Force to Jolo arriving thereat on 24 December. At the time there were about 300 Philippine Constabulary troops on Jolo Island to contest any hostile landing. The pre-invasion naval bombardment, however, neutralized or destroyed most of the beach defense positions and permitted the enemy to occupy the town of Jolo before daybreak. After capturing Jolo, the Sakaguchi Detachment sailed for the East Indies.

Main Landing at Lingayen

The Japanese Imperial Army's initial landing plan in the Philippines had been successful. American air and naval power had been destroyed. Five landings had been virtually made at widely sepa-

⁶ Col. Ambrosio P. Pena, (Ret.) Bataan's Own, p. 41.

⁷ Capt. Ambrosio P. Pena, "The Japanese Conquest of Mindanao," Published in the Military History Review, Vol. IV No. 1 dated December 1956, GHQ AFP p. 21.



LANDINGS IN MINDANAO

rate points and strong Japanese detachments were already conducting offensive operations in Luzon and Mindanao.

The main landings however, to be made on Luzon north and south of Manila had been planned. There would be two landings: the major effort at Lingayen Gulf and a secondary effort at Lamon Bay in Southern Luzon. The forces assigned to these landings had begun to assemble late in November. The 16th Division (less the 9th and 33d Infantry) left Osaka, Japan, on 25 November and arrived at Anami, Oshima in the Ryukyus on 3 December. Three days later, the 48th Division (less the 2d Formosa Regiment) was concentrated at Mako, Takao and Kirun, in Formosa.


There was much confusion during the concentration period. The greatest secrecy was observed, and only a small number of officers knew of the entire plan. These men had travelled constantly between units and assembly points to assist in the preparation and in the solution of detailed and complicated problems. Unit commanders were given the scantiest instruction, and worked, for the most part, in the dark. Important orders were delivered just before they had to be executed, with little time for study and preparation. Such conditions, the Japanese later regretted, "proved inceptives to errors and confusion, uneasiness and irritation."⁸ Moreover, after 8 December, the Japanese lived in fear of an American bombing of Formosa ports, where the vessels were being loaded with supplies and ammunition.

Despite fears, confusion and mistakes, the separate convoys were finally loaded with supplies and ammunition, ready to sail by 17 December. The uneasiness arising from ignorance and secrecy persisted aboard ship. The men were not told where they were going. Added to the nervousness was the restriction placed on the use of maps. Only a few officers were allowed to see them. "All the units," the Japanese later observed, "were possessed of a resentment, arising from the general atmosphere, that they were on their way to a very important theater of operation."

The Fourteenth Army staff, which did know the destination, shared the nervousness of the troops. Everything depended on the success of this operation. All that had gone before was but a preliminary to these landings. If they did not succeed the plans of the Southern Army and of the Imperial General Headquarters would fail. "During all my campaigns in the Philippines," said General Homma when he was on trial for his life, "I had three critical moments, and this was number one."⁹

⁸ Philippine Landing Operations (Amphibious) ATIS Dec 1989-6A.

⁹ Proceedings in the trial of USA vs Masaharu Homma before the Military Commission convened by the CG, USAF Western Pacific, p. 3050, Testimony of Homma.



On the morning of 22 December, barrio people of Bauang, La Union, along the shores of Lingayen Gulf, observed a Japanese trawler cruising leisurely offshore. Unmolested, it took soundings and serenely sailed off to the north.¹⁰ Late that night, 76 heavily loaded Army transports, all under strong naval escort, steamed into Lingayen Gulf.

Aboard the transports was the main strength of General Homma's Fourteenth Army, altogether with 43,110 men. The major combat strength of the Lingayen Force was drawn from the 48th Division. Activated in Formosa in late 1940 and as yet untried in battle, this Division was composed of the 1st and 2d Formosa Infantry Regiments, the 47th Infantry and Artillery, reconnaissance, engineer and transport regiments. Attached to it for the landing was a large number of combat and service units. Although probably the best motorized division in the Imperial Japanese Army at that time, the 48th Division, by American standards could hardly be said to have sufficient motor transportation. One battalion of each infantry regiment was equipped with bicycles. Divisional artillery consisted of the 48th Mountain Artillery, similar to a standard field artillery regiment except that the basic weapon was the 75-mm. mountain gun (pack).¹¹

In addition to the 48th Division, the Lingayen Force was composed of the 16th Division's 9th Infantry, and part of the 22d Field Artillery with eight horse-drawn 75-mm. guns. Larger caliber pieces were provided by the 9th Independent Field Artillery Battalion (eight 150-mm. howitzers), and the 8th Field Artillery Regiment (sixteen 105-mm. guns. Included in the Lingayen Force were between 80 and 100 light and heavy tanks distributed between the 4th and 7th Tank Regiments.¹² A larger number of service and special troops completed the force.

The vessels that reached Lingayen Gulf on the night of 21 December were organized in three separate convoys. The first left from Kirun in Northern Formosa at 0900 of the 17th. It contained twenty-one transports and was escorted by the Batan Island Attack Force which returned to Formosa after the landing on 8 December.¹³

¹⁰ Data given by Col. Donald Blackburn, 11th Div (PA) on 13 May 1949. Colonel Blackburn was then stationed at Bauang, La Union.

¹¹ Order of Battle of the Japanese Armed Forces, WD G-2, 1 March 1945, p. 108; USA vs Homma; Handbook of Japanese Military Forces, TM-E-30-480, 15 September 1944, p. 37.

¹² One of these was a heavy tank regiment, whose tanks were the equivalent of the US 13-ton light tank; the other was light. The Japanese did not indicate which was the heavy and which was the light tank regiment.

¹³ Fourteenth Army Opns, I, 46: II, 8, Untranslated Chart 5; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 14; Morrison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 162.

The convoy loaded in the Pescadores, being second farthest from the Philippines, was the next to depart. At noon of 18 December, the twenty-eight transports of this group, accompanied by the Vigan Attack Force, left port. The third convoy left Takao in Formosa at 1700 on the 18th, escorted by the naval force which had supported the Aparri landing.

In addition to the direct support provided by the naval escorts for each convoy — altogether 2 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, and a large number of torpedo boats, mine-sweepers and layers, patrol craft, and miscellaneous vessels — a large naval force led by Vice Adm. Ibo Takahasi, 3d Fleet commander, moved into position to furnish distant cover.¹⁴ On 19 December, this force sortied from Mako and sailed to a point about 250 miles west of Luzon. There it was joined by units of Vice Adm. Nabutaka Kondo's 2d Fleet, detached from support of the Malayan invasion.¹⁵ Altogether, the Japanese had a covering force of two battleships, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, two seaplane carriers, and some destroyers in position to meet any allied naval attempt to disrupt the landing at the Lingayen Gulf.¹⁶

The Japanese plan called for landings at three points along the shores of Lingayen Gulf, to begin at 0500 of 22 December.¹⁷ Each of the convoys constituted a separate task force and was to land at a designated point. The southernmost landing was to be effected by the Takao Force convoy carrying the 47th Infantry (less one battalion), 4th Tank Regiment (less one company), and supporting elements. This force was to land at Agoo, La Union, just inland from the eastern shore off Lingayen Gulf. Starting at 0500, the troops, already loaded into the 69 landing crafts assigned to this force, were to head for the beach. The first wave was scheduled to touch at 0540. The round trip time of the landing crafts in this wave was to be two hours; thereafter it would be made faster in one hour. Altogether each of the crafts would make ten round trips during the first day.

¹⁴ Fourteenth Army Opns, II, 1-15, 8 Untranslated Charts 1 and 5; Handbook of Japanese Military Forces, pp. 327-330.

¹⁵ Answers by the 1st Demob Bureau to Questionnaires on Phil Campaign, 5 August 1949, ATIS Doc. 49692.

¹⁶ Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 14; Interrogations of Vice Adm. Kazutaka Shiraichi, CofS, 2d Fleet, 15 Oct 45, and of Capt. Masamichi Fujita, 2d Fleet Staff, 20 Oct 45, USSBS; Interrogations of Japanese Officials, I, 26, 72; Morrison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 178.

¹⁷ The landing plan was drawn up in Formosa on 1 Dec 41, and was reproduced by Fourteenth Army Opns, II, 1-5.

The landing crafts of the Mako convoy, carrying the 1st Formosa and 7th Tank Regiments, were to move out thirty minutes after the 47th Infantry, and at 0550 would hit the shore at Caba, seven miles north of Agoo. To carry the troops of this force ashore, 57 landing crafts and 19 powered sampans were assigned.

The third force, known as Kamijima Detachment, named after Col. Kamijima, commander of the 9th Infantry, was not to start landing operations until 0700. At that time the troops would be loaded into 20 landing crafts and 29 sampans and would head for Bauang, about seven miles north of Caba, the first wave reaching shore at 0730. Thus, the Fourteenth Army expected to hold a fifteen-mile stretch of beach, from Bauang in the north to Agoo in the south, along the narrow coastal plain between Lingayen Gulf and the Cordillera central range, by 0730 of 22 December.

The position chosen for the landing was an excellent one. Between the mountains and the shore was a narrow level strip along which ran Route 3, an excellent hard-surfaced, two-way highway. At Bauang was a road intersecting Route 3 and leading eastward through a mountain defile to Baguio, turning south down the Kennon Road and joining Route 3 again near Rosario, La Union. At Aringay, just above Agoo, was a river which formed a small valley through the mountains. Through this valley ran a partially surfaced road which led from Aringay to Rosario, one of the key road intersections in this area. South of the landing beaches was the Central Plain of Luzon. Route 3 opened directly on to the road network leading to Manila.

Once ashore the troops were to destroy any American force in the vicinity and move inland without waiting to consolidate the beachhead. Later waves would perform that task. The Kamijima Detachment at Bauang sent one element north to occupy San Fernando, La Union and another element sent east along the Bauang-Baguio road to seize the Naguilian airfield and then press on to Baguio. By seizing Baguio, the Japanese would prevent an American counterattack from the east through the defile. The occupation of San Fernando would effect a consolidation with the Tanaka's Detachment moving south from Vigan and would protect the rear of the Japanese southward advance.

The forces landing at Caba and Agoo were to press south toward Damortis and Rosario. Two roads would be used: the coastal highway to Damortis, and the partially surfaced road which paralleled the Aringay River leading to Rosario. Once at their objectives, these troops were to assemble and "prepare to advance" toward the bank of Agno River, the first formidable obstacle to a force moving south from Lingayen Gulf to Manila.

The voyage of the Lingayen Force to the target was uneventful. In an effort to avoid detection and to create the impression that the destination was Indo-China, the transport at first followed a south-westerly course. Only a typhoon in the South China Sea hindered the approach; no American planes or ships appeared.

The combined invasion force was without air cover, such support no longer considered necessary until the 31st when twenty planes of the 24th and 50th Fighter Regiments, based at Laoag, came out to meet the ships and escorted them up to the last leg of the journey. At the same time, six light bombers struck Fort Wint on Grande Island at the entrance to Subic Bay. Between 0110 and 0430 on 22 December, the three convoys, after a slow voyage at an average of eight knots, dropped anchor in Lingayen Gulf.¹⁸ The weather was chilly, the skies were dark, and an intermittent rain was falling.

At this point things began to go wrong. The convoy leaders, having been warned against stopping short of their targets, went to the other extreme. The initial anchorage was to have been between San Fernando and the Aringay River, but overshot the mark, and dropped anchor off Santo Tomas, about four miles south of Ago. The other transport followed, dropping anchor at intervals over a distance of fifteen miles. As a result, the landing crafts now had to make a longer trip than anticipated to reach their designated beaches.¹⁹

Beachhead Landings

Under cover of cruiser and destroyer gunfire, the troops prepared to land shortly after 0200. By 0430 two battalions of the 47th Infantry and one battalion of the 48th Mountain Artillery were in the landing crafts, ready to strike out for shore. At 0517 the first troops touched down on the beach south of Ago. Less than fifteen minutes later, at 0530, the 1st Formosa Infantry, the main strength of the 3d Battalion, 48th Mountain Artillery, and tanks began landing at Aringay, about two miles south of Caba. Two hours later, the rest of the troops landed at Santiago, three miles to the south, at 0300.²⁰

The transfer of the troops to the landing crafts had proven extremely difficult because of high seas. The light crafts were heavily

¹⁸ Answers to Questionnaires on Phil Campaign, 5 Aug 49, ATIS Doc 49692; Interrog of General Maeda, Fourteenth Army, 10 May 47, Interrogations of former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I; USA vs Homma, p. 3049, testimony of Homma.

¹⁹ Interrogations of General Maeda, 10 May 47; Phil Landings Opns (Amphibious), ATIS Doc 1989-6A.

²⁰ Interrogations of Captain Ishihara, 3d Fleet Staff, 22 October 1945, USSBS; Interrogations of Japanese Officials 1-83.

buffeted on the way to the shores and the men and equipment soaked by the spray. The radios were made useless by salt water, and there was no communication with the first waves ashore. Even ship-to-ship communication was inadequate. The men had a difficult time in the heavy surf, and it proved impossible to land heavy equipment. The high seas threw many of the landing crafts up on the beach, overturning some and beaching others so firmly that they could not be put back into operation for a full day. The northernmost convoy finally had to seek shelter near San Fernando Point, where the sea was calmer. The second wave could not land as planned, disrupting the entire landing schedule. The Infantry, Mountain Artillery, and some of the armored units got ashore during the day, but few of the heavy units required for support were able to land.

To increase the Japanese worries, four of the B-17's that had come up from Bachelor Field to bomb the Japanese at Davao flew on to Lingayen Gulf and managed to slip through the covering screen of the 24th and 50th Fighter Regiments to strafe the cruisers and destroyers and inflict some damage on the Japanese. Even Admiral Takahashi's Cover Force, which was about 100 miles northeast of Lingayen Gulf, fell under attack. PBV's and US planes went for the Japanese flagship Ashigara but they scored no direct hits. The Cover Force finally slipped away into a rain squall.

Meanwhile, the rising sea had forced many of the Japanese ships to shift anchorage besides ducking the fire coming from the 155-mm. guns of the 86th Field Artillery Battalion (PS). This battalion had two guns at San Jacinto and another two at Dagupan, and these apparently opened fire on the southernmost elements of the invasion force. Although claiming to have sunk three transports and two destroyers, the coastal guns actually did not do much damage except to give General Homma many nervous moments.²¹

The Japanese landing at Lingayen did not surprise the high command in the Philippines. It was the logical place to land a large force whose destination was Manila. Earlier on 18 December, G-2, USAFFE, had received information of the movement of a hostile convoy of about eighty transports moving toward the Philippines from the north. This information had been relayed to the 16th Naval District headquarters which had dispatched submarines in the area.²²

²¹ Rad/Msg from General MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 34, 22 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41)

²² James V. Collier, Notebooks II, 10. This information was not corroborated by naval sources or by the meager official accounts, but it corresponded with known facts.

At 0200 of the 20th, a large enemy convoy was sighted forty miles north of Lingayen Gulf. On the night of 20-21 December, the USAFFE, acting on information received, warned the units stationed in that area that a Japanese expedition "of from 100 to 120 vessels" was moving south and could be expected off the mouth of the Gulf by evening of the 21st.²³ The first report of the arrival of the invasion force came from the submarine Stingray which had been on patrol off Lingayen for several days. This was the only submarine present on the mouth of Lingayen Gulf. Before any action could be taken, the landings had begun.

USAFFE's Coastal Defense

Despite the warning, the Americans seemed to have been ill-prepared to drive off the invaders. At this time the 120-mile long coast line of Lingayen Gulf was defended by two Philippine Army divisions, only one of which had a divisional artillery. The southern edge of the Gulf where the landing was expected and where the bulk of the artillery was emplaced, was in the 21st Division sector. The eastern shore, as far north as San Fernando, was held by the 11th Division. The 71st Infantry, was attached to the 11th Division and posted in the Bauang-Naguilian area. The 26th Cavalry (PS), was moved from the North Luzon Force as reserve at Rosales and sent to Pozorrubio on Route 3 in the path of the Japanese advance.

At Bauang, the Filipino troops waited at the beach. The Headquarters Battalion, 12th Infantry, 11th Division (PA) with one .50 caliber and several .30 caliber machine guns, faced the incoming Japanese.

As the Kamijima Detachment approached the shore, the Filipinos met it with fire. The .50 caliber machine gun inflicted heavy casualties among the Japanese, but the caliber .30's dropped out of action earlier due to clogged firing mechanisms caused by faulty ammunition. Despite the casualties, the Japanese pushed ahead and established a foothold on the shore, whereupon the Filipinos withdrew.²⁴

On 21 December, the 71st Infantry was behind the beach at Bauang with orders to halt the Tanaka Detachment north of San Fernando, La Union. One battalion, with a battery of 75-mm. guns (SPM) attached, was to move up the coastal road to meet the 2d Formosa head on. Another battalion was to advance along a secondary road to the east and attack Colonel Tanaka on his left flank. This maneuver, if well executed, might have destroyed the Tanaka

²³ Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 58.

²⁴ USA vs Homma, p. 3054, Testimony of Homma; Interrogations of General Maeda, 10 May 47; Phil Landing Opns (Amphibious), ATIC DOC 1989-6A.

Detachment, but the inexperienced and poorly equipped Filipinos were not capable of a swift and sudden onslaught.²⁵

Before the 71st Infantry could complete its movement the Japanese had landed. Patrols from the Kamijima Detachment immediately moved north along Route 3 and at 1100 made contact with a 2d Formosa patrol. By 1400 the main bodies of both units had joined. Meanwhile, Colonel Kamijima's 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry had pushed into Bauang immediately after landing and by 1700 had secured the town and surrounding area. The 3d Battalion, in accordance with the plan, moved out along the Bauang-Baguio road to the east, toward the Naguilian airfield.

The 71st Infantry's Withdrawal to Baguio

In the evening of the 21st, Capt. Guillermo Nakar's 1st Battalion, 71st Infantry came into grips with the Japanese spearhead advancing south on Manila Road. The 2d Battalion under Capt. Jose V. H. Banzon was also committed to action in the same evening when some Japanese tried to outflank the entire regiment by attacking from the south.

With Colonel Kamijima's 9th Infantry ashore, the position of the 71st Infantry units became untenable. One battalion moved down the coastal road, and the other with elements of the 11th Division, fell back to the east in the face of the Japanese advance. Colonel Van Bonnet then ordered a withdrawal to the south through Baguio, clearing the Philippine summer capital by dark.²⁶

Farther south, Col. Hifumi Imai's 1st Formosa and the 48th Mountain Artillery (less 1st and 2d Battalions) had landed at Aringay and by 1030 had concentrated for the advance. Colonel Imai's mission was to move his force south toward Damortis and Rosario. The regiment moved out, down the coast road, and by 1600 the column had joined the 48th Reconnaissance and the 4th Tank Regiments, which had come ashore at 0730, north of Damortis.

The landing at Agoon, where Col. Isamu Yanagi's 47th Infantry with a battalion of the 48th Mountain Artillery had come ashore, was unopposed initially. The 47th then moved inland toward Highway 3, thence south to Damortis. Meanwhile, General Brougher had sent a battalion of infantry to meet the Japanese coming down the coast

²⁵ The remainder of the 71st Inf Regiment (PA) was at Bauang. Extract from the diary of Maj. William J. Priestly, pp. 1 and 2, copy on file in OCMH. This diary consists of a series of notebooks prepared by Major Priestly while in a prison camp after talking with the officers and men of the various units.

²⁶ Collier, Notebooks, II, 35.

to disrupt the landing at Agoo. But the 48th Reconnaissance and 4th Tank Regiments were already ashore, and the brush that followed easily routed the Philippine Army troops who made a hasty retreat to Damortis.

Thus, by the afternoon of the 22d, the Japanese had pushed ashore elements of three regiments, with supporting artillery and tanks. However, the main force of the Fourteenth Army was still on board the transports.

General Homma's Problems

While his troops at Lingayen were pushing ahead, General Homma remained aboard ship on Lingayen Gulf. He had done all he could in the planning and preparation for the invasion. Now his troops were committed and their failure or success was out of his hands. His anxieties, the lot of any commander during the amphibious stages of an operation, were increased by lack of communication with the men ashore and the confusion caused by heavy surf. He had no knowledge of the disposition of his landed troops, moving in many columns in all directions, and no way of controlling the action. He had pushed his infantry and approximately half his armor ashore between Bauang and Agoo, but all the artillery save one regiment, was still aboard the transport. Cut off from his ground force troop commanders, he had no way to lessen his apprehension by assurances that all was well.

There were some bases for General Homma's fears. The position of the Japanese troops ashore, while generally favorable, might easily become precarious. The landing had been made on a narrow corridor crossed by numerous streams, each of which afforded the defenders an opportunity for delaying action. Although the plain to the south provided an excellent route to Manila, it could also be used by the Americans and Filipinos as the base for a concerted counterattack against the Japanese as they streamed out of the corridor. A vigorous and well timed counterattack by the four divisions of the North Luzon Force, spearheaded by the well trained and equipped Philippine Division in USAFFE reserve, might well "wipe out the invader."²⁷ If, at the same time, sufficient air and naval forces could be mustered to attack the transports and naval escort lying at anchor in the bay, the Japanese line of retreat could be cut and all of Homma's achievements and plans brought to naught.

According to the Japanese plan, the troops, once they had landed at Lingayen, were to move on without waiting for the concentration

²⁷ Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 60. The four divisions were the 11th, 21st, 71st and 91st Divisions (PA). With the state of training, lack of equipment and transportation, and the absence of communication, such an attack was impossible.

of the entire landing force. But a difference of opinion arose at Fourteenth Army headquarters. The more cautious officers, believing it would be suicidal to proceed with the advance as planned, argued for the establishment of a strong, well organized beachhead before moving further. Their troops, they reasoned, were at present confined to the long, narrow coastal plain, and the USAFFE units, from their positions along the commanding heights at the east might well hold up any Japanese advance long enough to allow General MacArthur to send up his reserves. The results would be disastrous.

The more aggressive wished to execute the original plan. They argued that the American commanders would not risk an offensive in front of the Agno River line. Even if the Americans decided to attack earlier, the older Japanese staff officers felt that the advantages gained from continuing the advance were great enough to justify the risk. If the plan succeeded, the Japanese would gain bridgeheads across the Agno and would be in position to advance rapidly toward Manila. Also, it would assure the safety of the beachhead. The views of the more aggressive won out, and General Homma agreed to continue the advance as planned.²⁸

As the first day passed and no word came from the advancing troops, General Homma's fears increased. With no prospect of a calm sea in which to land his artillery and heavy equipment, and still fearing an American counterattack, he determined to shift anchorage. At 1730 of D-Day he ordered the convoy to move farther south during the night, to a point off Damortis, and continue landing operations there the next day. Fearing artillery fire at the new anchorage, he ordered General Tsuchibasi, the 48th Division commander, to take San Fabian where there were two 155-mm. guns emplaced at San Jacinto, thus extending the Japanese drive southward along the Lingayen coast.²⁹

²⁸ Phil Landing Opns (Amphibious), ATIS Doc 1989-6A.

²⁹ USA vs Homma, pp. 3053-3054, Testimony of Homma.

The AFP on Martial Law

"The officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, more than any other body of the government personnel, have been called upon to carry and are now carrying a great share of the great burden of suppressing the activities of groups of men actively engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines of eradicating widespread lawlessness, anarchy, disorder and wanton destruction of lives and property now prevailing throughout the country."

—President Ferdinand E. Marcos

CHAPTER VII

USAFFE'S INITIAL DEFENSE

As the Japanese invasion force was ready to land, the Americans made last-minute preparations to meet the attack. USAFFE attached twelve 75-mm. guns on self-propelled mounts to the North Luzon Force and ordered the 192d Tank Battalion to support.¹ General Wainwright in turn sent General Pierce's 26th Cavalry (PS) from Pozorrubio to Rosario. While the main body of the 26th Cavalry advanced toward Rosario, the Scout Car Platoon (less detachments) moved westward quickly to Damortis. A few miles to the north the Scouts ran into the forward elements of the 48th Reconnaissance and the 4th Tank Regiments of the Japanese, so the Platoon fell back to Damortis.


Upon its arrival, the 26th established defensive positions which would permit a delaying action in the event of a forced withdrawal. At 1300 the cavalymen came under attack from Japanese ground units supported by planes of the 5th Air Group.

General Pierce who had, in addition to his own cavalry, a company of the 12th Infantry and another company from the 71st Infantry under his command, was hard put to hold his position, so he requested for reinforcement. At about the same time General Wainwright received word that an enemy force mounted on eyeless or light motor vehicles was approaching Damortis. To meet this emergency, General Wainwright ordered a company of tanks from Brig. Gen. James R.N. Weaver, the Provisional Tank Group Commander to contain the enemy.

Due to shortage of gasoline, General Weaver could furnish only a platoon of five tanks from Company C, 192 Tank Battalion. These moved out to the threatened area and near Agoo met the enemy's light tanks. The command tank, maneuvering off the road received a direct hit and burst into flames. The other four, all hit by anti-tank fire, succeeded in returning to Rosario but were lost by bombing later in the day.

At 1600 elements of the 1st Formosa and 48th Mountain Artillery, which had landed earlier in the day at Aringay joined the attack.

¹ The attachment of the guns, Batteries F, H & L consisting of 12 guns was made before the Japanese landing.



General Pierce, finding himself completely outnumbered, withdrew to his first delaying position east of Damortis. By 1900, the Japanese were in complete control of the town.²

The 71st Division at Rosario-Baguio Road Junction

Earlier that afternoon General Wainwright had attached the 26th Cavalry to the 71st Division. He then ordered General Selleck to transfer his Division from Urdaneta to Damortis, a distance of about twenty-five miles, and prevent the Japanese from moving south. The 26th Cavalry was to cover the right flank of the 71st Division and hold the junction of the Rosario-Baguio road, east of Rosario, in order to permit the 71st Infantry (less 1st Battalion, then at Baguio), to clear that point and join the North Luzon Force.

At about 1630 General Selleck, accompanied by Col. Lloyd Biggs, 72d Infantry commander and Lt. Col. Halstead C. Fowler, commander of the 71st Field Artillery, arrived at Rosario, where he learned that Japanese troops were not only approaching from the west along the Damortis road, but also from the northwest where the 47th Infantry was advancing from Agoo along the Aringay River valley. On his way to Damortis, General Selleck found General Pierce in his defensive position and learned of the exhausted condition of the 26th Cavalry. Since the 71st Division troops had not yet come up, he ordered the cavalymen to fall back slowly to Rosario.

The Japanese by this time had a sizable force advancing along the Damortis-Rosario road. With the 48th Reconnaissance Regiment in the lead and Colonel Imai's 1st Formosa supported by the 48th Mountain Artillery (less 1st and 2d Battalions) forming the main body, the Japanese threatened to overwhelm the weary cavalry. Only bold action by Maj. Thomas J.H. Trapnell in blocking a bridge over a small river a few miles west of Rosario with a burning tank halted the Japanese and prevented a complete rout.

When the retreating cavalymen reached Rosario, they discovered that Troop F, which had been defending the trail northwest of the town, had been forced back by the enemy. Fortunately for the Scouts, a part of the attacking force had been detached and ordered back to Agoo for the drive on San Fabian. Troop F held on until the rest of the 71st Division had passed through Rosario. Then it broke off the action and followed, leaving the Japanese in possession of the town.

² Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 94; Ltr Weaver to Wainwright, 20 Nov 45; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 3, OCMH; Prov Tank Gp, Rpt of Opns 1941-42, p. 9; Annex X USAFFE-USIF Rpt of Opns.

The 71st Infantry at Baguio

Things had gone no better for the 71st Infantry at Baguio. Colonel Van Bonnet was busy tracking down Japanese units approaching in every direction. He could not immediately proceed to Rosario. Lt. Col. John P. Horan, the commander of Camp John Hay at Baguio, reported to USAFFE headquarters by radio of Japanese movements in the area and of the predicament of the force under Colonel Van Bonnet.³ In reply, General MacArthur directed Colonel Van Bonnet "to move south at once if way is clear."⁴

Meanwhile, the 72d Infantry was ordered to Sison to establish the Sison-Pozorrubio line, while the 26th Cavalry was protecting the rear at Bued River. Later, the 26th Cavalry retreated to Binalonan as the Japanese attacked the defensive line forcing the North Luzon Force to retreat again further south.

On 22 December, the Japanese main invasion force landed along the entire southern beach of La Union. The 71st Infantry was ordered to defend the Bauang-Naguilian-Baguio Road and later to proceed down Kennon Road to join the rest of the Division at Mexico, Pampanga. The 2d and 3d Battalions were ordered to break contact with the enemy and withdraw to Baguio via the Bauang-Naguilian-Baguio Road. The 1st Battalion under Capt. Guillermo Nakar was to cover the movements.

Handicapped by lack of transportation facilities, the 71st Infantry was able to reach Baguio only and could not proceed down to Urdaneta as the enemy had already occupied Kennon Road. The following day, in order to save his unit, Colonel Van Bonnet led his regiment in a cross-country march over the rugged Cordilleras passing through Ambuklao and Aritao in Nueva Vizcaya. Then he took the ascend to Balete Pass down to San Jose, Nueva Ecija and from there he rejoined the 71st Division at Mexico, Pampanga on 27 December.

The 1st Battalion was still along the Naguilian-Baguio Road covering the rest of the regiment in its withdrawal. When the 71st Infantry reached Baguio, Captain Nakar pulled out his troops to join the main body but Colonel Van Bonnet had already left the city.

The 1st Guerrilla Regiment

When Baguio was declared an "open city", Captain Nakar took the Baguio-Bokod-Bocboc-Aritao route which Colonel Van Bonnet took the day before reaching Aritao on January 1942. In the meantime, San

³ Colonel Horan's Rad/Msg to General MacArthur, AG 370.2 (19 Dec 41) Phil Rads.

⁴ Rad/Msg, Horan to CG, USAFFE, 22 Dec 41, AG 370.2 (19 Dec 41) Phil Rads.

Jose had fallen into enemy hands and the 1st Battalion was cut off from the rest of the 71st Infantry Regiment. With no possible means of escape, Captain Nakar decided to remain in the mountains to conduct an indefinite resistance from the rear.

The rapid advance of the Japanese to Baguio and Nueva Ecija quickly isolated elements of the 11th Infantry, 71st Infantry, 91st Infantry, 43d Infantry and Troop C of the 26th Cavalry. Captain Nakar joined forces with Capt. Everett Warner, AUS, and Capt. Manuel Enriquez, G-2 of the 11th Division (PA), designating their new unit as the 1st Guerilla Regiment. Thus, the first organized guerrilla unit in the Philippines was formed.

With a trans-receiver set brought down from Baguio, Capts Warner, Enriquez and Nakar informed General MacArthur of their action and were later commended for their initiative. The three were promoted to major and their unit was designated by General MacArthur as the 14th Infantry Regiment, PA.⁵ Major Warner was placed in command of the new regiment; while Major Enriquez was designated Executive officer and concurrently commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, with the area of responsibility from Bato Ferry to Balete Pass.

The 1st Guerrilla Regiment was assigned the mission of conducting harassing actions against the enemy in its area. On 13 January 1945, the 1st Battalion in coordination with Troop C of the 26th Cavalry under Capt Ralph Praeger raided the Japanese garrison at Tuguegarao and the adjoining airfield. The raid resulted in the killing of approximately 100 enemy soldiers and the destruction of enemy aircrafts.

Because of this attack, the Japanese high command became aware of the rear actions of the guerrillas. Soon, they started their campaign against guerrilla organizations. Since then Major Warner's fate was not known. He was last reported on his way to Casiguran. On the other hand, Major Enriquez later surrendered to the enemy, thus leaving Major Nakar in command of the guerrilla unit.

The 1st Guerrilla Regiment had the distinction of being the first guerrilla organization in the Philippines to have established direct contact with General MacArthur's headquarters in Australia.⁶

Not long after contact was made between the Philippines and Australia, Lt. Col. Nakar's (he was promoted by General MacArthur) headquarters was attacked by the Japanese Forces. He was cap-

⁵ The 14th Infantry Regiment, PA, is the only Philippine Army unit which was granted an Army of the United States status in recognition of its achievements.

⁶ The newly designated 14th Infantry sent a message which reads: "Your victorious return is the nightly subject of prayer in every Filipino home."



tured and imprisoned at Ft Santiago where he was tortured and subsequently executed.⁷

The 72d Badly Decimated

The 72 Infantry Regiment was ordered to forward areas to reinforce the North Luzon Force line on 20 December. It occupied the right flank of the line at Sison, Pangasinan. In the evening of 23 December, the Japanese attacked and the 72d Infantry bore the brunt of the attacking enemy supported by tanks and artillery fire. The line wavered but with the men under control succeeded in reaching Pozorrubio and Binalonan.

While the troops were at rest at Binalonan and Pozorrubio, the two towns were attacked simultaneously. Caught unaware, the 72d Infantry was almost decimated. They fought back the Japanese invaders, but in the process the unit lost about 50% of its personnel.

Although badly beaten to the draw, the 72d Regiment was able to withdraw to the south. They regrouped and reorganized at Tayug, where another defense line was put up. But on 25 December, the unit was ordered to retreat farther south after a relatively light action against the enemy. They proceeded to Cabanatuan where they bivouacked for two days.

Withdrawals from the South

Earlier on 24 December, General Morioka anchored his fleet of eighty vessels at Lamon Bay. In this landing attempt, many ranking Japanese officers were either killed or drowned.⁸ On the defenders' side, the 1st Battalion (under 1st Lt. Godofredo Mendoza) of Capt. Alfredo M. Santos' 1st Infantry, 1st Regular Division, PA, was practically decimated.⁹ The enemy then proceeded to the shores of Mauban up to farther south to Atimonan where hostile landing operations took place.

Brig. Gen. Albert M. Jones' 51st Division was ill-prepared to carry out effectively its mission of securing the coastlines of Tayabas (Quezon) and the Bicol provinces. For one thing, just like the other PA divisions, the 51st was not yet fully mobilized when the war broke out. Its 53d Infantry Regiment under Col. John R. Boatwright,

⁷ Annex N.


⁸ Roman T. Gavino, Operations of the 1st Regular Division, PA, USAFFE, Historical Division, HNDP, Manila, 1947, p. 8.

⁹ Robert Considine, General Wainwright's Story, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, New York, 1946, p. 30.

had newly completed its mobilization and had not yet started training in the Company level. On the other hand, the 51st FA under Col. Hamilton F. Searight, had never been fully mobilized. Besides, the elements of the division were either widely dispersed or were in the process of movement from their mobilization centers to the training area in Batangas province.¹⁰

As had been previously planned, the South Luzon Force had to proceed to Bataan. But unlike the North Luzon Force, General Jones had to improvise delay actions place lines. After brief encounters along the way of withdrawal, with the enemy following closely in pursuit, the South Luzon Force continued its withdrawal passing through the towns of Pagbilao, Sampaloc, Tayabas, Lucena, Candelaria, Sariaya, Tiaong and finally to Bataan.

¹⁰ Col Ambrosio P. Pena (Ret.) Bataan's Own, p. 63.



CALUMPIT BRIDGE
A vital link between the North and South Luzon Forces

CHAPTER VIII

WITHDRAWAL INTO BATAAN

While the South Luzon Force was gallantly resisting the enemy at the Tayabas coast, General Wainwright ordered the 11th, 71st, and 91st Divisions, (PA) the 26th Cavalry (PS), and a platoon of tanks, to hit the enemy at Sison and Pozorrubio. Upon occupying the line, the USAFFE troops came into grips with the main body of the enemy's superior mechanical force. So the defenders withdrew and later established a new battle position at Binalonan. Here, General Wainwright planned for a counterattack, but he was directed to execute War Plan Orange No. 3.²

Bataan is almost ideal for defensive purposes. Its mountainous terrain and thick vegetation afford good cover for defenders and formidable obstacles against the offensive use of enemy armor or airpower. Given the proper weapons and supplies, Bataan could hold for six months or may be for a longer period of time.


In compliance with WPO No. 3, the Bataan Defense Force was formed and placed under the overall command of Maj. Gen. George M. Parker. The USAFFE-Bataan echelon was placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall. The Philippine Department was converted into a Service Command and placed under Brig. Gen. Allan C. McBride. The 31st Division, (PA) under Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel was withdrawn from the North Luzon Force. Likewise, the 41st Division (PA), under Brig. Gen. Vicente P. Lim was also withdrawn from the South Luzon Force.³ The Bataan Defense Force was ordered to prepare installations for the arrival of USAFFE troops from the North and South.⁴

¹ Homma's Giant Pincers, Prepared by the Historical Division, HNDP, Manila, published in the Armed Forces Journal, Vol I, December, 1947, p. 11.

² General MacArthur had formulated this plan which envisioned that in the event of a successful Japanese landing on the main island of Luzon, the Philippine Division and the Philippine Army, if unable to beat off the landing and subsequent advance of a theoretical enemy, were to fight delaying actions and to withdraw into the Bataan peninsula. The plan also envisioned a six-month stand on Bataan, by which time aid from the United States would arrive. (Robert Con-sidine, General Wainwright's Story, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, New York, 1946), p. 9.

³ Triumph in the Philippines, Prepared by the Combat History Division, G-1, AFWESPAC, Manila, 1946, Vol I, Into Darkness, p. 64.

⁴ Ibid, p. 64.



The Defensive Lines

Pursuant to the order of withdrawal, General Wainwright directed that delay points were to be established in a series of successive defensive lines. The enemy was to be disengaged at night and the new positions held during the day.

D-1 (Delay Point One) — The first organized mass retreat of the 21st, 11th and 71st Divisions, PA was to be executed on the night of 23 December 1941. It called for withdrawal to a line along Urdaneta, San Carlos and Aguilar, Pangasinan about midway between the base of Lingayen Gulf and the Agno River. This line was about 16 miles inland from the beach and would parallel the Urdaneta-Sta. Barbara section of National Highway No. 3 and would cut all south-bound routes to Manila.

D-2 (Delay Point Two) — It was occupied on 24 December by the same troops. This was a line behind the Agno River from Mangatarem on the left flank (west) through the towns of Bayambang, Sto. Tomas, Rosario and on to Tayug, Pangasinan. The 21st Division occupied the western flank, the 11th Division in the middle, and the 71st division occupied the eastern flank whose units were at Alcala, Rosales and Tayug. Meanwhile, the 71st Infantry Regiment was at Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya.

D-3 (Delay Point Three) — The line was to be established on the night of December 25-26. It extended from Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac on the western flank, connecting Gerona, Tarlac to Guimba, Muñoz and San Jose, Nueva Ecija. The 21st Division again defended the western flank, the 11th in the middle and the 71st in the eastern flank.

D-4 (Delay Point Four) — The line was to be occupied on the night of 27-28 December. It extended from Cabanatuan and Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija through La Paz up to the high grounds west of Tarlac, Tarlac. This line was favorable to the defenders. Being hemmed in the western flank by the Zambales mountains and the eastern flank by the Sierra Madre mountains, the defenders squeezed themselves into the highway connecting Tarlac, and Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. The 21st Division occupied the western flank, the 11th in the middle and the 72d Infantry defended the eastern flank. The CP of the 71st Division, was at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, while the 71st Infantry was at Camp Olivas reorganizing after a long trip from Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya to San Fernando, Pampanga.

D-5 (Delay Point Five) — It was to be established on 28-30 December. The line extended from Bamban, Tarlac at its western flank to Sibul Springs, Bulacan at the foot of the mountains to the east.

After delaying the advance of the enemy that infiltrated through Nueva Ecija, the defenders retreated from Baliuag, Bulacan, to the banks of the Pampanga River to the south at Calumpit, Bulacan. This

action was ordered by General Wainwright even as he ordered the establishment of a front along the Pampanga River to serve as security for the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force until they have funneled through the Calumpit Bridge.

Companies "E" and "F", 71st Infantry were attached to the 91st Division to defend the bank of the Pampanga River. Here, the on-rushing Japanese Forces caught up with the defenders. After several hours of fighting they were ordered to retreat to Culis, Bataan where they again reorganized.

On 30 December 1941, one battery from the 71st FA Regiment was committed to cover the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force funneling through the Calumpit bridge. After the last elements of the South Luzon Force had funneled through this vital bridge, it was blown up by the USAFFE engineers.

After fighting the Japanese at Rosario, La Union and at Pozorrubio and Binalonan, Pangasinan, on 27 December 1941; at San Jose and San Isidro, Nueva Ecija on 28 December 1941; at Calumpit, Bulacan, on 29 December 1941; and at Baliuag, Bulacan, on 30-31, the remnants of the North Luzon Force finally reached Bataan.

The 71st at the Layac Junction⁶

After New Year's Day, as the North Luzon Force was absorbing additional punishing blows on the Guagua-Porac line, General Wainwright conceived of the necessity of organizing a holding position below Layac Junction. He gave the mission to organize this position to General Selleck whose badly battered 71st Division of only two infantry regiments, the 71st and 72d, had been reduced to about 2,500 effectives. To reinforce his Division Selleck was given the American 31st Infantry and the badly mauled 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS). In support was the 71st FA Regiment, of six firing batteries, which was organic to the Division, one battalion from the 88th FA Regiment (PS), and one battalion from the 23d FA Regiment (PS), each of two firing batteries, and two batteries of SPM's. All told, General Selleck could count on fifty artillery pieces: sixteen 2.95's and thirty-four 75's, the most powerful of which were the eight French 75's with which the SPM batteries were equipped. For additional support a tank group was also given to General Selleck. When organized the Selleck Task Force would have been formidable, as in fact it was, had it been provided with some heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns.

The 71st Division reached below the Layac Junction and although disorganized and physically weak, it was immediately committed to the projected battle line which generally guarded the northern ter-

⁶ Pena, Bataan's Own, pp. 83-84.

CHAPTER IX

THE BATTLES OF BATAAN

Reorganization of the USAFFE

In accordance with WPO No. 3, the withdrawal into Bataan was a success. Thereafter, General MacArthur ordered a reorganization. The North Luzon Force became the I Philippine Corps under General Wainwright and the South Luzon Force became the II Philippine Corps under the command of General Parker. The Corps' areas were divided by a line running north through south drawn through Mt. Natib in the north to the Pantingan River thence to Mt. Mariveles in the south.¹


The I Corps was assigned the areas left (west) half of the main line of resistance with its left flank anchored at a point south of Moron, while its right flank rested on the slopes of Mt. Natib. The 1st Regular Division (PA), guarded the beaches of Moron; the 31st Division (PA) was at Hacienda Abucay; the 45th Infantry Regiment (PS), was positioned along the Pilar-Bagac Road; the 26th Cavalry (PS), and the 91st and 71st Divisions (PA) were Corps' reserves.²

The I Corps' area was divided into three sub-sectors. The right sub-sector under the command of Brig. Gen. William E. Brougher had the 11th Division (PA), and the 2d PC Regiment. The left sub-sector was under the command of Brig. Gen. Albert M. Jones, but was later relieved by Brig. Gen. Luther R. Stevens when General Jones became commander of the I Corps. The south sub-sector under the command of Brig. Gen. Clyde A. Selleck, who was replaced later by Brig. Gen. Clinton A. Pierce, had the miscellaneous Air Corps ground units, the 65th Quartermaster Pack Train, the 12th Quartermaster Regiment (PS), the 2d Anti-Tank Battalion, and the 1st PC Regiment.

The II Corps had the 11th and 21st Divisions (PA) as Corps' reserves; the 41st Division (PA), deployed along the main line of resistance; the 51st Division (PA) was on the left flank; while the 57th Infantry (PS), occupied the right flank protecting the beaches along Manila Bay. In mid-January, General Parker acquired the

¹ Robert Considine, *General Wainwright's Story*, Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, New York, 1946, p. 48.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.



31st Division, but ten days later, he lost the 11th Division which was reassigned to the I Corps.

The II Corps units under the command of General Parker were disposed on the new MLR. Its area of operations was divided into five sub-sectors. Sub-sector A, commanded by Col. Constance L. Irwin, extended from the beach defenses at Orion northward to Limay. Elements assigned to this sub-sector were the 31st Infantry (PA), the Philippine Army Air Corps Battalion, and the Philippine Army Training Cadre Battalion. Sub-sector B, commanded by Col. Irwin B. Doane, was defended by the U.S. Provisional Air Corps Regiment and it occupied positions near the right flank of the main battle positions.

Sub-sector C, under Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel, consisted of the 41st Infantry (PA) and the 51st Combat Team. Sub-sector D, under Brig. Gen. Maxon S. Lough occupied the left flank of the main line of resistance. This sector was defended by the 41st Division (PA), (less the 41st Infantry) and the 33d Infantry Regiment. Sub-sector E, under Brig. Gen. Guillermo B. Francisco was along the beaches of the Manila Bay below Limay. It included the 2d Regular Division, (PA) and other miscellaneous units which had followed the main USAFFE force during the withdrawal into Bataan.

With the withdrawal of the USAFFE from Layac Junction, the avenue to the peninsula was opened and the Japanese easily moved westward. The Japanese were aware that the USAFFE main line of resistance was about three miles to the north of the Abucay-Mauban line. General Nara, commander of the 65th Brigade, committed two columns of his force on the eastern portion of the peninsula. A third column was to provide diversionary action in the west by advancing toward Moron and Bagac. Logically, General Nara felt that the principal action would take place in the western portion of the II Corps from where he expected to break through the main line of resistance and execute an encircling maneuver towards Balanga town.³

After the reorganization, the USAFFE troops in Bataan included approximately seventy thousand Filipino officers and men and about twelve thousand civilian volunteers.

Japanese Assault Troops

In pursuit of the defenders, the Japanese artillery started shelling the main line of resistance of the 41st Division, (PA). This was fol-

³ In spite of the insurmountable obstacles presented by the Mt. Natib area, General Nara readily saw this part of the MLR as the easiest to penetrate. It was from here that he expected to drive a wedge between the two USAFFE Corps and work on the destruction of the II Corps by a wide envelopment to its rear.

lowed by assault troops, but the attack was repulsed leaving a large number of casualties.⁴ The 41st FA Regiment also countered with deadly accuracy, silencing the enemy battery.⁵ But a strong Japanese force succeeded in pushing back a platoon of the 41st Infantry at the left flank. The 41st Combat Engineers laid down booby traps in front of their positions and when the Japanese tried to infiltrate, they were blown to pieces.⁶

The 71st Division, reinforced by the 31st Infantry (US) fought on the Hermosa-Dinalupihan line. There was fierce fighting in the sector and the defenders inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy side.

The 16th Division came to assist the 65th Brigade and captured Hermosa, Bataan. In the meantime, the Nara Group, after reorganizing at Angeles, Pampanga, moved south towards Bataan.⁷

The Japanese made a light and exploratory attack on the Ma-batang sector at the same time employing a heavier assault on the exposed left flank of the 57th Infantry (PS). Here, the enemy was met with artillery fire from the USAFFE defenders. In spite of heavy losses, the Japanese threw more men into the attack and succeeded in penetrating the line held by the 2d Battalion of the 57th Infantry (PS). Furious fighting continued for six days.

The enemy next shelled the 43d and the 41st Infantry sectors. Japanese infantry units made several attempts to close in at night, but they were mowed down at the barbed wires by MG's firing along their protective lines. The 3d Battalion of the 32d Infantry, 31st Division (PA), whose right flank was threatened, counterattacked and repelled the enemy before nightfall.⁸

The 42d Infantry, 41st Division (PA) was threatened by the enemy approaching from the draw in its direct front. A squad of volunteers from the 41st Combat Engineers set traps which caught the enemy.⁹

The Abucay-Moron Line

The defense scheme of Bataan called for a line to be established from Moron on the west coast to Mt. Natib and later to include the

⁴ Rigoberto Atienza, "Diary in Bataan", Manila, 1946, p. 13.

⁵ Ibid, p. 14.

⁶ Abbreviated History of the 1st Regular Division, PA, USAFFE, Historical Division, HNDP, Manila, 1947, p. 3.

⁷ Arraignment and Public Trial of Masaharu Homma, War Crimes Commission, Manila, 1946, Vol. XXVI, p. 3095.

⁸ Atienza, op. cit., p. 74.

⁹ Ibid, p. 76.

town of Mauban, seven miles to the south of Moron. It was agreed that the MLR would be at Mauban but that Moron would also be defended at full strength. The 1st Regular Division, (PA) under Brig. Gen. Fidel V. Segundo was responsible for the defense of the area.

On 15 January, the Japanese attacked and captured Moron, but not before they suffered great casualties. A counterattack by Filipino defenders was launched. However, with the arrival of Japanese reinforcement two days later, the 1st Regular Division moved out of Moron and reestablished a defensive line at Mauban.

For a time, the USAFFE forces held on to their positions at Mauban despite determined assaults by the enemy. The sudden appearance of a Japanese roadblock at the rear of the 1st Regular Division forced General Segundo to order a withdrawal from the Mauban line. About 1,000 Constabulary troops had managed to negotiate the difficult route along the rugged coast. The withdrawal was in general successful although their artillery pieces were lost. They were fortunate that during their retreat the enemy did not attack the Mauban line. By the evening of the 25th, the troops had evacuated the Mauban line, at about the same time that the II Corps was withdrawing from the Abucay line.


Having failed at the Abucay front, the Japanese shifted their attack on the sector of the 51st Division, (PA). On account of a very heavy infantry pressure, the 51st withdrew to about a kilometer further back and allowed the infiltrating Japanese troops to reach the western slopes of Mt. Natib.¹⁰

In an offensive against the 11th Division, (PA), the enemy's 20th Infantry attacked the positions held by a company of Igorots, (natives of Mountain Province). An order to counterattack was issued with an infantry unit supporting the tanks. The route of attack had a very irregular terrain, covered by heavy bamboo thickets which were almost impenetrable. But the Igorot commander ordered his men to the top of the tanks and with sticks guided the tanks through the thick vegetation. The exposed Igorot soldiers armed with automatic pistols fired continuously as the unit closed in on the enemy. When the attack was over, the remnants of the tanks and the Igorots were still there, but the Japanese 20th Infantry Regiment was completely annihilated.


In this display of heroism and fighting spirit, General MacArthur praised the Igorots.¹¹

¹⁰ Triumph in the Philippines. Prepared by the Combat History Division, G-1, AFWESPAC, Manila, 1946, Vol. 1.

¹¹ Francis Trevelyn Miller, General Douglas MacArthur, (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Co., 1945), pp. 264-266.



A ROAD BLOCK AT THE MORON LINE



General Homma, in the meantime, initiated a new attack on the west flank occupied by the I Corps. The **Kimura Detachment** which landed at Balanga struck southward from Olongapo, crossed the Moron River and hit the left flank of the 1st Regular Division (PA). Denied of the only avenue of escape, the Division commander had no other recourse but to order the destruction of all artillery pieces and materials were thrown into the sea.¹²

Withdrawal to the Orion-Bagac Line

Having been pressured by the enemy, the defenders withdrew to the Orion-Bagac line. One battalion of the 51st Infantry (US) maintained combat patrols along the Abo-abo River to cover the withdrawal. Earlier, two battalions of the 31st Infantry at Hacienda Abucay were attacked by a suicide banzai charge, but the attackers were totally annihilated.

The 21st Division, (PA) moved to the forward slope of Mount Samat near Trail 1, but they were subjected to artillery bombardment and suffered heavy casualties.


The **Kimura Detachment** and the **Nara Group** closed in on the heels of the withdrawing I Corps. The Japanese artillery at Balanga fired at the route of withdrawal, which nevertheless, was completed as scheduled. The USAFFE troops were disposed on the Orion-Bagac line from east to west with the 11th Division, (PA). The 1st Regular Division, (PA), the 92d Infantry, some elements of the 91st Infantry, the 3d Battalion of the 71st Infantry, and two battalions of the 72d Infantry were at Bagac. The rest of the 71st Division (PA) were on beach defense, while the 45th Infantry (PS) and the 26th Cavalry (PS) were the Corps' reserve.

The 71st at Aglaloma

After the initial contact with the enemy on 7 January 1942, there was practically no action in the sector of the 71st Division. For the first time, the officers and men enjoyed a two-week's rest after their withdrawal from Central Luzon.

In the meantime, the Japanese had thrown their entire strength against the USAFFE along the II Philippine Corps' sector. For two weeks, the Japanese tried to puncture the 41st Division line at Abucay but failed. Wave after wave was sent on a frontal assault only to be mowed down by the 41st Division artillery. Up to this stage of the war, the battle of Abucay was a bitter one as both sides punished each other with heavy artillery. There was continuous firing from the 9th up to the 11th of January, 1942.

¹² Abbreviated History of the 1st Regular Division, PA, USAFFE, History Division, HNDP, Manila, 1947, p. 3.



About the second week of January, scouts of the 71st Division reported that the Japanese were evidently preparing for a flanking movement on the west coast. To meet this possible threat, General Wainwright reinforced the 71st by attaching the 1st PC Regiment under Col. Mariano N. Castañeda, the 2d PC Regiment under Col. Manuel V. Atanacio and the miscellaneous U.S. Air Force units. These units were ordered forward to establish positions on the beaches and were deployed as follows: the miscellaneous U.S. Air Force personnel were sent to Quinauan Point; the 3d Battalion, 1st PC Regiment was sent to Anyasan; the 71st Division occupied the main assault position with the 51st Division on its right and the rest of the 1st PC Regiment on its left.

At about this time, General Nara realized that he was up against a determined resistance by the defenders of Bataan, contrary to the reports of the Fourteenth Army's intelligence. Consequently, he committed more reserves and set a big offensive for 13 January. This offensive, however, was frustrated on the east by the 21st Division, (PA), although they succeeded in forcing the 51st Division, (PA), to move back north of the Balantay River. On the 15th, the Japanese 141st Infantry launched another strong attack towards Hacienda Abucay. The fight that ensued lasted for more than a day. The defenders scored another victory in this battle.

The following week, nothing happened in the front lines. The defenders busied themselves improving their positions and clearing fields of fire.


Battle at Quinauan Point

In the evening of 22 January, the outpost on Quinauan reported that rumble of motors moving to and from the beaches in their immediate vicinity had been distinctly heard. The outpost at Aglaloma reported the same observation.

At 2000, fighting started between the U.S. Air Force personnel and the advance elements of the enemy which had landed on Quinauan. The 1st Battalion, 1st PC Regiment under Capt. Jose Tando, supported the U.S. Air Force men.

When it was evident that the enemy could not be dislodged from its beachhead, an assault force was organized under the personnel command of General Pierce. This force was composed of elements of the 71st Division (plus attached units), the 2d Anti-Tank Battalion, the 2d Battalion of the 45th Infantry Regiment (PS), the 57th Infantry Regiment (PS), and the 2d Battalion, 2d PC Regiment.

After the initial encounter at Quinauan Point the U.S. Air Force personnel were relieved by the 1st Battalion, 1st PC Regiment. Taking



advantage of their previous gains the Japanese secured the caves on the beaches. The Constabularymen occupied the high grounds above the caves and were enticing the Japanese to come out and fight, but the latter refused. They clung to their positions, supported by Japanese planes which hovered over their beleaguered soldiers. After failing to dislodge the enemy, the 45th Infantry Regiment, (PS) which relieved the 1st Battalion, initiated an attack to drive the Japanese away, but also to no avail. Enemy reinforcement by sea tried to land but the barges were either sunk or driven off by the defenders.

In the meantime, the Japanese were getting short of food and ammunition. Planes dropped food supplies to their beleaguered troops, but these fell within the USAFFE sector and instead taken by the defenders.

In the evening of the 24th, the Japanese succeeded in securing another beachhead at Anyasan Point. Colonel Castañeda ordered the 2d PC Battalion together with the 57th Infantry Regiment, (PS) to drive the Japanese away. The U.S. Air Force and the Philippine Air Force personnel and a battery of 75-mm. guns were thrown in to support the assault forces. General Selleck sent reinforcement to the Lapiay-Longoskawayan-Pucot area. After a brief encounter, the Japanese withdrew.

The next morning, 25 January, the 81's were emplaced on the northwest slope of Mt. Pucot and fired against Japanese positions. The crew of Battery Geary in Corregidor with eight 12-inch mortars began a sweeping fire on Longoskawayan.¹³ The Japanese rushed into Aglaloma Bay, crossed Quinauan Point and sought refuge in the jungles. Under heavy curtain of fire, machine-gunners of the 1st PC Regiment and the 45th Infantry Regiment, (PS) emplaced their guns on the opposite shore towards the shallow waters of Aglaloma Bay.

The following day, Battery Geary reversed its fire, this time firing from the south to the north shores of Quinauan. The Japanese rushed out of the jungles and became easy targets of machineguns which opened up with terrifying accuracy. The sweeping fire mowed down a large number of Japanese who were killed in this death trap.

A few fanatical Japs saved themselves by staying inside the caves along the water line. The caves had been earthen out of the cliff by the wash of the waves. They were the first Japs to be pocketed. An offer to surrender was made but the Japanese fired on the soldiers who brought the offer. A U.S. Navy gunboat shelled the caves, while Army engineers lowered electrically-charged fuses and blew the caves to pieces. A few Japanese rushed out, and plunged themselves into the sea only to be picked up one by one by the USAFFE troops or to be drowned in the sea.

¹³ Col. Ambrosio P. Pena (Ret.) Bataan's Own, p. 107.

Feats of Heroism

Officers and men of the assault force performed many feats of heroism which won for them distinguished awards. Capt. Pedro Q. Molina, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism "in the face of intense enemy fire while rescuing a brother officer who had been seriously wounded in the face of a heavy enemy attack."

Col. Mariano Castañeda was awarded the Silver Star for "extraordinary heroism" together with Col. Irwin, Maj. Deogracias Tenazas, Capt. Diosdado Rodriguez, Capt. Jose Tando, and Lt. Dayrit.¹⁴ The Purple Heart was awarded to Captain Tinio, Lt. Jolly Bugarin and other officers "for wounds sustained in action in the Battle of Aglaloma."

After the mopping up operations at Quinauan, Aglaloma, Anyasan, Silaliim and Cañas Points, General Wainwright reported to General MacArthur that the main line of resistance of the I Philippine Corps was still containing the enemy even after three weeks of furious fighting.¹⁵

The 71st Division with the Service Command


The defense of the southern portion of the peninsula was given to the Service Command under Brig. Gen. Allan C. McBride. Assigned to it were the General Francisco's 2d Regular Division and General Selleck's 71st Division, various elements of the U.S. Army Air Force and the PA Air Corps earlier reconstituted into infantry units. Its area of responsibility was between the Mamala River on the east and the Paysawan River on the west. The east sector facing Manila Bay had a regular coastline characterized by excellent beaches. On the other hand, the area within the west sector was rugged, thickly forested and with many streams. The shoreline was very irregular, consisting of numerous points jutting out like fingers and forming equally numerous small inlets and bays.

Later, the 71st Division (—) was assigned to southwestern Bataan after the battle at the Hermosa-Dinalupihan line. The Pantingan-Mariveles line was extended to the south along the Paniquian River which served as boundary line of the 2d and 71st Divisions.

General Selleck, when apprised of his mission, was quite perplexed, for he was to secure approximately thirty kilometers of shoreline without the necessary means to do it. His 71st and 72d Infantry

¹⁴ Annex P, R, U, & Q.

¹⁵ General MacArthur, in turn commended the entire I Corps Command with the full laconic statement: "Well done, I Corps."



and 71st FA Regiments had been attached to the 91st and the only combat unit which secured the southwestern coast of Bataan was the 2d Battalion, 1st PC Regiment under Capt. Macario Negrosa and some provisional infantry units composed of American and Filipino air corps personnel.¹⁶

It was here that General Homma decided that in order to gain control of the vital Pilar-Bagac Road, landings should be made on the west coast south of Bagac.

As early as 22 January, several barges were loaded at Moron and proceeded to the south. However, on the way, they were attacked by PT boats. Some of the barges were sunk while the others drifted away from their intended landing sites, one at Longoskawayan Point on the southern tip of the peninsula and another at Quinauan Point. Instead, landings were made at Anyasan and Silaim Points.

Jungle Fighting

Having landed successfully behind enemy lines, the Japanese conducted a vicious warfare against the units sent out to block them. Continuous jungle fighting took place for three weeks, with each side suffering heavy tolls. In this battle around 1,500 Japanese troops were killed.


It was a bold move taken by General Homma but the price was extremely costly. The Japanese lost an equivalent strength of one regiment. On the other hand, the USAFFE suffered around 550 casualties, with 166 killed and the rest wounded. With these successful operations against the Japanese at the Points, the USAFFE men's morale went up.

Japanese Withdrawal

After a series of defeats from the hands of Filipino and American troops which annihilated every Japanese infiltration group, General Homma ordered a general withdrawal within Bataan. Consequently, the Japanese had to abandon their hard-won positions.

Having withdrawn his forces General Homma re-examined the war situation in the Philippines. According to the timetable set by the Imperial General Headquarters he was supposed to have completely destroyed the USAFFE forces in Luzon by 31 January. The fact that he was not able to do so caused much anguish and embarrassment for him and his Fourteenth Army. Moreover, his 65th Brigade was fast dwindling in strength due to its humiliating defeat at the hands of the defenders.

¹⁶ Col. Ambrosio P. Pena (Ret.), Bataan's Own, p. 86.



General Homma realized that he needed to reorganize his forces and to ask for reinforcement if he was to present the Bataan campaign to its successful completion. He knew that what was needed was rest for his troops for their morale and a reinforcement in order that he could launch a final offensive that would uphold his name and that of his Army.¹⁷

Finally, he ordered a withdrawal on 3 February, to areas north of the Pilar-Bagac Road. At this time, the Fourteenth Army had a combat force of only 7,000 men. General Homma was waiting for reinforcement as he feared of a counterattack by the defenders. He believed that had the USAFFE launched one, he could have only offered little opposition and the Bataan Force would have reached and recaptured Manila practically in no time.

In truth, the launching a counter-offensive had been considered by the beleaguered USAFFE commanders, but higher headquarters rejected such plan saying that the main objective was to hold on until assistance would arrive and any move that would jeopardize this primary consideration was out of the question.¹⁸

USAFFE versus Hunger

Meanwhile, the weary defenders felt the serious shortage of nutritive food items, like meat, sugar, lard, and milk. In view of the situation, soldiers were sent foraging missions and many died in the process. While this encouraged the men to display valor and services beyond the call of duty, the seriousness of the food situation drove many others to act in desperation.

It was little known however, that during the siege of Bataan and Corregidor there were attempts to remedy this lack of supplies by running through the Japanese blockade. Several U.S. ships sailed from Australia carrying supplies which were unloaded in Mindanao and Cebu. Later, three ships likewise came from the United States loaded with supplies and ammunition but, these hardly alleviated the supply problem of the USAFFE.

¹⁷ Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, OCMH, Dept. of the Army, 1953, p. 349.

¹⁸ Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim submitted a plan of counterattack that would be in the nature of a limited offensive. The first phase would be the recapture of Abucay, then Guagua and finally San Fernando. His plan was rejected.

CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF PROPAGANDA

The battles of the points and of the pockets were huge successes of the USAFFE. After these Bataan became unbelievably quiet and peaceful. There were occasional flurries attendant to patrol clashes; there were inevitable artillery duels and aerial reconnaissance and bombardments; but aside from these there was an incredible lull in the peninsula.

During the period of lull, active combat operations ceased throughout the entire Bataan front. Scouts of the 71st Division going far out beyond the OPLR reported no enemy within sight. Other roving patrols reported having made contact with enemy patrols who made friendly gestures at them. The enemy seemed to have lost its aggressiveness. Behind these friendly gestures however, the enemy was just starting its propaganda efforts to alienate the Filipino soldiers from the Americans.

Subsequently, enemy planes dropped thousands of propaganda leaflets in the area. These contained different cartoons, pictures and other propaganda materials. Some leaflets depicted the brutality and inhumanity of the Americans which began in 1898, when they first occupied the Philippines up to the present war. There were cartoons showing President Roosevelt dragging President Quezon to stop a Japanese heavy tank. There were leaflets containing drawings of appetizing menus served in hotels and restaurants in Manila. There were also pictures of nude women enticing the Filipino officers and enlisted men to leave the Americans and go back to Manila for a good life. Also distributed were copies of a letter from a wife to her soldier-husband.

The Japanese used loud speakers placed in front of the OPLR making appeals to the Filipino soldier requesting him to stop fighting as the Japanese were not fighting the Filipinos. They requested the Filipinos to leave the Americans and let them fight their own war. These loudspeakers also broadcast radio programs from Manila's station PIAM, where a soft-voiced propaganda artist made appeals to the mental, physical, spiritual, and even sexual instinct of the Filipino soldier.

What is the New Order in Greater East Asia?

India, China, Philippine, the East Indies and Indo-China were the lands of paradise created by God. During the last two or three centuries, however, these lands turned into an area of misery and suffering by the aggressive exploitation of the White race—the English, French and Dutch. It was like an invasion by a burglar while the whole family was asleep.

The good natured people did not know how to defend themselves from the burglar with weapons. There was no other way left for those people who were dreaming in their paradise, but to let their invaders do what they please. Spiritually and culturally these

WELL FOUGHT AND WELL DONE



TYPICAL JAPANESE PROPAGANDA

REMEMBER CALOOCAN!



REMEMBER CALOOCAN!

17,000 FILIPINO MEN, WOMEN & CHILDREN
SLAUGHTERED MAY, 1900

In May, 1900, American soldiers...
General Joseph Smith...
...and 10 years ago...
...together with other Filipinos...
...and still live and number...
...of the...
...by its...
...America, the...
...to...
...to...
...to...
...to...

Filipinos, Come One, Come All

Stop resisting. All efforts are useless. The American Main Forces in Manila are now retreating. Surrender one by one or in groups with high standards and no harm will happen to you. Remember, all Filipinos are our Friends and Brothers.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
The Imperial Japanese Armed Force

Good Conduct Pass

Simultaneous with these various propaganda was a "Pass" made out of a cartolina paper, the size of an ordinary calling card, to serve as a "Ticket to Peace" and "Ticket to Happiness". On the reverse side was printed a set of instructions on what the holder should do in case he would wish to surrender. This would also serve as a good conduct pass, and no questions would be imposed upon the holder.

Although most of these propaganda were to some extent intended for the Filipino troops, some were also directed towards the Americans. In the height of these Japanese propaganda, the Americans were asked to surrender and cease to intensify the non-sensible fight. And to overcome the fierce fight rage, they made use of some signed letters and statements of captured American troops, revealing the essential goodness, fair and nice treatment accorded to the Americans by the Japanese.

Despite all these movements, the Japanese still failed in their attempt to win the sympathy of the Filipino troops; for loyalty and freedom were deeply rooted in the Filipino soul and the people would not barter it for a totalitarian way of life. The Filipino people were too intelligent to be deceived by sugar-coated Japanese falsehood.

For every propaganda raised by the Japanese, the USAFFE gallantly countered with magnificent courage in their messages USAFFE's "Voice of Freedom," projecting from Corregidor, the hard-pressed Filipinos bearing the various brunt of Japanese invasion. Another propaganda machinery used by the Americans was the International News Summary, illustrating their allied victories in some other parts of the world, most especially the defeat of the Germans in the Russian front, and how the English troops fought against the enemies, amid the daily aerial bombardments that caused conflict, horribly damaged and trampled the country. The News revealed of a milelong convoy on its way to the Philippines to reinforce the beleaguered troops and to bolster the USAFFE's morale.

In contrast to the propaganda raised by the Japanese, the USAFFE troops in Bataan, readily adhered to their own propaganda. The Filipinos were drawn to it, because of their loyalty to the United States, although some of the propaganda were still far from being a reality, like the plan of celebrating a victory parade in Manila, the tremendous number of planes, tanks and warships that were being produced by the United States, the refloating and putting into an A-1 condition the damaged American Fleet in Pearl Harbor. All of these added courage and sheer determination to go on with the fight against the Japanese.

"Remember Erlinda"

The expected enemy counterattack on the 3d of February did not come. Patrols sent to reconnoiter the enemy positions came back with negative reports. On 4 February, a strong patrol was sent out further to the front to locate the enemy. There was no hostile opposition encountered. On the spot where the enemy had previously resisted strongly were found what probably was his Command Post and his Quartermaster dump. Stores of telephone wires, clothes, some used and bloody, bicycles, and some canned foods were found scattered. These were unmistakably left in a hurry. There were many American maps and papers with Japanese characters scattered around as well as white posts left standing over loose moulds of earth, probably Japanese graves. One of these posts and some important looking papers and maps were sent to II Corps headquarters for deciphering.

In the evening of 4 February, Capt. Mamerto Montemayor, G-1 of the 41st Division, and his assistants were busy writing a theme that was meant to arouse the hatred of the Filipino soldiers against the Japanese invaders. They came upon two words which were soon to become a by-word with the Filipino troops. These were "Remember Erlinda". There were numerous atrocities committed by the Japanese that were incredible which Captain Montemayor and his assistants wanted to be brought to public knowledge.

Probing around, members of the patrol came upon a shallow grave from which two pairs of feet stuck out. After the bodies were dug out, two young girls in their underclothes presumably shot in the back were recovered. The younger one was pretty with soft skin and delicate hands. She was apparently a well-cared woman belonging to a middle class family. She wore a white chemise on which was embroidered the name "Erlinda." The other was a little older. From her appearance, she seemed to be a servant or chaperon of Erlinda. A picture of Erlinda was found in the pocket of a dead Japanese soldier. The picture bore on the right lower corner the address "Pasig, Rizal." An exhaustive reconstruction of the facts recovered showed Erlinda had evacuated to Bataan from her province of Rizal. Then the invaders got caught of her, molested her, raped her and killed her. Whatever actually happened, Captain Montemayor thought Erlinda as a symbol of Filipino womanhood who had been killed, desecrated, insulted, injured and abused by the savage invaders.

After the paper had been completed, copies were sent to the front and to Col. Carlos Romulo's Press Relations Office. Frontline commanders were directed to read the theme to the men. So far, many unknowing soldiers thought they were fighting to save their skins and not for any noble cause. Now they understand. The article

was also sent to Corregidor and broadcast verbatim by the "Voice of Freedom" radio. The words "Remember Erlinda" hereafter became a popular battle cry in the Pilar-Bagac front.

The soul-stirring letter reads as follows:

"Pasig, Rizal"

"To my fellow countrymen:

"I call upon you to justify our grievances as the weaker sex. It is for many days now that we were taken prisoners by the occupying Japanese forces. And within a limited space of time, my girl companions and I had encountered the most cruel treatment from the brutal hands of the Japanese.

"Their misdeeds are crimes without names in the vocabulary of human beings. Their invective impulses are that of the irrational beast. They have no respects for the rights of the weaker sex . . . but instead binds us to the superiority of their male strength, considering that we are women and who belong to a race that is not their enemy.

"We did not lose our virtues, but we suffered thirst and hunger. And during the nights, we shivered from the coldness of these mountain fastnesses, for most of us had nothing more to cover our bare backs because those Japanese mercilessly tore them to pieces, while we kneel and beg them for pity, and explain our miserable condition.

"I leave unto you this farewell message not only in behalf of Filipino womanhood of which my prayers and hope that this may act as an inspiring power to guide you in this hazardous fight. Don't give up this fight, my brethren! Go on! This enemy is the root of all evil deeds not fit to live with the human race or share with us in this beloved country of ours."

"Erlinda"



COLONEL MAMERTO MONTEMAYOR
(Then Captain) Author of "Remember Erlinda"

To offset any gain the propaganda might have had, USAFFE Headquarters did everything possible to keep the morale of the troops on high level. There was no need of it though as the officers and men of the 71st Division could not under any circumstance give up the fight.

As to the officers and men of the 71st Division, who were schooled in the basic tenets of the democratic way of life, they stuck to their job and did not pay much attention to the enemy propaganda.

USAFFE Forces Accounting

Taking advantage of this lull period, General Wainwright reorganized his forces as follows:

Philippine Army:

Headquarters, Philippine Army	700
11th Division, PA	4,500
21st Division, PA	5,000
31st Division, PA	5,000
41st Division, PA	5,000
51st Division, PA	3,300
71st Division, PA	3,300
91st Division, PA	6,400
1st Regular Division, PA	1,300
2d Regular Division, PA	2,200
Service Units	2,800

Philippine Scouts:


14th Engr Battalion	800
45th Infantry Regiment	2,200
57th Infantry Regiment	2,200
26th Cavalry Regiment	550
Miscellaneous units including the 24th, 86th and 88th FA	4,700

Mixed PA, PS, USA Units:

Service Commands	11,500
Headquarters, I Corps	600
Headquarters, II Corps	800
Headquarters, Luzon Force	200
General Hospitals, No. 1 & 2	800

Total 63,850

Of this force, a total of forty six thousand men were sick or suffering from malaria, dysentery, mal-nutrition, avitaminosis, beriberi, and a lot of other diseases. The effective combat strength of the USAFFE had been reduced to a little over twenty eight thousand men. On the other hand, Homma's Fourteenth Army had been reinforced and was ready for another big assault. He did not want to suffer another set back.



CHAPTER XI

THE JAPANESE FINAL OFFENSIVE

Arrival of Japanese Reinforcement

The final Japanese effort to capture the peninsula was launched on Holy Week, but the massive preparations were made much earlier.

It will be recalled that on 3 February, General Homma ordered a general withdrawal of his troops in Bataan and made a report to *Daihon-ei* (Imperial Japanese General Headquarters) describing his predicament. Subsequently, the Tokyo High Command took a sympathetic view towards General Homma's plight and forthwith ordered all the forces that could be spared to finish the campaign in the Philippines. Before doing so, however, the Tokyo High Command showed its displeasure by relieving some of the key staff officers of the Fourteenth Army.¹

Daihon-ei decided to reinforce the Japanese Fourteenth Army to insure the destruction of the Bataan garrison which by then was being acclaimed as the world's greatest citadel of democracy in Asia. Toward this end, there were redeployed to the Philippines some crack and battle-tested units: from China, the 4th Division; from Hongkong, five heavy artillery regiments; from the French Indo-China, the 21st Brigade (*Nagano Detachment*); from Borneo, three infantry battalions (*Ikuta Detachment*) and three Mortar companies; and from Singapore, the *Kawaguchi* and *Kawani Detachments*. Besides, these ground reinforcement included two Army heavy bombardment groups from Singapore and one Navy bombardment group from Timur. In addition, all losses of the 16th Brigade, originally with Homma's invasion forces were replaced.

The reinforcement began to arrive in the Philippines in February 1942. On the 27th, the 21st Brigade arrived. Simultaneously, the heavy artillery regiments from Hongkong and the 4th Division landed in Lingayen Beach with the last elements arriving on 1 April, on

¹ According to Homma, inspecting officers from Tokyo found many of his staff officers relaxing in Manila. As a result of this, on 23 February, Homma's Chief of Staff, the Operations and Training Officer and the Supply Officer of the Fourteenth Army were relieved. (Testimony of Homma, War Crimes Commission Trial, USA vs Homma).

time for the final offensive of 3 April. The *Ikuta Detachment* arrived sometime in March, while the Army and Navy bombardment groups completed their transfer to Clark Field also in March. The *Kawaguchi* and *Kawani Detachments* arrived early in April 1942, and were assigned to the Visayas and Mindanao areas.

By late March, there were about 46,000 ground troops available for the final battle at Bataan. In addition to these, there were artillery reinforcement, two heavy bombardment regiments and naval air units.²

As commander of the reinforcement troops, General Wachi left for the Philippines on 27 February 1942, and reported to General Homma on 1 March 1942.³

As stated earlier, it was at this juncture Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim, Commanding General, 41st Division, PA, recommended a counter-attack toward San Fernando. Had the USAFFE High Command accepted General Lim's recommendation, the USAFFE, on admission of Homma and Wachi, could have "walked into town" with only a token opposition. So demoralized and badly mangled were the Japanese that of their original 16th Division and 65th Brigade, only two battalions of infantry were considered effective at the time. The days that followed, however, gave the Japanese the much needed respite. What was more, their replacements and reinforcement began to arrive. On the other hand, the USAFFE, without hope of reinforcement and assistance was slowly weakening due to the ravage of hunger and disease.

The Japanese continued regular bombings of the front and rear areas of the USAFFE and intensified their propaganda to camouflage their activities. From late February until the final attack on 3 April, the Japanese kept regular patrols to forestall any USAFFE counterattack. Meanwhile, the Lingayen Gulf and Subic Bay areas were clogged with Japanese transports and supply ships unloading cargo. The roads from Lingayen to Manila were busy with Japanese convoys.

Early in March, an Igorot patrol from the 11th Division, PA, operating behind Japanese lines reported heavy concentration of troops, motor transportation and supplies at Guagua, Pampanga. On

² Morton, Fall of the Philippines, OCMH, Dept of the Army, 1953, pp. 413-414.

³ "The morale of the troops had been completely broken down and they confined themselves to the bottom of the ravines or in the canyons because they had fought to no avail. Battle after battle they failed successively and in the face of too many defeats their morale could not be sustained. They could not penetrate into the thick forests and their only hope at the time was aerial attack . . . the Japanese Army was severely beaten by the Philippine Army . . . the artillery was so accurate and powerful that the Japanese Army feared this most."

19 March, the Japanese had massed about 20,000 men in front of the II Corps. Three days later, additional Japanese troops landed in Subic Bay. Toward the end of March the bombing and shelling of the II Corps line became more severe.

In the meantime, General Wachi moved his advance command post from San Fernando to Balanga, while General Homma moved his headquarters from San Fernando to Orani.

General MacArthur leaves for Australia

In compliance with orders from the War Department to leave the Philippines and proceed to Australia to become Far East Commander, General MacArthur left Corregidor on 12 March, on board a PT boat. From there, he went to Mindanao where a plane picked him up and his party and brought to Australia.

Before his departure, General MacArthur created the Luzon Force and designated General Wainwright as commander. General MacArthur had chosen to exercise control as commander of all forces in the Philippines through an advance post in Corregidor under his Deputy Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Lucius Beebe. Later however, this order was superseded when General George C. Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff, designated General Wainwright as commander of the US Forces in the Philippines, (USFIP).⁴ In turn, General Wainwright designated Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr to take command of the Luzon Force, comprising the two Philippine Corps in Bataan.

The Main Assault

On 28 March, Philippine Scout patrols reported that Japanese troops estimated to be about 60,000 men with strong tank and artillery support and about 1,000 trucks were massing in front of the USFIP's defense line.

Evaluating the evidence before them, G-2 USAFFE, now redesignated USFIP, concluded that the Japanese were preparing for the main assault.

Earlier on 25 March 1942, in his new headquarters at Orani, General Homma summoned his unit and artillery commanders and announced that a general offensive would be launched on the 3d of April. They began perfecting the plans of the second and final battle of Bataan.

⁴ Annex O.

In the planning phase, the general staff was greatly aided by the capture of USFIP situation maps of Bataan.⁵

In deciding where to exert his main efforts, General Homma calculated that an attack against the I Corps' front would meet with heavy resistance because the terrain afforded strong defensive position. On the other hand, an attack against the II Corps' right (east) flank over comparatively open terrain, could only expect to run into heavy resistance as General Wainwright would naturally deploy heavier defensive forces along the sector. Finally, General Homma decided to attack through the northeast and northwest slopes of Mount Samat for two reasons: first; the USFIP would least expect a frontal assault against the 65-foot cliffs, and second; he wanted to take this key terrain so that his artillery observers could get commanding observation and assure maximum artillery support to his attacking troops. Thus, it turned out that five-kilometer stretch at the limiting point of General Capinpin's 21st Division and General Lim's 41st Division at the north undulations of Mount Samat was selected as the breakthrough point.

Enemy Troop Disposition

Accordingly, General Homma disposed his troops along the Pilar-Bagac line as follows: two battalions of the 16th Division and two battalions of the Ikuta Detachment were to contain the entire I Corps' front from Bagac to Pantingan River; the 65th Brigade would be deployed from Pantingan River to the west edge of Mount Samat; the 4th Division would occupy the east edge of Mount Samat to the bend of Pilar-Bagac line; and from there on to Pilar was the Nagano Detachment.

The artillery units, mortars and heavy infantry guns were massed on the five-kilometer frontage and a depth of four kilometers west of Balanga and behind the left (east) half of the 65th Brigade and a small portion of the right (west) half of the 4th Division. Distance between guns was 30 meters. The 16th Division and two battalions of the Ikuta Detachment were held in reserve.

To dislodge and demoralize the USFIP, the attack was to be prepared with heavy artillery bombardment concentrated in front of Mount Samat. This was to be followed by an attack of a regiment

⁵ On this matter, General Wachi declared: "We know generally the disposition of defensive troops of the USAFFE as they were committed in late February 1942. This map was sent to Tokyo where several copies were reproduced.

"We have only knowledge of the strength of the USAFFE during the final battle of Bataan. However, our general estimate was from 60,000 to 80,000 men. As to the types of guns used, we did not know, except that we believed the USAFFE possessed considerable amount of arms. As to planes, we knew that there was one or two planes stationed at Corregidor."

of tanks (20 to 30 in number) and the infantry. Simultaneously with the artillery barrage a saturation bombardment of the Mount Samat area by the Air Groups was to be unleashed.

General Homma directed that in the event a gap was created at Mount Samat, the 4th Division would funnel through and then swing to the left (east) toward Limay so that the USFIP forces at Orion would be sandwiched between this Division and the Nagano Detachment. The 65th Brigade was to keep pushing south toward Mariveles to protect the right (west) flank of the 4th Division, while the Nagano Detachment was to sweep the eastern coastline of Bataan, capture Cabcaben to prevent escape from Bataan and engage any reinforcement from Corregidor.

So confident were the Japanese of overcoming the Bataan defenders that they did not bother to provide for an alternate plan in the event of failure.

Meanwhile, after inspecting the lines on 27 March, General Wainwright conferred with General King and his sub-sector commanders regarding the impending Japanese attack and to check the disposition of the troops.

On the eve of the final battle of Bataan the USFIP numbered about 70,000 of which only about 28,000 were effectives. The rest were sick in the rear areas. The Fourteenth Army, on the other hand, had about 40,000 to 50,000 combat effectives with sufficient tanks, artillery and air support.

The "Zero" Hour

The "zero" hour was set at 1500 on 3 April 1942. For the Japanese the day was "Empire Foundation Day;" for the Fil-Americans, it was good Friday. The Japanese called for preliminary artillery barrage and aerial bombardment for at least five days to soften the Filipino-American lines.

Accordingly, on 29 March, they initiated night bombing raids against the II Corps. The following day, large Japanese combat patrols smashed the OPLR of the 42d Infantry. Simultaneously, the OPLR of the 21st Infantry was also smashed by artillery concentrations. The following day, the Japanese launched a combined aerial bombardment and artillery barrage at the junction of the 41st and 21st Divisions. This was followed by a heavy combat patrol assault but which was repulsed by the defenders. On the China Sea coast, Japanese warships commenced shelling the flank of the I Corps' lines. Meanwhile, diversionary skirmishes were taking place all along the Pilar-Bagac line.

On 1 April, Japanese artillery and bombers again incessantly pounded the same sector. The following day, Japanese patrol actions had ceased altogether. However, their artillery directed by planes and balloons continued to throw shells into the Fil-American lines with sustained intensity.

Meanwhile, the tanks and troops were assembled at their respective lines of departure. At 0900 on 3 April, a combined artillery and aerial bombardment of incredible fury was directed at an area about five kilometers wide and five kilometers deep at the limiting point between the 41st and 21st Divisions. The fire was so well-planned that the first volley fell at the rear of the USFIP lines and succeeding rounds gradually moved northward (backward) until every inch of the ground covered by the defending troops was hit. This totally disrupted communications and cut off all possibility of retreat. All day long, except for brief intervals, the Japanese threw shells and bombs into the sector and at 1400 the 41st Division, was so badly smashed that its elements began to filter to the rear.


With new intelligence information about the elaborate defense of the USFIP, General Homma called for an estimate of the enemy situation. He believed he could destroy the main line of resistance in two weeks. After this phase, the operations would degenerate into mopping-up operations which he hoped would be terminated in another two weeks. It turned out later that his estimate was too conservative, made so perhaps by his earlier failure to make Bataan capitulate on the scheduled date.

Havoc on the USFIP Fronts

As planned, intense bombardment was made by some 150 Japanese artillery pieces and a sustained air attack on the USFIP positions. So fierce and intense was the artillery-air preparation that there was almost a complete devastation of the installations. Immediately after the lifting of this barrage five Japanese columns began advancing, each spearheaded by tanks. The pattern of maneuver was a pincer movement, with Mount Samat as the primary objective.

The days immediately preceding the assault were one of horror and tragedy. The heavy and ceaseless enemy bombardment wrought havoc on the USFIP positions destroying whatever determination there was left among the defending troops to resist the onrushing Japanese infantry. The USFIP MLR was a blazing inferno. On 4 April, the Japanese found themselves in possession of the north and north-eastern slopes of Mount Samat.

At the start of the final offensive, the estimated fighting strength of the USFIP forces was around 28,000. There were 3,219 patients in the two general hospitals in Bataan. The number increased to



4,700 and during the intervening period 800 of them had been reported dead. In front areas, collecting stations, and field hospitals, the number of ineffectives had increased to around 25,800.

At 1700 on 5 April, the Japanese smashed the lines along sub-sector "D", while advanced elements captured the top of Mount Samat, the all-important artillery observation post. Seven hundred prisoners and several artillery pieces were captured. In the evening, they captured the junction of Trail 129 and Trail 4 which were the main trails leading to the rear of Mount Samat.

At this stage, General Wainwright planned for a counterattack. The 31st Infantry Regiment (U.S.) was able to gain one thousand yards although its advance was checked at this point.

During the furious battle, Brig. Gen. Mateo Capinpin, commanding general of the 21st Division, (PA) was captured by the Japanese near his command post. Upon learning of the fate of their leader, the remnants of the Division decided to break through enemy lines. Some succeeded, but others were ambushed and suffered heavy casualties.

The II Corps was ordered to withdraw and form a new line along the San Vicente River facing northeast. The Japanese, however, seemed to have anticipated the projected move, as all day long enemy artillery fired on the fleeing troops. The USFIP artillery had been silenced; its position became untenable. By nightfall of 6 April, the situation was hopeless. The 45th Infantry (PS), had been cut off on the Pantangan River Valley. Sub-sector "D" had been cut off from the II Corps and the 41st Division, (PA) had withdrawn deep into Mariveles. The remnants of the Division (PA), were at Limay retreating south.

As the grim days of fighting drew to a bitter end, the Japanese became indiscriminate in their attacks. Japanese bombers shelled anything that moved — struck at all stationary targets including hospitals. They bombed the vicinity of Hospital No. 1, near Mariveles, killing about sixty patients and destroying a large part of the compound. The bombing lasted for fifteen minutes throwing the patients into panic. Patients crawled into the jungles for cover. The worst surgical cases were evacuated to Hospital No. 2 at Cabcaban where they suffered greater inconveniences.

General Bluemel attempted to regroup his delaying force to the south bank of the Mamala River on 7 April, but after a canvass of men available from the 26th Cavalry (PS), 57th Infantry (PS), 31st Infantry (US), and the 14th Engineers (US), he decided that with such force no effective defense could be made. The USFIP artillery poured its last shells into the vicinity of Limay in a futile attempt

to stop the enemy. The Japs in spite of this attack advanced in all directions capturing Limay at dawn.

Brig. Gen. Mased J. Punk, Chief of Staff of General King, went to see General Wainwright for a permission to surrender to prevent a massacre but which was not granted. Instead, General King was ordered to attack with his I Corps. But the troops were malaria-ridden and almost famished so the attack order was countermanded.

The following day, on 8 April, General Wainwright sent radio messages to General MacArthur in Australia and to the War Department advising them of the possibility of a disaster on Bataan. However, he received an order to counterattack.



Prisoners of war being divested of their personal belongings by the Japanese conquerors

CHAPTER XII

THE END OF PHILIPPINE DEFENSE CAMPAIGN

While the USFIP headquarters was in quandary as to what to do to save the situation, a huge formation appeared overhead at noon at 8 April, and unleashed the most terrific air strike ever made on Bataan.

At midnight of the same day, General Wainwright ordered General King launch a counterattack. This was in compliance with the order he received earlier from General MacArthur directing him that "when our supply situation becomes impossible, there must be no thought of surrender. You must attack."¹

On his part, General King knew that to counterattack was impossible. The position of his troops in the face of the enemy was highly untenable and to continue the fighting would subject his men to unwholesome slaughter. His decision was, therefore, to surrender in order to avoid complete massacre of his troops. He instructed the demolition of all weapons of combat.


Surrender Negotiations

Meanwhile, he sent Col. Everett C. Williams, his chief of Artillery and Maj. Marshall H. Hurt, Jr. of the 31st Infantry (US) to arrange for surrender terms with the Japanese commander.

At 0230 on 9 April, Colonel Williams and party, on a jeep with a white flag flying on its front bumper, met an advance Japanese patrol near the Lamao Agricultural Experimental Station. He was brought to the Japanese Command Post, but in the absence of an interpreter, nothing transpired. He was taken as hostage. Only Major Hurt was allowed to go back to fetch General King.

General King, accompanied by Col. James V. Collier and his aides Maj. Wade Cothran and Capt. Achille Tisdelle left for the conference. They placed large white bed sheets attached to long poles in their jeeps. In spite of this sign of truce, Japanese aircrafts made strafing passes at the party.

¹ General MacArthur later explained in his Reminiscences that he expected the Bataan Force to disperse in the event of failure of counterattack, and to engage in guerrilla warfare. The commanders in Bataan, however, had no such understanding.



BRIG. GEN. EDWARD P. KING, JR.
 Commanding General of the Luzon Force Command
 He agreed to an unconditional surrender in order to save the lives of his men.

*U.S. Army Photo
 Reproduced by MSgt. V. Obedencia*

On the other hand, General Wainwright did not like the negotiations being entered into by General King. He ordered all negotiations be stopped, but for lack of communication, his order was not relayed to General King.

With the aid of a Japanese interpreter, General King explained that as commander of the Bataan Force he came to surrender with certain conditions. But Col. Motoo Nakayama, representing General Homma's headquarters said that the surrender must be unconditional.

General King knew that every minute of delay meant death to more of his men. So, he agreed to an unconditional surrender.

The Japanese made no attempt to make the surrender a matter of record. Neither did they permit General King to return to his Command Post to reorganize his men to be turned over as prisoners of war as he had requested.

In the meantime, Japanese infantry units continued firing as they moved southward, contrary to the terms of the agreement. They destroyed ammo dumps and burned hospital buildings after the patients were evacuated.

Bataan was rocked by explosions that night. In addition, two earthquakes occurred that shook the peninsula. Amidst all these, Bataan fell.

The defenders could not continue to resist the enemy any longer. Their stand had been bold but could not last.

On that fateful day, General Wainwright received a message from President Roosevelt giving the former every confidence on whatever decision he might take in view of the untenable situation in Bataan. That message confirmed therefore the action of the USFIP commander to surrender.

The Death March

The "March of Death" is a gruesome story of a sanguinary and barbaric orgy of brutality, murder and torture which has no equal in the annals of modern warfare. In this infamous march, twenty thousand Filipinos and five thousand Americans taken as prisoners of war trekked the long route from Mariveles, Bataan to San Fernando, Pampanga. About twenty five thousand civilians who had followed the USAFFE into Bataan during the withdrawal were also forced to join the "march of death".

The Death March began on 10 April. On the road, the prisoners of war were divested of their personal belongings. The conquerors snatched greedily all the money, rings, watches, fountain pens, shoes,

clothings and even the food which the prisoners had saved for the emergency. Those who were slow in giving up their belongings were slapped, beaten or shot to death.

No one was exempt from the march. The wounded and the sick had to join and thousands of them died along the way. Some were bayoneted or machine-gunned while trying to fill up their canteens with water. Japanese planes hovering overhead would also strafe them. Under the blistering heat, the POWs marched along with hardly a time for rest. No food was given and no water for anybody. Men were dying of thirst. Many went crazy and several died. Three Filipinos and three Americans were buried while still alive.

Upon reaching San Fernando, the prisoners were thrown into railroad mailbox cars up to Capas, Tarlac. Again here, they were subjected to another three-hour sun treatment, then marched off to the concentration camp at Camp O'Donnell.

The fifty thousand Filipino and American officers and men, and civilians, in different stages of malnutrition avitaminosis, natural fatigue, exhaustion, and beriberi finally reached the concentration camp.

While there, the POWs were again tortured. Food served was only fit for the dogs. They were fed only with a small ball of rice and a little salt. Thousands of them died and only few survived till they were released.

The Fall of Corregidor²

After the fall of Bataan on 9 April, the Japanese High Command expected Corregidor to follow suit. The Rock which could have withstood indefinitely a naval attack from the China Sea, stood alone. The enemy who had employed his artillery on the slopes of Mount Mariveles in southeastern Bataan and had full control of the air, could now concentrate everything he had on tod-pole-shaped Corregidor.

The saturation bombing did not force Corregidor to surrender along with Bataan. As early as 29 December, while the North Luzon and South Luzon Forces were withdrawing to Bataan, Corregidor became the target of aerial attacks by planes of the Japanese Army's 5th Air Group and the Navy's 11th Air Fleet. Tons of bombs of the 225- and 550-pound variety were dropped on Corregidor, giving The Rock a ghastly picture of an island enveloped "in clouds of dust and black smoke."

² Military History Review Vol. IV, 1 "Corregidor: Japan's Isle of Delusion," Military History Branch, TI & ED, GHQ, AFP, issue of December 1956.

As though the aerial attacks were not enough, towards the end of January, the enemy moved to the shores of Ternate, Cavite. The **Kondo Detachment** (named after Maj. Toshinori Kondo) an artillery unit of four 105-mm. guns and four 150-mm. howitzers bombarded the island fortress. Fort Drum in El Fraile Island fired back with its 6 and 14-inch guns, aided by the 12-inch mortars of Fort Frank in Carabao Island.

Towards the end of February the hostile artillery fire slackened, which coincided with the lull in Bataan. But in the succeeding first two weeks of March, a much stronger artillery group, the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment, which became known as the **Hayakawa Detachment** (named after Col. Masayoshi Hayakawa) opened fire with its 240-mm. howitzers on the island fortress. During that seven-day period, from 15-21 March, much more damage was inflicted on Corregidor than during the one-month shelling by the **Kondo Detachment**.

Immediately after the surrender of Bataan, the enemy's Army artillery under Lt. Gen. Kishiro Kitajima, started shooting at **The Rock**. On 12 April the batteries³ on Corregidor were given authority to counterbattery fire. The artillery battle went on with unceasing fury for the rest of the month of April. The most effective batteries were Battery Way with its four 12-inch mortars and Battery Geary with its eight 12-inch mortars. However, in spite of their gallant, admirable stand, the defenders were doomed largely because of the shortage of supply in food and water and ammunition.

By the end of April, Lt. Gen. Kenzo Kitano, CG, 4th Division planned to land his force on the north side of Corregidor, between Morrison Point and Rock Point. Two detachments, the **Sato Detachment** (named after Col. Gempachi Sato, Commander of the 61st Infantry) was assigned the left (east) wing force, while the **Taniguchi Detachment** (named after Maj. Gen. Kureo Taniguchi, infantry commander of the 4th Division) would take the right (west) wing force. Air action from the 22d Air Brigade under Maj. Gen. Kizo Mikami was intensified. Its biggest day was 4 May when it scored 16,000 hits on Corregidor. **Kitajima's Artillery** began the pre-invasion bombardment on the evening of 5 May, at the same time the **Sato Detachment** was making the landing on the fortress.

The beach defenders, which included the 4th U. S. Marines, 59th Coast Artillery Regiment (U.S.), and 1st CA Regiment (PA) were dismally unfamiliar with infantry tactics. Their only good attribute was the will to fight. On the other hand, Colonel Sato made considerable

³ Batteries Geary, Way, Wheeler, James, Cherry, Crockett, Hamilton, Smith, Grubbs, Hearn, Hanna, Ramsey, Keysor, Morrison, Cushing, Wright, Morja, Ordnance Point, Rock Point and Sunset.

headway in his advance. He had broken through the USFIP line at Denver Hill and was now getting ready to make an assault at the east entrance of Malinta Tunnel.

By 0600 on 6 May, Corregidor's ebbing strength was almost entirely spent. Consequently, General Wainwright knew too well that Corregidor's gallant defenders could no longer absorb any additional beating. Like General King before him, General Wainwright made an estimate of the situation and arrived at the same conclusion that there was nothing to be gained by continued resistance. Surrender was the only logical way out . . . to avert the needless sacrifice of his men and to keep the dreaded flame throwers out of the tunnel.

By 1000, General Wainwright made the difficult decision which eventually put an end to the Philippine defense campaign. The 27-day siege of **The Rock** proved wrong the Japanese high command's expectation that Corregidor would capitulate at the same time or a few hours after Bataan.

After the war General MacArthur, speaking of Corregidor, said, "Corregidor needs no comment from me. It has sounded its own story at the mouth of its guns. It has scrolled its own epitaph on enemy tablets. But through the bloody haze of its last reverberating shot, I shall always seem to see a vision of grim, gaunt, ghastly men, unafraid."

Great Need For Discipline

To us, discipline is of the greatest need and importance in the current undertaking because it was the lack of discipline which brought us to the brink of disaster. We failed to realize that our rights required corresponding responsibilities. The abuse of our freedom stemmed from our lack of a sense of personal as well as communal responsibility. We went our separate ways without thinking of the community interest; we placed ourselves a part and above the national interest. In the process, we reached that critical point of anarchy which necessitated the imposition of martial law, and if there is any priority objective of martial law, it is the imposition of discipline on the society in order to restrain excesses and abuses which wasted and misdirected our efforts in the past. At the same time, discipline is the systematic utilization of our energies for the achievement of common goals.

Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile.

CHAPTER XIII

THE 73D INFANTRY REGIMENT IN MINDANAO¹

As earlier stated, when the main bulk of the 71st Division, PA was shipped to Luzon in September 1941, the 73d Infantry Regiment was still being organized on paper. However, some of its officers and key men had been called to duty earlier and already had joined the training of the 71st Division while in cantonment at Camp O'Donnell, Tarlac. By the end of October, these officers and key men returned to Negros to join their mother unit, the 73d Infantry Regiment.

When the Visayas-Mindanao Force under Maj. Gen. William F. Sharp was formed, the 73d Infantry was attached to it.

Concerned over the security of Mindanao which was deemed the more important enemy objective next to Luzon, General Sharp transferred his Visayas-Mindanao Force headquarters from Cebu to Mindanao on the first day of January 1942.

Upon arrival at his new headquarters at Kawayanon, in Del Monte, Bukidnon, General Sharp issued Field Order No. 1 specifying the mission of the Visayas-Mindanao Force.²

¹ Capt. Ambrosio P. Pena, "The Japanese Conquest of Mindanao", published in the *Military History Review*, Vol IV, No. 1, December, 1956, pp. 20-70.

² Mission of the Visayas-Mindanao Force was that of "holding the island of Mindanao, or as large a part of the island of Mindanao as possible. The central plateau of Mindanao . . . must be held at all costs. If units are forced to withdraw by overwhelming enemy superiority they will withdraw toward the central plateau mentioned."

Field Order No. 1 — Agusan Sector under Colonel (then lieutenant colonel) Ben Hur Chastaine: the 81st and 93d Infantry Regiments; the Philippine Constabulary units in Surigao and Agusan, and the local volunteer guards; Cagayan Sector under Colonel William P. Morse: the Cagayan Brigade composed of the 61st and 81st FA Regiments which were almost entirely equipped as infantry; the rifle-equipped Hqs and the 30th Squadron, of the Bombardment Group (US); and the local PC and volunteer guard units, and the following elements of the 101st Div; Headquarters & Headquarters Bn and 1st Bn of the 103d Inf; 2d Bn, 102d Inf; and 3d Bn, 101st Inf; Lanao Sector under Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort: the 81st Div less its 81st, 82d, and 83d Inf and 81st FA Regts; the 2d, 61st, 62d, and 73d Inf Regiments; the rifle-equipped 14th Squadron, 19th Bombardment Group (US); local PC and volunteer guard units; and a bolo Bn; Zamboanga Sector under Col. William F. Dalton: the 1st Bn, 102d Inf; the 43d Inf (PS) of only two companies; and the local PC and volunteer guard units; and the Cotabato-Davao Sector under Brig. Gen. Joseph P. Vachon: the 101st Div, less its detached elements; the 2d Bn, 82d Inf; the 3d PC Regiment; the rifle-equipped 28th Squadron, 19th Bombardment Group (US); and the volunteer guards.

All the while the troops in Mindanao continued with their training program. The call to active duty of reservists as well as the enlistment of recruits continued at a steady pace to bring to as close as possible to wartime strength the units in Mindanao, and to man the new units scheduled for activation at an early date. In Bukidnon a school in infantry tactics was organized, staffed by personnel of the 43d Infantry. The training program was felt adequate to meet the situation, but one big drawback was the dire shortage of small arms ammunition so that its expenditure on the firing range was prohibited. At best the men learned how to shoot their rifles by simulated fire.

Siege of Mindanao

The failure of General Homma to capture Bataan under the timetable for conquest served the Japanese a good lesson. **Daihon-ei** decided to send General Homma the needed reinforcement which would be utilized not only in Bataan and Corregidor but also in the Visayas and Mindanao.³

It consisted of the **Kawaguchi Detachment**, **Kawamura Detachment** and the **Ikuta Detachment**.⁴

Meanwhile, the Japanese high command had worked out a grandiose plan of terminating the Mindanao campaign at the earliest possible time. The plan called for amphibious assaults to be staged by the **Kawaguchi** and **Kawamura Detachments** at Illana Bay and Macajalar Bay, respectively. The **Kawaguchi Detachment** was to effect two landings, one at the town of Cotabato, headed by General Kawaguchi, and the other at the town of Parang. Once ashore the first landing party was to push immediately toward the junction of the Cotabato Road and Route 1 at the barrio of Nuling, thence eastward toward the Sayre Highway to join the **Miura Detachment** which, meanwhile, was to drive westward from the town of Digos.⁵

The other landing party, upon the seizure of Parang, was to push north along Route 1, past Lake Lanao, to Iligan thence to central Misamis Oriental to join with the forces of General Kawamura. A

³ Among these reinforcement were the 4th Division, several battalions of heavy artillery which were grouped under Lt. Gen. Kishio Kitajima; the **Kawaguchi Detachment** consisting of the 35th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and the 124th Infantry Regiment all placed under Maj. Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi; and the **Ikuta Detachment**, consisting of five independent battalions of infantry under Col. Torao Ikuta.

⁴ The killing of Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos was attributed to the elements of the **Ikuta Detachment**.

⁵ The **Miura Detachment** had landed at Davao on 20 December 1941 under Lt. Col. Toshio Miura.

small party from Parang was to push to the south along Route 1 to link with the force which landed at the town of Cotabato.

General Kawamura was to bring his Detachment ashore at the head of Macajalar Bay, in the vicinity of the northern terminus of the Sayre Highway. From its beachhead, a small element was to drive westward to effect junction with the **Kawaguchi Detachment**, while the bulk was to drive to the south through the Bukidnon plateau, along the Sayre Highway. It was expected that the elements of the three detachments, one driving east, another west, and the third south, would be ultimately converged at the junction of the Sayre Highway and Route 1. Control of Mindanao would then pass into Japanese hands.

All these landings of the Japanese were successful having met only slight opposition from the defenders. However, the enemy was repelled at Parang which was the site of Camp Luna where the 2d Infantry Regiment under Col. Calixto Duque gave the Japanese a good fight. There was also a gallant stand of the USAFFE at the Digos front under Brig. Gen. Joseph P. Vachon, 101st Division commander and concurrently commander of the Davao-Cotabato Sector.

The battles inland proved the heroism of the defenders. Even as they were continuously harassed by heavy hostile infiltrations, the enemy had to pay costly for every inch of ground they were able to occupy. Among the significant battles where furious fighting took place was at the Mataling front line. The defenders established three battle lines wherein each figured fierce engagement with the enemy. Fighting started at 0300, 30 April and lasted up to 5 May. A two-day lull broke the action after which fighting was again resumed up to the date of surrender on 27 May.

The 73d with the Lanao Sector

On 1 May, the enemy struck at the position of the 61st Infantry under Col. Eugene H. Mitchell. Behind the line was emplaced the 2.95-inch guns and one section of mortars from the 73d Infantry's Combat Company. The enemy opened up with its artillery, mortars and machine-guns, keeping the 61st Infantry pinned down, and in the meantime, prepared its infantry for the attack. For a while the defenders held their group but the hostile infantry supported by tanks and artillery once more mounted a full-scale attack.

Consequently, Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort, Lanao Sector commander, ordered the 1st Battalion of Lt. Col. Robert H. Vessey's 73d Infantry to move to Ganassi and establish a secondary line to support the 61st Infantry. However, lacking adequate transportation, it never reached its destination. At 0130, 2 May, after the Porog line had been abandoned, the 1st Battalion, 73d Infantry was still at Bacolod Grande.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 73d Infantry was ordered to take position alongside the 1st Battalion.

In the face of incessant attacks the 61st Infantry began to disintegrate. In its ranks numerous hostile snipers had infiltrated, exacting great damage in the regiment's dispositions. At 2300 when the enemy finally called off the attack, the bulk of the defending troops had vanished. Colonel Mitchell, with his not more than 39 men, joined forces with Capt. Jesus F. Pastrana of the PC Company stationed at Ganassi who had around 60 men. They established a defensive line before the Ganassi-Lumbatan Junction. But a Japanese motorized column spearheaded by tanks crushed their position and both Colonel Mitchell and Captain Pastrana were captured.

The complete rout of the 61st Infantry left only one unit of the Lanao Force intact — the 73d Infantry. General Fort had hoped to utilize this regiment under Colonel Vessey in a last effort to break the Japanese attack and save his command.

The 73d Infantry had been assigned to secure the Camp Overton-Iligan area which until then was not immediately threatened by hostile action. On the evening of 1-2 May, General Fort issued orders for Colonel Vessey to move his 1st and 2d Battalions to Ganassi. At dawn of the 2d, the 73d encountered the Japanese. After fierce fighting, Ganassi was captured. Colonel Vessey withdrew his force and established his position at Bacolod Grande. But no matter what he did, Colonel Vessey was only expected to delay the hostile advance but not to break it up. The force that he had, inadequately supported, could not equal the display of strength arrayed against him.

At 0800, 3 May, the enemy in motorized column, preceded by four tanks, appeared before the line of the 73d Infantry. The 2d Battalion which was astride the road, immediately opened up with its cal. 50 machine-gun, concentrating its fire on the leading tank which was disabled. This stalled the advance, and taking advantage of the situation all the automatic weapons of the 2d Battalion opened up on the trucks, inflicting heavy damage on the enemy dispositions. As admitted by the enemy later on after the campaign, seven truckload of his troops were either killed or wounded.

After unloading from the trucks, the hostile troops deployed, and in the meanwhile the artillery opened fire on the front line dispositions of the 73d Infantry. A single aircraft entered the scene, which immediately began a strafing attack. Guided by this aircraft, accurate shots were registered by the artillery.

Not long after the enemy infantry launched a full-scale attack against the entire front line, with the greatest effort exerted against the right portion of the line held by the 1st Battalion. The enemy

finally succeeded in turning the right flank, forcing Colonel Vessey to withdraw to his secondary position before the town of Tugaya. But before he could settle down to organize the new line, the enemy again struck and forced another withdrawal. Before the day ended, apprehensive that Colonel Vessey's battered force would be totally destroyed, it was ordered to pull back to a wooded area four kilometers east of the town of Dansalan. The 3d Battalion which had not at all been committed, was also withdrawn farther to the north-east, to the township of Kapai.

The next day, 4, May, the enemy moved into Dansalan without meeting any further resistance. It had now gained almost complete control of Lanao, leaving only the eastern and northeastern region of the province to General Fort and his badly shattered command.

General Kawaguchi with a force of 4853 and some assistance from Colonel Miura's Detachment had finally completed his assignment. He had now under his control the southern and western Mindanao. It took him but four days to accomplish the job, from the morning of 29 April to 3 May, of completely routing or immobilizing the elements of the Lanao Force and the Cotabato-Davao Force. It was now left for General Kawamura, assigned to stage an amphibious assault on the Cagayan Sector in northern Mindanao, to do his part in order to complete the conquest of Mindanao.

General MacArthur wanted the island of Mindanao as a backdoor to use in his eventual return to the Philippines. When he left for Australia in March 1942, he had issued orders for General Sharp to keep the island even if in the end he would have to engage in guerrilla warfare. But General Sharp was seriously handicapped in carrying out the orders due to the dire shortage of trained men and material at his disposal.

The Japanese had elected to engage a segment in a particular sector, one at a time, and in this way succeeded in destroying by piecemeal General Sharp's Mindanao Force.

The Surrender of Mindanao Forces

Between the 1st and the 10th of May when General Sharp formally surrendered his command, the record of the Mindanao Force was one of successive defeats and withdrawals. In Central Cotabato there was nothing more that could be done by General Vachon's Cotabato-Davao Force. General Vachon received the surrender orders from General Sharp on 12 May and on that same day, he and his staff were taken to Camp Casisang where they were confined as prisoners of war.

Meanwhile, General Fort hoping still to reorganize and strengthen his depleted command, moved his headquarters farther inside the

forest, by the Koroken creek and then later at Mt. Palao. Still later, when the enemy showed no signs of taking any measure against the remnants of the Lanao Force, General Fort moved his headquarters at Bubong. General Fort felt greatly elated at the initial success of rebuilding his force. On 20 May, he once more transferred his headquarters to a wooded area east of Tamparan.

All the while, several couriers were sent by General Fort to contact the Mindanao Force headquarters, but to no avail. Then finally on 22 May, Colonel Mitchell, former commanding officer of the 61st Infantry, Major Pritchard, G-4 of the 81st Division, PA and Col. William F. Dalton of the Mindanao Force headquarters, arrived at General Fort's headquarters with written orders from General Sharp to surrender. At first he refused to accept the orders but when he was informed that his failure to surrender would mean the execution of some 60 to 90 American officers of the Mindanao Force then being held as hostages, General Fort decided to give up the fight.

On the morning of 27 May, what remained of the Lanao Force, including the remnants of the 73d Infantry, marched out of Tamparan to Dansalan and there gave themselves up to the enemy, marking the end of organized resistance in Mindanao. For the Japanese, the conquest of Mindanao was completed.

A Challenge to Greatness

At no time in the contemporary experience of the Filipino soldier has he been put to the supreme test of moral and physical courage, of dedication, integrity, of professional competence and objectivity. Not only has he been called upon to save the country from the peril of violent overthrow; he is also asked to help build a new order. Indeed it is a challenge to greatness.

General R. C. Espino
AFP Chief of Staff

— ooOoo —

"During those long months in Europe, my associates and I came to understand that in a major conflict there was no such thing as a separate land, sea, or air war. Single purpose and direction and careful balancing of forces was necessary . . ."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Supreme Allied Commander

CHAPTER XIV

THE NEGROS FORCE

Organization

After the 71st Division, (PA) left for Luzon in September 1941, for attachment to the South Luzon Force, and later its 73d Infantry Regiment was sent to Mindanao on 7 January 1942, Negros and Siquijor Islands were left without any organized troops.

Anticipating the withdrawal of these troops Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador, Commanding Officer of the 7th Military District, issued orders calling all reservists who had not yet reported for duty. In answer to this call, reserve officers, mostly school officials and teachers and enlisted reservists reported for duty. They formed the nuclei of the 74th and 75th Infantry Regiments. However, there was still lack of personnel to form a unit to garrison Negros and this prompted Colonel Gador to request Headquarters, PA for authority to enlist volunteers. Accordingly, on 19 December 1941, HPA granted the request with instructions to train right away all accepted applicants.

Pursuant to these instructions, Colonel Gador immediately established seven (7) recruiting centers in strategic places in the 7th Military District and assigned each center a team of 2 officers to interview, process and train the volunteers.¹ Two days later a medical officer followed to conduct physical and medical examinations in each center.

Far beyond the expectation of Headquarters, 7th Military District, the youth of Negros flocked to the centers by the hundreds daily. The Municipal Mayors and Chiefs of Police fully cooperated and provided free transportation to and from the registration centers. Their civil status was not a deterrent factor as single and married alike volunteered. However, preference was given to those without de-

¹ These centers were as follows: San Carlos Elem Sch, San Carlos, Neg Occ, 1st Lt. Damaso Morales and 3d Lt. Wilfredo Encarnacion; Bacolod High Sch, Bacolod City, 1st Lt. Delfin Estelloso and 1st Lt. Eleuterio Birondo; Pontevedra Elem Sch, Pontevedra, Neg Occ, 1st Lt. Graciano C Soliquen and 2d Lt. Maximino B de Guzman; Guihulngan Elem Sch, Guihulngan, Neg Or, 1st Lt. Venancio Oracion and 1st Lt. Francisco Alcantara; Dumaguete High Sch, Dumaguete Neg Or, 1st Lt. Herminigildo Mercado and 1st Lt. Gregorio Larot; Larena Elem Sch, Larena, Neg Or, 1st Lt. Felix Estrada and 1st Lt. Nestorio Erum; Murcia Elem Sch, Neg Occ, 1st Lt. Saturnino Abes and 2d Lt. Arsenio Castillo.

pendents. After a week of enlistment no less than seven thousand volunteers were registered. Many others were turned down on account of educational and physical reasons.

Each Recruiting Team performed all the manifold duties attendant to every training camp and worked from early dawn to late at night. The volunteers were organized into companies for purposes of control, messing and training. Each company had a leader chosen from among them. The weekly training program prepared by Hq 7th MD patterned after that of the cadre trainees were religiously followed. Lectures on information and propaganda, however, were emphasized.

At midnight on 31 December 1941, all recruiting officers were recalled and the recruits were ordered to go home with instructions to stand by for future orders. Simultaneously, the officers reported at La Carlota, Negros Occidental. Later, the bulk of the recruits were inducted into the Negros Force and ninety-five per cent of them joined the 7th Military District Guerrillas.

The territorial organization of the Negros Force embraced the islands of Negros and Siquijor. Its personnel was a conglomeration of ROTC cadets, reservists, and civilian volunteers. The volunteers represented the cross-section of the island population such as students, government employees, laborers, farmers and fishermen. While the bulk of its personnel lacked military training they possessed however, the spirit and the will to fight.

On 7 January 1942, Maj. Gen. William F. Sharp, CG, Visayas-Mindanao Force, ordered Colonel Gador to command all inducted forces in Negros and Siquijor islands. Simultaneously, the organized units under the 7th Military District were designated "The Negros Force".

Initially, the Headquarters of the Negros Force was temporarily housed at the La Carlota Elem. School, La Carlota, Negros Occidental. The Negros Force staff was composed of Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador, Commanding Officer; 1st Lt. Ceferino Martinez, Adjutant; Maj. Tiburcio Ballesteros, QM Officer; Capt. Romeo Intengan, Finance Officer; Capt. Francisco Serrano, Medical Officer; 1st Lt. Augusto Alfonso, Engr Officer; 1st Lt. Eligio Cruz, Censor Officer; and 1st Lt. Fidel Soliven, Jr, Detachment Cmdr (Internee Camp).

About the later part of February, Col. Roger Hilsman, was assigned to command the Negros Force vice Colonel Gador who was reassigned in Mindanao. Prior to his appointment to the Negros Command, Colonel Hilsman commanded the troops in Digos Sector, Davao during the initial landing of the Japanese in Mindanao in December, 1941. After assuming command, he transferred his Headquarters at La Granja, La Carlota for security reasons. He reorganized his staff as follows: Maj. Licerio Balolong, Ex-O; Capt. Sinforoso Men-

chavez, Adj. & G-1; Capt. Francisco Gomez, G-2; Capt. Salvador Abcede, G-3; Capt. Vicente Geroso, G-4; Maj. Tiburcio Ballesteros, IG; Capt. Romeo Intengan, Fin O; Capt. Francisco Serrano, Med O; 1st Lt. Augusto Alfonso, Engr Officer.

Sometime in late March 1942, Col. Carter McClennan, formerly of the 61st Division, (PA) was assigned as Executive Officer vice Colonel Balolong. After the fall of Bataan, the Negros Force Headquarters was again transferred to Fabrica. Almost simultaneously Colonel Hilsman was relieved of his command in Negros and assigned in the staff of Brig. Gen. Bradford Chynoweth in Cebu. Colonel McClennan became the Acting Commander with his staff as follows: Lt. Col. Licerio Balolong, Ex-O; Maj. Sinforoso Menchavez, Adj & G-1; Lt. Eduardo Montilla, G-2 & G-3; Maj. Vicente Geroso, G-4; Maj. Romeo Intengan, Fin O; Capt. Francisco Serrano, Med O; 1st Lt. Augusto Alfonso, Engr. O; Maj. Sam C. Jones, CO, 74th Inf; Lt. Col. Tiburcio Ballesteros, CO, 75th Inf.

The 74th Infantry Organized

The 74th Infantry Regiment was organized in Magallon, Isabela to garrison the province of Negros Occidental. It was at first contemplated to form the nucleus of the 72d Division which was to be organized as the war progressed.

The enlisted personnel of this regiment were reservists and civilian volunteers. These were reservists who were either late in reporting for duty or were declared excess when the 71st, 72nd and 73d Infantry Regiments were being organized. The civilian volunteers on the other hand, were mostly students, employees and farmhands who applied for enlistment at the outbreak of the war.

The officers were mostly school teachers and officials who received commission in the Reserve Force. Most of them had undergone the required training at the ROSS while others were graduates of SRC.

The 74th Infantry was under the command of Maj. Sam C. Jones, with its headquarters at Hacienda San Jose, La Castellana. Other officers assigned with the 74th Infantry were Maj. Jose Culig, Ex-O; 1st Lt. Reyes, Adj & S-1; Maj. Angel Okol, CO, 1st Bn; Maj. Francisco Gomez, CO, 2d Bn; and Maj. Ernesto Mata, CO, 3d Bn.

The Regiment was composed of a Headquarters Battalion and three infantry battalions of four companies each. It garrisoned the western side of Negros island extending from the town of Cadiz in the north to Cawayan in the south. Disposing its battalions strategically all along the coastal plain of western Negros, Major Jones established his command post at San Jose.

The 75th Infantry

Recognizing the necessity of organizing a force in Oriental Negros out of the troops already inducted there, Headquarters, Negros Force activated the 75th Infantry. Its personnel came from the reservists at Camp Leon Kilat, Tanjay, Negros Oriental who were waiting for assignment. These reservists were organized into a Provisional Battalion under 1st Lt. Feliciano Señeres. Immediately after its organization Lt. Señeres transferred his headquarters from Tanjay to Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental to conduct further training of the troops.

On the other hand, the ROTC cadets of Silliman University having been previously inducted into the USAFFE were waiting for assignment. They were organized by Capt. Salvador Abcede and 1st Lt. Antonio Romero, Commandant and Asst. Commandant respectively. One of their problems was the lack of commissioned officers. This problem was later solved when the 75th Infantry was activated and the ROTC Battalion became one of its components.

On 12 January 1942, Major Ballesteros arrived in Negros Oriental to organize the 75th Infantry. He took along 1st Lt. Herminigildo Mercado and 2d Lts Maximino B. de Guzman and Uldarico S. Baclagon of the Provisional Battalion to assist him. The following day, he issued Special Orders Nos. 1 and 2, Hqs 75th Infantry, announcing his assumption of command and designated his Regimental Staff as follows: 1st Lt. Herminigildo Mercado, Ex-O & S-1; 2d Lt. Uldarico S. Baclagon, S-2 & S-3; and 2d Lt. Maximino B. de Guzman, S-4.

The Provisional Battalion under Lt. Señeres was redesignated the 1st Battalion and the ROTC Battalion under Lt. Romero was organized as the 2d Battalion. In the meantime, additional officers were assigned to the Regimental Headquarters which was reorganized as follows: Lt. Col. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Commanding Officer; Capt. Herminigildo Mercado, Ex-O; 1st Lt. Saturnino Abes, S-1; 1st Lt. Fidel Soliven, Jr. S-2; 1st Lt. Uldarico S. Baclagon, S-3; and 2d Lt. Maximino B. de Guzman, S-4.

On 1 February, the Regimental Headquarters and the 2d Battalion left for Ayungon, Negros Oriental and four days later moved to Guihulngan where the training of the troops was intensified. In the meantime, more officers from HQ, Negros Force reported for assignment in the 75th Infantry.

As of March, the staff and battalion commanders of the 75th Infantry were: Lt. Col. Tiburcio Ballesteros, CO; Maj. Fortunato Roque; Ex-O; 1st Lt. Uldarico S. Baclagon, S-1; 1st Lt. Fidel Soliven, Jr., S-2; 3d Lt. Ramon Nolan, Asst. S-2; 1st Lt. Antonio Romero, S-3; 3d Lt. Felipe Belzunce, Asst. S-3; 1st Lt. Maximino B. de Guzman, S-4; 1st Lt. Antonio Briones, Surgeon; 3d Lt. Juanito Magbanua, Sig.

Officer; Capt. Herminigildo Mercado, CO., Hqs Bn; Capt. Feliciano Señeres, CO, 1st Bn; and 1st Lt. Benjamin Ignacio, CO, 2d Bn.

Prior to the organization of the sub-sector plan of defense, the Negros Force was composed of the Headquarters troops, two infantry regiments, three PC companies and two QM depots. The 74th Infantry was dispersed along the western side of Negros up to Cadiz in the North and supported by the 1st and 2d Occidental Negros PC Companies, while the 75th Infantry was given the mission to defend the eastern side of the island supported by the lone Negros Oriental PC Company. The QM depots located in Bacolod City and Dumaguete City supplied the needs of the combat units.

When the defense plan of Negros changed from establishing a "Little Bataan" in Mt. Canlaon in favor of guerrilla warfare, Negros island was divided into five sectors each to be defended by a reinforced battalion. When the order of surrender came the Negros Force was composed of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th sub-sectors which originally were the 74th and 75th Infantry Regiments and the three PC Companies.

Mt. Canlaon — The "Little Bataan"

The success of the Bataan garrison to hold out at the early stages of the war encouraged Colonel Hilsman to make Mt. Canlaon the "Little Bataan" in Mt. Canlaon in favor of guerrilla warfare, Negros peninsula. After surveying the area it was discovered that it could only be approached on three sides, the north being impenetrable. Areas for supply depots and warehouses were established and the defensive areas of the 74th and 75th Regiments were designated. The new defense plan was implemented right away.

Simultaneously, the two regiments started the preparation of their defense lines in Mt. Canlaon area. The 74th Infantry took the west and southeastern slopes of the mountain. Each battalion was assigned its sector in the regimental area and the companies in turn were allocated their respective positions in the battalion areas. After a month of intensive preparation Mt. Canlaon became fully prepared for the enemy.

While the Engineers were constructing barracks and warehouses for storage of supplies, the Signal Corps personnel were rushing the communication lines in and around the vicinity of Mt. Canlaon. On the other hand, the Quartermaster Service people were busy stocking food supplies. By late March, 1942, the preparation in Mt. Canlaon was almost complete except for the required quantity of food supplies to last six months.

The Mt. Canlaon bastion, then fittingly captioned "Little Bataan," gave the men the feeling of sufficient security which increased their morale. It was not uncommon to hear them say, "Let the dirty Japs come and get us," or "Like Bataan, Canlaon will be their graveyard." Lulled under the protecting impregnableness of Mt. Canlaon, the security of their own man-made defenses, the officers and men devoted themselves to procuring more supplies and ammunition.

Ammunition and Supply Problems

To augment the limited ammunition available for the troops, salvage crews were organized and formed into teams to retrieve the ammunition that went into the bottom of Maricalum Bay in Southern Negros with the SS Panay which was sunk by Japanese planes. Fortunately, more than half of the salvaged ammunition were found serviceable and were distributed to the men.

In order to supplement their limited stock of hand grenades, the 74th Infantry manufactured Molotov cocktails out of native materials. On the other hand, the 75th Infantry opened an ordnance shop for the repair of machine guns and rifles at the San Carlos Sugar Central, thus making possible the repair of many defective Enfield and old Springfield rifles.

The QM Depots in Bacolod and Dumaguete took care of supplying the combat units with their needs. They hired tailors and shoemakers, contracted vegetable and fish vendors and they even engaged in wholesale production of tapa and dried fish, etc. to supplement their food.

President Quezon In Negros

On 5 March 1942, the MS Princess of Negros arrived in San Carlos from Corregidor with President Quezon and party on board. Among those in his party were members of his immediate family, Vice-President Sergio Osmeña, Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, Maj. Gen. Basilio J. Valdes, Colonels Manuel Nieto and Andres Soriano.

The arrival of President Quezon was a blessing to the Negros Force as he settled the problem of volunteer officers regarding their commission in the Army. Due to the lack of commissioned officers in Negros when the war broke out, Headquarters, Negros Force appointed about fifty professionals and 1st and 2d Class ROTC cadets of Silliman University as 3d Lts (Volunteers). Actually performing the duties as commissioned officers, these volunteer-officers were refused payment of their salary by the Finance Officer on the ground that their appointments lacked Presidential authority. When President Quezon arrived and this question was brought out to his attention, he immediately issued orders commissioning all the volunteer-officers as 3d Lieutenants in the Reserve Force.

For the duration of President Quezon's stay, Negros became the seat of the Commonwealth Government in the field. To forestall any attempt by fifth-columnists to spy on the President's movements the military and civil government officials took special care in covering and camouflaging his travels. Strict precautionary measures were taken to safeguard the President by assigning a platoon of infantry as his honor guard. President Quezon and his party left Negros on 18 March 1942, and proceeded to Mindanao where a plane awaited them for the United States.

Japanese Cruisers Attacked Negros

Even while President Quezon was still in Negros, two Japanese men-of-war appeared at the northern entrance of Tañon Strait on 14 March. Their appearance caused much panic among civilians and apprehension among the soldiers. After cruising leisurely in the narrow strait the Japanese fired about 20 shells on the shores of Negros. Unfortunately, Negros Force did not have artillery. About a mile away from San Carlos the cruisers slowed down and directed their course toward the Municipal Wharf. They peppered the wharf and vicinity with machine-gun fire. Upon reaching about 400 yards from the outer tip of the wharf the Japanese lowered several life boats filled with sailors. However, no landing was made.

In the meantime, the troops of the 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry then garrisoning San Carlos took battle positions along the beach. The 2d Battalion, which was at the time preparing defensive position in Mt. Canlaon was ordered by Colonel Ballesteros to support the 1st Battalion. The 75th Infantry and the PC companies were also alerted for any possible landing in their respective sectors and to support the 75th Infantry if necessary.

Fortunately or unfortunately the Japanese did not make any landing. Instead, they veered away from San Carlos.

On 29 March, another Japanese destroyer appeared in the vicinity of Dumaguete and cruised toward north. As it moved northward it fired several salvos towards Dumaguete, Sibulan and Ayquitán, Negros Oriental. The "C" Co, 1st Bn, 75th Infantry and the PC detachment in Dumaguete were alerted. The cruiser was perhaps only probing the coastal defenses of the area but found nothing. Then it turned back towards Mindanao Sea.

Negros Divided into Sub-Sectors

The failure of Bataan to hold out against a superior enemy with an air dominance proved to the military leaders of Negros the vulnerability of Mt. Canlaon. With approximately 2,000 arms and an average of 40 rounds of ammunition available to each soldier, Mt. Canlaon will only be the unhappy graveyard for the Negros Force.

Hence, a plan was conceived jointly by Majors Salvador Abcede and Francisco Gomez, then G-3 and G-2 respectively of the Negros Force to prepare the Island for a protracted guerrilla warfare against the enemy in case of invasion.

At about this time, Colonel Hilsman was called to Cebu and assigned as Chief of Staff of General Chynoweth, then Commanding General of the Visayan Force. Col. Carter McClennan, then Executive Officer became acting commander. As Majors Abcede and Gomez perfected their plan of guerrilla warfare, the same was submitted for discussion about 13 April 1942, in a staff conference presided over by Colonel McClennan. As envisaged in the new defense plan, the Negros Force will disperse throughout the island and harass the Japanese from the rear in case of enemy landing. To effect this plan Negros would be divided into sub-sectors.

Simultaneously with the adoption and implementation of the sub-sector idea of defense, the headquarters of Negros Force was transferred to Fabrica, Negros Occidental. To forestall interference with the activities and movement of the battalions, Hq Negros Force took operational control of the two regiments. The administration of the personnel, however, remained under their control. The Regimental COs and Staff Officers were either reassigned to the sub-sector headquarters or attached to the headquarters of the Negros Force.

In the sub-sector plan the island of Negros was divided into five sectors each sector with definite boundary lines. In each sector, a reinforced battalion was assigned to garrison it. In the final division of Negros Island the area of each sub-sector was as follows:

The first sub-sector comprising the towns of Murcia, Talisay, Silay, Manapla, Victorias, Saravia and the City of Bacolod was placed under the 3d Bn, 74th Infantry under the command of Maj. Ernesto Mata. The CP of Major Mata was at Murcia, Negros Occidental.

The second sub-sector comprising the towns of Bago, Pulupandan, Villadolid, San Enrique, Pontevedra, La Carlota and La Castellana was placed under the 1st Bn, 74th Infantry under the command of Maj. Francisco Gomez. The CP was at Bacolod Airport, Negros Occidental.

The third sub-sector comprising the towns of San Carlos, Negros Occidental, Vallehermoso, Guihulngan, La Libertad, Jimalalud, Taysan, Ayungon, Manjuyod, Bais, Tanjay, Ayuqitan, Sibulan, Dumaguete, Luzurriaga, Bacong, Dawin, Zamboanguita, Siaton, Tolong in Negros Oriental and the sub-province of Siquijor was placed under the 2d Bn, 75th Infantry under the command of Maj. Fortunato C. Roque. The CP was located at Bagowinis, Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental.

The fourth sub-sector comprising the towns of Cadiz, Escalante, Calatrava, Sagay, and Fabrica was placed under the 1st Bn, 75th

Infantry under the command of Maj. Pullong Arpa. The CP was at Fabrica, Negros Occidental.

The fifth sub-sector comprising the towns of Isabela, Hinigaran, Binalbagan, Himamaylan, Ilog, Kabankalan, and Cawayan was placed under the 2d Bn, 74th Infantry under the command of Maj. Salvador Abcede. The CP was located at Isabela, Negros Occidental.

Under this new defense set-up the Negros troops although offering less or no resistance at all in case of enemy landing would prove costly to the enemy because they would be hit from behind. For the defense of their area of responsibility, each sub-sector commander stationed a platoon or company in strategic places of his sector. If the enemy attempted any beach landing they would be allowed without a fight but once inland they would be attacked or ambushed.

Each sub-sector was independent of the other. The QM Depot at Bacolod and Sub-QM Depot at Dumaguete continued to supply their needs. To augment the meager supply from the QM Depots, the sub-sector commanders were authorized to purchase food supplies such as fish, meat and vegetables in open market.

Surrender in the Visayas

After Bataan surrendered the seas that surround the Visayan Islands were alive with enemy activities. The Japanese had landed in Cebu and Panay, boxing Negros on both sides. Weeks passed but still Negros was avoided in spite of Japanese men-of-war cruising daily along the waters surrounding the island. For weeks until the order of surrender was issued the troops stayed on their post.

As the "Voice of Freedom" announced the fall of Corregidor the spirit of the troops became dimmer, but they continued to remain on post. But the final blow fell on them when they heard over the radio the order to surrender from Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, CG, USFIP.²

² "SUBJECT: Surrender

"TO: William F. Sharp, Commander, Visayas-Mindanao Force

"MESSAGE: To fully stop further useless sacrifice of lives in the fortified islands of Manila Bay. Yesterday I tendered to General Homma the surrender of the fortified islands. General Homma refused to accept the surrender unless I include the forces under your command. After leaving General Homma with no agreement between us, I decided to accept, in the name of humanity, his proposal and tendered at midnight, May 6-7, 1942, to the senior officer of the Japanese forces in Corregidor the formal surrender of all American and Philippine troops . . . You will therefore be guided accordingly, and will surrender all troops under your command. . . .

"This decision on my part, you will understand, was forced upon by circumstances beyond my control . . ." Repeat contents of this by radio to General MacArthur. "Failure to carry out the instruction can have only the most disastrous results. Colonel Nakar, please listen (Nakar was still furiously resisting the enemy in Northern Luzon) . . ."

In compliance with General Wainwright's directive, General Sharp issued his own order of surrender. But both civilians and soldiers in Negros took it with pessimism, as they had faith in the sub-sector set up of guerrilla warfare against the enemy under the able supervision and encouragement of Colonel McClellan, then Acting CO of the Negros Force. When the Cebu Force, however, capitulated to the enemy, Colonel Hilsman, then Chief of Staff of General Chynoweth returned to Negros and once more assumed command of the Negros Force. Immediately thereafter, talks of surrender became apparent. General Wainwright's message had something to do with his decision.

In the meantime, on 10 May 1942, a native boat with four prominent passengers landed in San Carlos. The party was composed of Col. Benito Valeriano, former PC Inspector for Visayas, Jose Osmeña, son of President Osmeña, Atty. Severino, one time Governor of Negros Occidental and one Atty. Veloso of Cebu. They were armed with U.S. pistols and carrying bundles of Japanese propaganda leaflets intended for distribution in Negros.

In a conference held the following day with Colonel McClellan representing Colonel Hilsman, Colonel Valeriano and party admitted that they were personal envoys of the Japanese commander in Cebu to make arrangement with the commander of the Negros Force.³

No decision was reached in the conference. Colonel McClellan assured Colonel Valeriano that he will convey to Colonel Hilsman the points raised in the conference.

On 12 May 1942, Colonel Valeriano and his companions were shot in cold blood by their security guard, Cpl. Justo Lusoc. In a signed confession, Corporal Lusoc assumed full responsibility of his acts and justified his action on the belief that Colonel Valeriano and his companions were Filipino spies working for the Japanese.

On 18 May 1942, the representative of General Sharp arrived in Negros to confirm the order of surrender. The following day, Colonel Hilsman wired Colonel Christie in Papay.⁴

From this message it was apparent that Colonel Hilsman had decided to surrender the Negros Force. On 19-20 May, he ordered his sub-sector commanders to be continuously in touch with their

³ The arrangement was for the unconditional surrender of the Negros Force; the immediate establishment of the civil government; and the release of the Japanese prisoners.

⁴ "REGARDLESS OF LEGALITY OF WAINWRIGHT'S SURRENDER FACT REMAINS THAT SHARP COMMANDING VISAYAS DID SURRENDER ALL VISAYAS WHEN THAT SURRENDER IS CONFIRMED BY SHARP'S STAFF OFFICER WE MUST SURRENDER OR BE CLASSIFIED AS DESERTERS BY OUR OWN COUNTRY AND AS OUTLAWS BY INTERNATIONAL LAW STOP I HAVE COPY OF RULES OF LAND WARFARE."

commands. Meanwhile, Headquarters Negros Force was preparing and mimeographing the order for surrender. Later, the representatives of Colonel Hilsman furnished the sub-sectors copies of the surrender order.

As a whole, General Wainwright's surrender order caused a repercussion and divided the officers and men into two camps. The bone of contention was the legality of his order. A vast majority of the troops believed that the order was illegal on the ground that it was forced upon him by the Japanese. The rest believed otherwise and justifying further the wisdom of surrendering on the futility of further resistance as well as on humanitarian grounds.

When the contents of the order became known to many enlisted men they left their camp areas. The officers and men were indifferent to the order. They counterproposed disbandment in lieu of surrender. "Surrender," they said, "is most humiliating." As the company commanders were waiting for orders from their sub-sector commanders during the night of 21 May, many of the men deserted their posts and faded to the hills.

Maj. Ernesto Mata laboring between discipline and freedom finally issued the order for his command to surrender although he himself refused to surrender. When his intention was known among his troops majority of his officers and men followed his example. Only few surrendered.

Maj. Francisco Gomez convinced of the wisdom of surrender and the fact that his family came from Negros surrendered with the remnants of his troops for the bulk had already escaped to the hills.

Maj. Fortunato C. Roque after consultation with his staff decided to disband his unit assuming full responsibility of his action. Due to their personal attachment and loyalty they stayed with him until he succeeded in dissuading them to leave him for their families. After repeated requests from Headquarters Negros Force to surrender, he finally surrendered with his S-3. When his staff learned of his action, they followed his example and surrendered too.

Maj. Pullong Arpa, then closest to Colonel Hilsman's Headquarters at Fabrica was not given a chance to vacillate with the order. Except "C" Co. under Capt. Felix Estrada, he and his command surrendered en masse.

Maj. Salvador Abcede on the other hand, believing that General Sharp can't surrender the Visayas as he was in command of Mindanao only decided not to disband his troops but told them to stand by. Issuing instructions to keep their arms, he told them to disperse and be ready to be called later. He therefore, gave reality to that idea which led to the abandonment of the defenses in Mt. Canlaon in favor of guerrilla warfare which he helped planned and organized.

By the end of May 1942, only seven hundred officers and men out of the more than three thousand original troops surrendered and were made POWs. Around four hundred of them were concentrated at Fabrica, while those at Mambucal, a little over two hundred were concentrated. The rest did not surrender to the enemy and instead carried on their resistance by joining guerrilla organizations.

Consequently, although officially the Negros Force surrendered, unofficially it didn't. The fight was continued not as Negros Force, USAFFE, but as 7th Military District Guerrillas under Lt. Col. Salvador Abcede.⁵

⁵ Annex R.

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The Strengthening of National Unity

"I believe that our realization of the common peril, our complete understanding of our national condition, will unite us in a democratic revolution that will strengthen our democratic institutions and offer, finally our citizens the opportunity of making the most and the best of themselves. Crises and challenges come and go and those societies armored by a strong leadership, an awareness of the common danger, unity of action, and, above all, a deep belief in the righteousness of their cause overcome in the end. In a revolutionary situation such as ours, the decisive factor is the fighting faith of men and nation.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos

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General Orders No. 33, Hq USAFFE dated 28 November 41

General Orders No. 46, Hq USAFFE dated 18 December 41

General Orders No. 1, Hq USFIP dated 21 March 42

General Orders No. 245, Hq Army dated 10 December 45

General Orders No. 106, Hq NDF dated 8 March 48

General Orders No. 376, Hq NDF dated 21 August 48

General Orders No. 148, Hq NDF dated 22 April 52

LETTERS AND RADIO/MESSAGES

Radio/Message from General Wainwright to General MacArthur on 8 April 42

Radio/Message from President Roosevelt to General Wainwright on 9 April 42

Radio Broadcast, "Voice of Freedom", from General Wainwright to General Sharp on 8 May 22

Radio/Message from Colonel Hilsman to Colonel Christie in Panay on 18 May 1942

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACP — Advance Command Post
 Adj — Adjutant
 AG — Adjutant General
 Amb — Ambulance
 Apr — April
 Aug — August
 AUS — Army of the United States
 Asst — Assistant
 Bde — Brigade
 Brig. Gen. — Brigadier General
 Bn — Battalion
 BS — Battle Ship
 CAC — Coast Artillery Command
 CAFB — Clark Air Force Base
 Cal. — Caliber
 Capt — Captain
 Capt (Navy) — Colonel
 Cav — Cavalry
 CG — Commanding General
 Co — Company
 CO — Commanding Officer
 Col — Colonel
 Comdr — Commander
 CP — Command Post
 Cpl — Corporal
 D.C. — District of Columbia
 DD — Destroyer
 DE — Destroyer Escort
 Dec — December
 Demob. — Demobilization
 Dept. — Department
 Div — Division
 DL — Frigate
 Elem. — Elementary
 Engr. — Engineer
 Ex-O — Executive Officer
 FA — Field Artillery
 FEAFC — Far East Air Force Command
 Feb. — February
 FEC — Far East Command
 Fin. — Finance
 G-1 — Personnel
 G-2 — Intelligence
 G-3 — Plans and Training
 G-4 — Logistics, Supply
 Gen. — General

GHQ — General Headquarters
 Grp — Group
 Hist. — History
 HPA — Headquarters, Philippine Army
 HPAF — Headquarters, Philippine Air Force
 HPC — Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary
 HPN — Headquarters, Philippine Navy
 HQ — Headquarters
 IG — Inspector General
 Inf — Infantry
 Jan. — January
 LC — Light Carrier
 LCM — Landing Craft, Mechanized
 LCVP — Landing Craft, vehicle personnel
 LST — Landing Ship Transport
 Lt — Lieutenant
 LTC — Lieutenant Colonel
 Lt Gen — Lieutenant General
 Lt (JG) — Lieutenant Jr Grade (Navy)
 Lt (SG) — Lieutenant Sr Grade (Navy)
 Maj — Major
 Mar — March
 MB — Motor Boat
 MD — Military District
 Med — Medical
 MG — Machine gun
 Maj. Gen. — Major General
 Mil. — Military
 MLR — Main Line of Resistance
 mm — Millimeter
 Mt — Mountain, Mount
 Mtr — Motor
 MV — Motor Vessel
 MS — Motor Ship
 NDA — National Defense Act
 NE — Nueva Ecija
 Neg Occ — Negros Occidental
 Neg Or — Negros Oriental
 NLF — North Luzon Force
 Nov — November
 OCMH — Office Chief of Military History
 Oct — October
 OP — Observation Post
 Opns — Operations
 p. — Page
 pp. — Pages
 PA — Philippine Army
 PAAC — Philippine Army Air Corps

PAF — Philippine Air Force
 PATC — Philippine Army Training Center
 PC — Philippine Constabulary
 PCA — Philippine Constabulary Academy
 Phil. — Philippines
 PGM — Patrol Gunboat, Mechanized
 PMA — Philippine Military Academy
 PN — Philippine Navy
 PS — Philippine Scout
 PT — Patrol vessel, Motor torpedo boat
 Pvt. — Private
 QM — Quartermaster
 Rad/Msg — Radio Message
 Reg. — Regular
 Regt. — Regiment
 Res. — Reserve
 Ret. — Retired
 ROSS — Reserve Officers Service School
 ROTC — Reserve Officers Training Corps
 S-1 — Personnel Officer
 S-2 — Intelligence Officer
 S-3 — Plans and Operations Officer
 S-4 — Supply Officer
 Sch — School
 Sep — September
 Sgt. — Sergeant
 Sig. — Signal
 SLF — South Luzon Force
 SRC — School for Reserve Commission
 SSN — Nuclear Power Submarine
 Sv — Service
 Trans — Transport
 Trps — Troops
 US — United States
 USA — United States Army
 USAAC — United States Army Air Corps
 USAF — United States Air Force
 USAFFE — United States Army Forces in the Far East
 USFIP — United States Forces in the Philippines
 Vice Adm. — Vice Admiral
 WD — War Department
 WPO — War Plan Orange
 WWII — World War II

Annex A

ROSTER OF OFFICERS

71st Infantry Division, PA

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
3d Lt	Aban, Isabelo	JO, "G" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Abao, Robin	Ex-O, 2d Bn, 72d Inf
Major	Abcede, Salvador	CO, 2d Bn, 74th Inf
2d Lt	Abellana, Amadeo	S-3, 3d Bn, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Abes, Saturnino	Adj & S-1, 75th Inf
Capt	Acosta, Miguel R	Ex-O, 1st Bn, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Aglam, Clodualdo S	JO, "I" Co, 72d Inf
Major	Aguila, Bernardo	Regt'l Dental Surgeon, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Aguilar, Gaudencio	CO, "I" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Aguirre, Gorgonio	JO, 71st Engr Bn
2d Lt	Aguirre, Rodil	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Inf
Capt	Alamar, Juan	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Div
Capt	Alba, Luis	CO, Signal Co, 71st Div
1st Lt	Alcantara, Francisco	CO, "E" Co, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Alejandria, Abelardo	JO, "E" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Alfonso, Augusto	Engr O, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Almanzor, Prudencio	JO, Motor Trans Co, 71st Div
Capt	Alomajan, Jose I	Ex-O, Hq Co., 71st Inf
2d Lt	Andal, Abelardo	Ex-O, "A" Co, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Andora, Juan	Attached, 1st Bn 73d Inf
Major	Andres, Pedro	CO, "B" Co, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Apostol, Bernardo	Ex-O, "C" Co, 71st Engr Bn
3d Lt	Apuhin, Francisco	Ex-O "A" Btry, 1st Bn 71st FA
3d Lt	Aquino, Apolinario	CO, "K" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Arboledo, Emilio	Regt'l S-3, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Arce, Gabriel C	JO, "E" Btry, 1st Bn, 71st FA
3d Lt	Arcenas, Epifanio I	S-2 & Sup O, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Arimas, Orlando	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Arnaldo, Crisanto	Div Dental Surgeon
Major	Arpa, Pullong	CO, 1st Bn, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Arribas, Perfecto	Regt'l S-2, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Atendido, Mauro	JO, 3d Bn, 71st Inf
Capt	Ausejo, Monico V	Regt'l Adj & S-1, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Ayaay, Antonio	Ex-O, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Baaco, Pablo	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Baclagon, Uldario S	Regt'l S-1, S-2 & S-3, 75th Inf
2d Lt	Baga, David	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Bagalso, Claro	Asst. S-2 & S-3, 73d Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
Lt Col	Ballesteros, Tiburcio	Regt'l CO, 75th Inf
Major	Balolong, Licerio	Ex-O, Negros Force
1st Lt	Baltazar, Macairan	JO, "H" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Baluyot, Floro	JO, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 71st FA
1st Lt	Bansil, Andres	Med O 3d Bn 73d Inf
Capt	Banzon, Jose V. H.	CO, 2d Bn, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Baquir, Victor	Ex-O, 71st Med Bn
Major	Barbero, Carmelo Z	Regt'l Ex-O, 71st FA Regt
3d Lt	Barrios, Limneo	JO "I" Co, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Basco	CO, "A" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Batobato	Ex-O "L" Co, 74th Inf
1st Lt	Bautista, Valentin	S-4, Hq Bn, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Beltran, Santiago	JO, "A" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Belzunco, Felipe	Asst Regt'l S-3, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Bermejo, Elpidio de	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Inf
Lt Col	Biggs, Lloyd	Regt'l CO, 72d Inf (1 Sep-29 Dec)
1st Lt	Birondo, Eleuterio	CO, "F" Co, 75th Inf
Lt Col	Bonnet, Donald Van	Regt'l CO, 71st Inf
Capt	Borja, Mariano	Asst G-4, 71st Div
3d Lt	Bravo, Justo	JO, "I" Co, 74th Inf
1st Lt	Briones, Antonio U.	CO, Med Co, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Brodeth, Edilberto	JO, "A" Btry, 1st Bn 71st FA
2d Lt	Buenaventura, Fernando S	JO, "D" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Buenaventura, Ignacio	JO, "E" Co, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Bulanon, Ananias	(Atchd) CO, "H" Co, 73d Inf
Capt	Bustamante, Rodolfo	Regt'l S-4, 71st Inf
Capt	Byars, Stephen M	Regt'l Ex-O, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Caballero, Policarpio	Asst S-3, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Cabalsa,	JO, "L" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Cabanag, Noel	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Cabastangan, Zosimo dela	JO, "G" Co 73d Inf
2d Lt	Cacait, Jesus	JO, "D" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Cafe, Gregorio	CO, "K" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Cajeras, Constantino	JO, "G", Co, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Calip, Alfonso	Ex-O, "C" Co, 71st Inf
Col	Campton, Irving	Regt'l CO, 72 Inf (30 Dec-19 Feb)
1st Lt	Camus, Pedro	JO, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Capadocia, Jose	CO, "B" Co, 1st Bn 72d Inf
1st Lt	Capulong, Fruto	JO, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Capuyan, Bonifacio	S-1, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Carag, Lilim T	Vet Officer, 71st Div
2d Lt	Carangian, Pantaleon	JO, MT Co, 71st FA
1st Lt	Carbonell, Pedro	Div Gas O, 71st Div
3d Lt	Carbonell, Salvador	JO, 71st Div
1st Lt	Castaneda, Higinio	JO, "H" Co, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Castaneda, Modesto	JO, "C" Co, 74th Inf
2d Lt	Castillo, Arsenio	CO, Combat Co, 75th Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
3d Lt	Castro, Felixberto	Hq & Hq Co, 73d Inf
Major	Caswell,	CO, 1st Bn, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Celestino, Eladio	JO, "B" Btry, 71st FA
1st Lt	Chase, Albert F	CO, 1st Bn, 73d Inf
Major	Collins, William C	Asst to the Comdr, 71st Div
3d Lt	Concepcion, Antonio	JO, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Consing, Pedro L	CO, Coll Co, Med Bn, 71st Inf
Col	Cordero, Virgil N.	Regt'l CO, 72d Inf (16 Feb-9 Apr)
3d Lt	Conrado, Policarpio B	JO, "A" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Corsiga, Manuel	CO, "A" Co, 71st Engr Bn
Capt	Crisanto, Arnaldo	Dental Surgeon, 71st Div
Capt	Cruz, Crispulo	Ex-O, 71st Med Bn
1st Lt	Cruz, Eduardo	CO, "G" Co, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Cruz, Eligio	Censor Officer, Negros Force
2d Lt	Cruz, Feliciano Jr	Adj, 2d Bn, 71st FA
1st Lt	Cruz, Victorino	S-3, 71st Med Bn
3d Lt	Cruz, Ranulfo	CO, "D" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Cuevas, Diosdado	S-4, 1st Bn, 71st FA
Major	Culig, Jose	Regt'l Ex-O, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Dabao, Armando P.	Trans O, 74th Inf
Capt	Dacanay, Jaime	CO, "E" Co, 74th Inf
1st Lt	Dacio, Andres B	Asst G-2, 71st Div
3d Lt	Dalit, Inocentes	CO, "B" Co, Anti-Tank Bn, 71st Div
3d Lt	David, Emilio A	JO, "K" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Dejaresco, Robustiano	S-4, 2d Bn, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Delarmente, Manuel	JO, "E" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Demal, Pacifico	Ex-O "D" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Diaz, Rafael N	Asst S-3, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Dimasala, Carlos	JO, 2d Bn, 71st Inf
Capt	Dinando, Eleuterio	CO, "E" Co, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Dipasupil, Gerardo	JO, 71st Med Bn
1st Lt	Divinagracia, Francisco	JO, 1st Bn 74th Inf
2d Lt	Dolojan, Romulo	CO, "C" Co, Anti-Tank Bn, 71st Div
3d Lt	Doriendo, Roberto	CO, "C" Btry, 71st FA
3d Lt	Dorin, Manuel	JO, "B" Btry, 71st FA
3d Lt	Doroteo, Vicente	CO, "L" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Dumdumaya, Roberto	CO, "F" Co, 75th Inf
Major	Duran	Regt'l Ex-O, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Echiverri, Juan F	Asst Adj Gen, 71st Div
3d Lt	Einsidel, Albert Von	JO, Anti-Tank Bn, 71st Div
3d Lt	Emilia, Ostervaldo	Asst. S-4, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Encarnacion, Wilfredo	JO, "C" Co, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Enriquez, Marcial	Ex-O, 1st Bn, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Erum, Nestorio	Ex-O, "B" Co, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Espejo, Marcelino V	Ex-O, Mtr Trans Co, 71st FA
1st Lt	Espina,	S-4, 2d Bn, 71st FA
2d Lt	Espinosa, Godofredo	CO, "C" Co, 72d Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
1st Lt	Estacion, Alfredo	Ex-O, 3d Bn, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Estelloso, Delfin	Adj & S-1, 2d Bn, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Estelloso, Florentino	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Estrada, Felix C	CO, "C" Co, 1st Bn, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Exaltado, Eduardo	CO, "F" Btry, 71st FA
3d Lt	Fajardo, Manuel	CO, "H" Co, (Mg) 72d Inf
Major	Fernandez, Ramon	QM Off., 72d Inf
3d Lt	Figalan, Simeon	Sig Off, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Floren, Rodrigo	JO, "B" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Flores, Cesar	JO, "K" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Flores, Cipriano	Div Vet Off, 71st Div
Major	Flores, Leon	CO, 2d Bn, 74th Inf
Major	Fontanilla, Luis R	CO, Hq, Bn, 72d Inf
Lt Col	Fowler, Halstead C	Regt'l CO, 71st FA Regt
Capt	Francisco, Pedro	Ex-O, 71st Engr Bn
Capt	Franco, Hector	CO, 71st Engr Bn
3d Lt	Gador, Francisco	JO, Combat Co, 73d Inf
Lt Col	Gador, Gabriel	CO, Negros Force
3d Lt	Gajeras, Constantino	JO, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Galia, Desgracias	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Gallardo, Jose E	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Gallardo, Marcelino	CO, "G" Co, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Gallego, Francisco	Asst G-2, 71st Div
3d Lt	Galones, Sulpiero	Ex-O, "L", 72d Inf
3d Lt	Galoyo, Sergio	JO, "K" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Gamus, Eleuterio	Engr Sup O, 71st Div
3d Lt	Garagay, Joaquin	S-3, 1st Bn 72d Inf
1st Lt	Garcia, Artemio	CO, "B" Co, 71st Med Bn
2d Lt	Garcia, Augusto	Adj, 71st Engr Bn
3d Lt	Garcia, Raul	S-4, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Gaston, Plinio	S-2, 75th Inf
2d Lt	Gatmaitan, Isidoro	CO, Hq & Hq Btry, 71st FA
2d Lt	Gayares, Felimon	JO, 2d Bn, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Gayares, Pedro	Regt'l S-1, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Geollegue, Gabriel A	Ex-O Combat Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Geroso, Vicente	G-4, Negros Force
Major	Gomez, Francisco G	CO, 2d Bn, 74th Inf
1st Lt	Gones, Catalino	Ex-O, "K" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Gonzaga, Rustico M	CO, "D" Btry, 71st FA
3d Lt	Gonzales, Gonzalo	S-4, 2d Bn, 71st FA
1st Lt	Gonzales, Luis	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Med Bn
1st Lt	Gonzales, Mariano	Ex-O, Med Det, 71st Div
1st Lt	Gonzales, Vivencio	Asst Div Prov Mar, 71st Div
3d Lt	Gonzales, Zacarias	Ex-O, "B" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Gozum, Jose	Ex-O, "C" Co, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Grabato, Jose	CO, "K" Co, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Guanson, Celso	JO, "G" Co, 72d Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
1st Lt	Guevarra, Francisco	CO, Coll. Co, 71st Med Bn
1st Lt	Guia, Irene de	CO, "F" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Gunting, Romero M	JO, "E" Co, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Guray, Tancredo	JO, "H" Co, 71st Inf
Capt	Gutierrez, Gregorio	JO, 71st Med Bn
3d Lt	Gutierrez, Jose	CO, "B" Co, 72d Engr Bn
1st Lt	Guzman, Jose de	JO, Sig Co, 71st Div
1st Lt	Guzman, Maximino de	Regt'l S-4, 75th Inf
Capt	Hechanova, Hospicio E	Ex-O Clearing Co., 71st Med Bn
1st Lt	Hernandez, Eligio	Protestant Chaplain, 71st Div
2d Lt	Hernandez, Juan F	Aide-de-Camp
Major	Hernandez, Ramon	QM Officer, 72d Inf
Col	Hilsman, Roger	CO, Negros Force
3d Lt	Hinlo, Perfecto Jr	JO, "F" Co, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Hofilonia, Manuel T	JO, 1st Bn, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Ibaro, Eurinco C	Asst. S-4, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Ignacio, Benjamin	Ex-O, 2d Bn, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Ignacio, Eriberto	CO, 2d Bn, 71st FA
1st Lt	Ilagan, Pedro	Ex-O, "F" Co, 73d Inf
Capt	Ilera, Juvenal O	CO, "M" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Imperial, Geronimo	JO, Prov'l Co, 71st Div
3d Lt	Imperial, Guillermo	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Div
Capt	Intengan, Romeo	Fin O, Negros Force
1st Lt	Isada, Maximino E	JO, "E" Co, 72J Inf
3d Lt	Jalandoni, Venancio	CO, "I", 72d Inf
1st Lt	Jamias, Filomeno	JO, 71st Engr Bn
3d Lt	Jarolan, Jesus	Ex-O, "H" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Javier, Antonio	Ex-O, & S-1, 2d Bn 72d Inf.
Capt	Jesus, Domiciano de	"C" Co, 71st Engr Bn
Capt	Jimenea, Sofronio	Regt'l Ex-O, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Jimenez	CO, "L" Co, 74th Inf
Major	Jones, Sam C	Regt'l CO, 74th Inf
2d Lt	Jopillo, Marino	CO, "E" Co, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Jose, Alfredo	S-4 71st Med Bn
2d Lt	Jose, Guillermo	CO, "K" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Jumud, Blumentritt	JO, "L" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Jurado,	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Div
2d Lt	Jurilla, Vicente	CO, QMS Co 71st Div
1st Lt	Katimbang, Gregorio	CO, 1st Bn, 71st FA
2d Lt	Kayanan, Corcino C	S-3, 2d Bn 73d Inf
3d Lt	Kilayko, Ramiro	Ex-O, "M" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Lacson, Simeon	Ex-O, "B" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Lagman, Felimon	JO, "A" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Lagrito, Felix	Ex-O, "H" Co, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Lemaana, Jose G	Chem Sup Off, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Lare, Jack M	CO, 2d Bn, 73d Inf
Capt	Larot, Gregorio	CO, "C" Co, 75th Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
2d Lt	Latoza, Alfredo	Ex-O, "F" Co, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Laxamana, Jesus	Ex-O, "I" Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Ledesma, Federico	JO, "B" Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Ledesma, Fortunato	Bn Surgeon, 1st Bn, 71st Inf
Capt	Ledesma, Santiago	Div Provost Marshal
3d Lt	Legaspina, Federico	JO, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Leon, Alfredo de	Asst G-3, 71st Div
3d Lt	Leon, Geminiano de	CO, "E" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Leyva, Uldarico	JO, "H" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Leyva, Conrado	JO, "K" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Lim, John	Regt'l S-3, 71st FA Regt
3d Lt	Limas, Teodulfo	JO, "I" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Limcangco, Amado	Med. Off, 2d Bn, 73d Inf
Capt	Liongson, Mariano	CO, Motor Trans Co, 71st FA
2d Lt	Lopez, David	CO, 3d FA Bn, 71st FA
2d Lt	Lopez, Leon	CO, "C" Co, 71st Engr Bn
1st Lt	Lorenzo, Dominador	Det. Comdr, Internee Camp
2d Lt	Lota, Luis	CO, "B" Btry 71st FA
1st Lt	Lucena, Antonio	Bn Surgeon, 2d Bn 72d Inf
Capt	Lucena, Leonardo	Div JAGS, 71st Div
2d Lt	Lukban, Jose G	Ex-O, 2d Bn, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Lumang, Alfredo	S-3, 2d Bn, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Lumbre, Fructuoso	JO, Hq Co, 2d Bn, 75th Inf
Capt	Lumotan, Angel	CO, "A" 71st Med Bn
1st Lt	Luna,	Ex-O, 71st Med Co
Lt Col	Luna, Manuel de	Div Surgeon, 71st Div
Capt	Mabugat, Vicente	CO, "E" Co, 2d Bn, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Macalua, Hilario I	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 3d Bn 72d Inf
2d Lt	Madayag, Froilan E	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 1st Bn, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Magbanua, Juanito	Stq Off, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Magcal, Pedro L	CO, Combat Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Magtoto, Benjamin	Med Off, 73d Inf
Capt	Malabayabas, Artemio	Sup Off, 71st Div
1st Lt	Mamicpic, Simplicio	CO, Hq Bn, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Mancesa, Alfredo	JO, "B" Co, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Mancao,	CO, "M" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Mandid, Carlos	JO, "C" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Manuel, Primo	CO, 2d PC Co, (Attached)
Major	Maniego, Felix S	AC of S, G-2, 71st Div
Capt	Manigque, Felix L	CO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Manila, Anatolio	JO, "H" Co, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Manrique, Bienvenido	(Atchd) Combat Co, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Maravilla, Eliseo E	JO, "A" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Maravilla, Manuel B	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Martelino, Apolonio	CO, "A", 71st Med Bn
1st Lt	Martelino, Felizardo	JO, "K" Co, 74th Inf
Capt	Martinez, Antonio	Ex-O, Med Co, 73d Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
1st Lt	Martinez, Ceferino	Adj, Negros Force
2d Lt	Masakayan, Melchor	"G" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Mascardo, Jaime	Div Finance Off, 71st Div
Major	Mata, Ernesto S	CO, 3d Bn, 74th Inf
1st Lt	Mayor, Francisco	JO, 71st Med Bn
Col	McClelland, Carter	CO, Negros Force (Mar-May 42)
3d Lt	Melocotan, Abelito	JO, "F" Co, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Melodia, Gonzalo	"A" Co, 75th Inf
Capt	Menchavez, Sinforoso	G-1, Negros Force
Capt	Mendoza, Jesus	CO, Clearing Co, 71st Med Bn
3d Lt	Mendoza, Rizalino	Asst Div Fin Off, 71st Div
1st Lt	Mercado, Arsenio	CO, "B" Co, Engr Bn
Capt	Mercado, Herminigildo	CO, "Hq" Bn, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Miciano, Agustin	Ordnance O, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Mijares, Cesar	JO, "A" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Mijares, Garcia S	CO, "A" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Milan, Mariano J	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Miranda, Jose	Div Chaplain, 71st Div
3d Lt	Molero, Bienvenido	JO, "E" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Montelibano, Julio	Ex-O & Adj, 1st Bn, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Montemayor, Jesus	CO, "L" Co, 74th Inf
Lt Col	Montilla, Eduardo	G-2 & G-3, Negros Force
1st Lt	Montinola, Luis	JO, "H" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Montinola, Ruperto	CO, "H" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Morales, Damaso	CO, "A" Co, 75th Inf
Major	Morge, Daniel	Regt'l Surgeon 73d Inf
1st Lt	Munes, Santiago T	CO, 1st Bn, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Muriera, Teodoro M	CO, "B" Co, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Nacional, Bartolome	JO, "E" Co, 72d Inf
Major	Nakar, Guillermo	CO, 1st Bn, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Narrajos, Florentino N	Ex-O "E" Co, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Nasal, Napoleon	MTO, 71st FA Regt
2d Lt	Navarro, Demetrio	S-4, 1st Bn, 71st Inf
Capt	Nicolas, Fernando	CO, 3d Bn, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Nicolas, Henry	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Nogales, Romeo C	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Nolan, Ramon	Asst S-2, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Nuevas, Pio	CO, "G" Co, 72d Inf
Major	Obana, Severino	ACofS, G-4, 71st Div
1st Lt	Obina, Fermin L	Ex-O, 1st Bn, 71st Inf
Major	Okol, Angel	CO, 1st Bn, 74th Inf
Capt	Olayta, Ponciano O	QM Off, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Ollero, Mausino	CO, "D" Co, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Ona, Sebastian	JO, "A" Coll 71st Med Bn
2d Lt	Ontal, Nickarter	CO, Combat Co, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Oracion, Timoteo	Asst S-4, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Oracion, Venancio O	CO, "B" Co, 75th Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
1st Lt	Ortega, Delfin S	CO, "C" Coll, 71st Med Bn
3d Lt	Pacaro, Sotero	JO, Combat Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Pachero, Tomas A	Ex-O "E" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Padilla, Bienvenido	S-2, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Pagsubiron, Apolonio	JO, "A" Btry, 1st Bn, 71st FA
3d Lt	Pajanlangit, Diego	JO, "H" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Palomar, Alfredo	JO, Signal Co, 71st Div
3d Lt	Paralejas, Rustico	Ex-O, "D" Co, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Paran, Lino	JO, "G" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Parcas, Hilario C	Adj & S-4, 1st Bn, 75th Inf
2d Lt	Pecana, Ignacio	Asst G-4, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Penaflores, Francisco	Ex-O, "G" Co, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Penaranda, Auxencio	JO, Combat Co, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Peredo, Roque	JO, 71st Engr Bn
2d Lt	Perez, Jose	Ex-O, "E" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Pider, Crispin	JO, "A" Co, 75th Inf
Brig Gen	Pierce, Clinton A	CG, 71st Inf Div (1 Feb-10 Apr)
3d Lt	Poblete, Jorge	CO, Hq & Hq Btry, 71st FA
2d Lt	Poblete, Teodulfo	CO, "M" Co, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Porres, Javier A	Adj, 1st Bn, 71st FA
3d Lt	Portuguez, Cresencio	JO, "M" Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Posa, Elias G	Asst G-3, 71st Div
3d Lt	Primerio, Silvino Q	JO, QM Co, 71st Div
1st Lt	Puga, Pedro B	S-3, 72d Inf
Capt	Pura, Pedro	CO, "B" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Quebrar, Pastor	CO, "E" Btry, 71st FA
3d Lt	Ragay, Emilio	JO, "L" Co, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Ramos, Cesar	Asst S-2, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Ramos, Dominador O	S-1, 71st Med Bn
3d Lt	Ramos, Filomeno	CO, "M" Co, (MG) 72d Inf
Capt	Ramos, Leodegario	Regt! S-4, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Ramos, Manuel M	Vet Off, 71st Div
Capt	Regular, Cesario	S-4, 71st Engr Bn
Major	Relosa, Juan C	ACofS, G-1 & Adj Gen, 71st Div
1st Lt	Reyes, Jesus	JO, 74th Inf
Col	Reyes, Salvador F.	Chief of Staff, 71st Div
2d Lt	Reyes, Venancio	S-3, 3d Bn, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Rios, Carlos R	CO, "A" Btry, 1st Bn 71st FA
3d Lt	Rivera, Hector	Asst S-2, 2nd Bn, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Romero, Antonio	S-4, 2d Bn, 75th Inf
Major	Roque, Fortunato C	CO, 1st Bn, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Ruiz, Silverio G	Ex-O & S-1, 3d Bn 72d Inf
3d Lt	Ruperto, Angel	JO, "A" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Sadol, Jose	CO, "I" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Salde, Custodio Jr	Sup Off & S-2, 2d Bn, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Salsipuedes, Hilarion	CO, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 71st FA
1st Lt	Samonte, Pablo	CO, Hq Co, 2d Bn, 74th Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
3d Lt	Samson, Jesus	JO, Combat Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Sancap, Jesus	JO, "G" Co, 73d Inf
2d Lt	San Agustin, Antonio	Adj, 71st FA Regt
Lt Col	San Diego, Pedro	ACofS, G-3 & IG, 71st Div
3d Lt	San Jose, Felix	Asst Div Sig O Sup O, 71st Div
3d Lt	San Jose, Pantaleon	Sig & Sup O, Hq Bn, 71st Div
2d Lt	Santarina, Dominador	JO, "C" Co, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Santiago, Basilio	Mtr O, Hq Btry 1st Bn, 71st FA
1st Lt	Santos, Estanislao S	S-1, 1st Bn, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Santos, Jesus	Bn Surgeon, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Sarino, Epaphrodito	JO, "B" Coll, 71st Med Bn
3d Lt	Sarroza, Francisco	JO, "B" Co, 72d Inf
Brig Gen	Selleck, Clyde A	CG, 71st Div (8 Dec-31 Jan 42)
3d Lt	Senador, Asterio T	S-2 & Sup O, 72d Inf
Capt	Seneres, Feliciano V	CO, 1st Bn, 75th Inf
Capt	Serrano, Francisco	Med Off, 71st Div
3d Lt	Sevilla, Miguel	JO, "A" Co, 74th Inf
Capt	Sibala, Galicano	CO, "A" Co, 1st Bn, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Silva, Lazaro	CO, "C" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Sioson, Eulogio	Ex-O, Hq & Hq Co, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Sobrepna, Ramon	Ex-O, 1st Bn, 71st FA
3d Lt	Sogueco,	JO, MT Co, 71st FA
1st Lt	Soliguen, Graciano	CO, Hq Co, 2d Bn, 75th Inf
3d Lt	Soliman, Prudencio	JO, "M" Co, 72d Inf
Capt	Solis, Alfredo	Ex-O, 3d Bn, 74th Inf
1st Lt	Soliven, Fidel	Det Comdr, Internee Camp
3d Lt	Somera, Servillano	JO, "C" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Soriano, Jose	CO, "F" Co, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Stephens, John W	CO, 3d Bn, 73d Inf
Capt	Sta Cruz, Eliseo	Ex-O, "A" Coll, 71st Med Bn
2d Lt	Sta Romana, Eliseo	Ex-O, "K" Co, 71st Inf
3d Lt	Sumalpong, Generoso	JO, "F" Co, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Sun, Reymundo C	Ex-O, "M" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Sy, Antaliano	Adj, 2d Bn, 73d Inf
1st Lt	Sy Gaco, Tomas	JO, "A" Co, 75th Inf Regt
2d Lt	Tabangsuarez, Severino	JO, "F" Co, 71st Inf
Capt	Taduran, Juan K	Provost Marshal, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Tambo, Amado	Ex-O, "C" Co, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Tan, Dominador	Asst G-3, 71st Div
3d Lt	Tantoco, Emilio	S-3, 73d Inf
3d Lt	Tejada, Floro V	JO, Med Co, 71st Div
Capt	Tejing, Restituto	S-4, 3d Bn, 74th Inf
1st Lt	Terella,	Med Sup Off, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Ticzon, Juan	CO, "B" Co, 71st Engr Bn
2d Lt	Tingco, Isaías	CO, "L" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Tolentino, Edgardo	CO, "E" Co, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Tomada, Alfredo	Asst Adj., 73d Inf

RANK	NAME	DESIGNATION
3d Lt	Torrejón, Ernesto	Ex-O, "G" Co, 75th Inf
2d Lt	Torres, Ruperto	Asst S-2, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Tubat, Rotmualdo	CO, "A" Co, 75th Inf
1st Lt	Ureta, Librado I	CO, 3d Bn, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Varias, Antonio	JO, Sig Co, 71st Div
Capt	Venecia, Braulio de	CO, Med Det, 71st Div
Capt	Ventura, Jose	Hq & Hq Co., 73d Inf
1st Lt	Venzon, Julian	S-2, 71st Med Bn
3d Lt	Verdeflor, Vicente	JO, "C" Co, 72d Inf
Col	Vessey, Robert H	Regt'l CO, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Victoria, Cesar dela	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Inf
Lt Col	Victoria, Daniel O	Div QM, 71st Div
Major	Vidamo, Juan	CO, Bacolod QM Depot
3d Lt	Villafior, Porfirio	JO, "C" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Villanueva, Cesar	JO, "M" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Villanueva, Vicente	JO, "I" Co, 72d Inf
1st Lt	Villar, Jose	JO, "K" Co, 74th Inf
3d Lt	Villarin, Zosimo	JO, "H" Co, 72d Inf
2d Lt	Villegas,	JO, "A" Btry 1st Bn, 71st FA
2d Lt	Villegas, Benjamin	JO, 71st Inf
2d Lt	Villegas, Bienvenido	JO, Hq & Hq Co, 71st Engr Bn
1st Lt	Viloria, Benjamin	S-1 & S-2, 2d Bn, 73d Inf
Capt	Vivencio, Braulio	S-1, 71st Med Bn
1st Lt	Yamba, Calixto A	Chaplain, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Yap, Florencio	CO, "I" Co, 73d Inf
2d Lt	Yarisanos, Alfonso	Div Asst Sup O, 71st Inf
Capt	Yra, Simeon	Regt'l S-4, 71st Inf
1st Lt	Yranela, Roberto	Med Sup O, 72d Inf
3d Lt	Zulueta, Maximino	JO, "D" Co, (MG) 72d Inf

Annex B

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES
PHILIPPINE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT COMMANDER

Bacolod City
December 19, 1938

C I R C U L A R)
NO. 21)

1. The following relative standing of each cadre in the Seventh Military District based on the inspection reports rendered by the District Commander, Inspectors from Military Adviser's Office, Plans & Training, G-2, and the District Surgeon, during the period from July 5, 1938 to date, is published for the information of all concerned:

NAMES OF CADRES AND CADRE COMMANDERS	INFANTRY CADRES						SPECIAL CADRES			
	3rd Negros Occidental Cadre CC 1 st Lt. R. A. Aguirre (Inf-Res)	2nd Negros Occidental Cadre CC 3 rd Lt. J. R. Narvaez (Inf-Res)	1st Negros Occidental Cadre CC 2 nd Lt. D. Gaerlan (Inf-Res)	2nd Negros Oriental Cadre CC 3 rd Lt. Armando Duque (Inf)	7th Negros Occidental Cadre CC 1 st Lt. D. V. Centeno (Inf)	1st Negros Occidental Cadre CC 3 rd Lt. G. E. Angeles (Inf-Res)	6th Negros Occidental Cadre CC 1 st Lt. A. B. Dacto (Inf-Res)	4th Neg Occidental Cadre (Engr) CC 1 st Lt. P. J. Bitanga (ES-Res)	3rd Negros Oriental Cadre (MG) CC 2 nd Lt. S. T. Munez (Inf-Res)	5th Neg Occ Cadre (Medical) CC 1 st Lt. V. B. Arrieta (MC-Res)
ORDER OF MERIT	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	1st	2nd	3rd
INSPECTORS	FINAL R A T I N G									
DISTRICT COMMANDER	91.13	94.19	92.08	89.00	—	79.09	—	93.81	87.84	77.36
INSPECTORS FROM MIL ADVISER'S OFF	93.25	88.12	86.13	83.50	78.55	82.38	82.20	96.05	81.05	78.75
PLANS & TRAINING G-3	96.40	97.50	96.50	87.50	88.70	88.00	82.30	93.40	84.60	90.30
DISTRICT SURGEON	91.43	90.51	88.47	90.16	90.00	90.42	88.67	91.67	90.00	90.30
GENERAL AVERAGE	93.05	92.58	90.80	87.56	85.75	84.97	84.30	93.73	85.87	83.83

2. The District Commander desires that all Cadre Officers will exert every effort on the next training period to bring up to at least 90% all those whose ratings are below that grade.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL TANEDO:

4C/2-

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OCMH, AFP/24 Apr 73/bav

s/t L. U. ECHIVARRE

Captain, Inf.

2nd in Command (Ex-O)

Annex C

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARMY HEADQUARTERS
MANILA

AGS (Res. Off. Div)

February 3, 1939

GENERAL ORDERS)

NO. 20)

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 1, Bulletin No. 116, HPA, dated August 10, 1937, the three best Engineer, Medical and Signal Cadres and the three best training cadres in Camp Murphy, McKinley, and Dau in each military district are hereby published for the information of all concerned:

ENGINEER CADRES

1st 7th MD — 1st Lt. PEDRO J. BITANGA — (CE-Res), Commanding
2nd 8th MD — 2nd Lt. ANGEL LEGASPI — (CE-Res), Commanding
3rd 10th MD — 2nd Lt. MANUEL D. MANDAC — (CE-Res), Commanding

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VALDES:

Stamped F. G. Oboza
t/ F. G. OBOZA
Lt. Col. AGS
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
"C"

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY /11
4 August 1949

s/t EDILBERTO IBASCO
Captain, AGS
Chief, Res Sec, Per Br, OTAG

A TRUE COPY FR THE XEROX TRUE COPY:
OCMH, AFP 23/4/73/bav

Annex D

MEMORANDUM
The Adjutant General, PA
(Thru AC of S, G-3)

July 5, 1939

1. The following extracts from the inspection reports submitted by Capt. J. C. FRY, USA should be filed with the efficiency reports of the following officers:

X X X X X

Cadre No. 4 (Engr) — Binalbagan, Occ. Neg.

June 10, 1939

1st Lt. Pedro J. Bitanga, CE-Res. — Commanding.

"This is the best in the 7th Military District.

"This Cadre Commander is intelligent, energetic, and has a well-trained organization with high morale. He understands his mission, has initiative to overcome local difficulties.

X X X X X

E. S. BACLIG
Colonel, (Cav)
Chief, Inspector's Division

COPY FURNISHED:
DC, 7th MD.

HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, July 13, 1939

COPY FURNISHED: Cadre Commander, 4th (Engr) Cadre, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, for his information.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL TAÑEDO:

(Sgd) Illegible
(T) P. R. SUAREZ
Major, Inf
Asst. Dist. Comdr, (Ex-O)

S/4
A TRUE COPY FR THE XEROX COPY: 23/4/73/bav

Annex E

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
 Office of the Commanding General
 Manila, P.I.

July 27, 1941

GENERAL ORDERS
 NUMBER 1

The War Department, effective July 26, 1941, constituted a command designated as the United States Army Forces in the Far East.

This Command includes the Philippine Department, Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines called and ordered into active service of the Armed Forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and such other forces as may be assigned to it. Headquarters is established in Manila, Philippine Islands.

The undersigned hereby assumes command.

s/t DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
 Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
 Commanding General
 United States Army Forces in the Far East

Reproduced: OMCH, AFP 11/May/73/bav

Annex F

MALACANANG PALACE
 Manila

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Proclamation No. 740

PUBLISHING THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DATED JULY 26, INCORPORATING THE PHILIPPINE ARMY INTO THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

For the information and guidance of all concerned, I, MANUEL L. QUEZON, President of the Philippines, do hereby publish the following Military Order of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941.

"MILITARY ORDER"

ORGANIZED MILITARY FORCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES CALLED INTO THE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

"Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States, by Section 2 (a) of the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934 (45 Stat-475), and by the corresponding Provision of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States, I hereby call and order into the service of the Armed Forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of a general officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines: Provided, That all naval components thereof shall be placed under the command of the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District, United States Army.

1. This Order shall take effect with relation to all units and personnel of the organized forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines from and after the days and hours, respectively, indicated in orders to be issued from time to time by the general officer, United States Army, designated by the Secretary of War."

(SGD) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

In witness hereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done at the City of Manila, this tenth day of August, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines the sixth.

(SGD) MANUEL L. QUEZON
 President of the Philippines

Reproduced: OMCH, AFP 11/May/73/bav

Annex G

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Manila, P.I.

5 August 1941

GENERAL ORDERS

NO. 5

Pursuant to the provisions of the Proclamation of the President of the United States dated July 26, 1941, the active, organized units of Philippine Army Air Corps are hereby called into the service of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines, effect 12:01 A.M., August 15, 1941, for the period of the existing emergency. The Philippine Army Air Corps and attached medical personnel are assigned to the Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Backes (O-11968), Air Corps, United States Army, Acting Chief of Air Corps, Philippine Army, will report to the Commanding General, Air Forces, United States Army Forces in the Far East for duty accordingly.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MACARTHUR:

R. K. Sutherland
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t CARL H. SEALS
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Acting Adjutant General

Reproduced at AGRD, 21 May 1951

Annex H

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Manila, P.I.

19 August 1941

GENERAL ORDERS

NO. 6

1. Pursuant to the provisions of the Proclamation of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941, the following regiments of Infantry and cadres from other units of the first ten Reserve Divisions of the Philippine Army are hereby called into the service of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines, effective 12:01 A.M., September 1, 1941, for the period of the existing emergency:

a. Infantry, complete:

11th Infantry, 22d Infantry, 31st Infantry, 42 Infantry, 52d Infantry, 61st Infantry, 71st Infantry, 81st Infantry, 91st Infantry, and 101st Infantry.

b. Cadres of the following units:

Cadres to consist of all officers and sergeants (to include attached medical), clerks and cooks; and in addition cadres of all Signal Companies, Regimental Signal Platoons, and Battalion Communication Sections to consist of all non-commissioned officers and all radio and telegraph operators.

- (1) 12th, 13th, 21st, 23d, 33d, 41st, 43d, 51st, 53d, 62d, 63d, 72d, 73d, 82d, 83d, 92d, 93d, 102d, 103d, Infantry Regiments.
- (2) 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st, Engineer Battalions.
- (3) 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st Transport Battalions QM Corps.
- (4) 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st Quartermaster Service Companies, Infantry Division.
- (5) 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st Field Artillery Regiments.
- (6) 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st Medical Battalions.
- (7) 11th, 21st, 31st, 41st, 51st, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st Signal Companies, Infantry Divisions.

c. All Finance Officers and Enlisted Finance Detachments of the first ten Reserve Divisions.

d. The Officers and Enlisted men of the Philippine Army comprising the Cadres of the Philippine Army Training Centers occupied by troops are called into the service of the armed forces of the United States by the provisions of this order.

e. Medical Detachments as follows:

(1) Six (6) corporals and twelve (12) privates, Medical Service, for each of the following Training Centers:

Camp John Hay	Iloilo
Camp Ord	Magallon
Camp del Pilar	Tubigon
Canlubang	Ormoc
Daraga	Davao

(2) Twelve (12) privates, Medical Service, for each of the following Training Centers:

Camp del Pilar
Camp Murphy

2. The above complete units, cadres and detachments are assigned to the command of the Commanding General, Philippine Department.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MACARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t CARL H. SEALS
Colonel, A. G. D.
Acting Adjutant General

Reproduced at AGRD, 21 May 1951

Annex I

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Manila, P.I.

24 September 1941

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 11

1. Pursuant to the provisions of the Proclamation of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941, the following Engineer Battalions, Philippine Army less elements accepted for service with the United States Army Forces under provisions of paragraph 1b (2), General Orders No. 6, this headquarters are hereby called into the service of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines, effective 12:01 A.M., 1 October 1941, for the period of the existing emergency and will be accepted for such service by a United States Army officer to be designated by Headquarters Philippine Department, at the mobilization centers indicated:

Organization

Mobilization Center

11th Engineer Battalion (less elements)	Tuguegaro, Cagayan
21st Engineer Battalion (less elements)	Bangad, Nueva Ecija
31st Engineer Battalion (less elements)	San Miguel, Bulacan
41st Engineer Battalion (less elements)	Camp Murphy, Quezon City
61st Engineer Battalion (less elements)	Dingle, Iloilo
71st Engineer Battalion (less elements)	Binalbagan, Negros Occidental
91st Engineer Battalion (less elements)	Tacloban, Leyte

2. The personnel indicated above, upon acceptance, is assigned under the command of the Commanding General, Philippine Department.

By COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MACARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t CARL H. SEALS
Colonel, A.G.D.

Reproduced at AGRD, 21 May 1951
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OCMH, AFP/23 Apr 73/bav

Annex J

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Manila, P.I.

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 33

28 November 1941

1. Pursuant to provisions of the Proclamation of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941, the units of the Philippine Army, less elements accepted for service with the United States Army Forces, under the provisions of Paragraph 1b, General Order No. 6, this Headquarters, dated 19 August 1941, are hereby called into the service of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines, effective at 12:01 A.M., 15 December such service by United States Army officers to be designated by the Commanding General, South Luzon Force for units of the 51st Division; by the Commanding General, North Luzon Force for units of the 11th and 31st Divisions; and by the Commanding Officer of the Visayas-Mindanao Force for units of the 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st Divisions, at the mobilization centers indicated:

Organization	Mobilization Center
63d Inf. Regt. (less 1st and 3d Battalions)	San Jose, Antique
1st Bn, 63d Inf	Banga, Capiz
3d Bn, 63d Inf	Odiangan, Romblon
73d Inf Regt	Tanjay, Negros Oriental
83d Inf Regt. less 2d and 3d Battalions)	Tagbilaran, Bohol
2d Bn, 83d Inf	Tubigon, Bohol
3d Bn, 83d Inf	Ubay, Bohol
93d Inf Regt (less 2d Battalion)	Catbalogan, Samar
2d Bn, 93d Inf	Catarman, Samar
103d Inf Regt (less Co. A 1st Bn and 3d Bn)	Zamboanga City
Co. A 1st Bn, 103d Inf	Jolo, Sulo
3d Bn, 103d Inf	Cotabato, Cotabato
11th F.A. Regt. (less 3d Battalion)	Bangued, Abra
3d Bn, 11th F.A.	Tuguegarao, Cagayan
31st F.A. Regt.	Camp Del Pilar, Pampanga
51st F.A. Regt.	Lucena, Tayabas
101st F.A. Regt.	Malaybalay, Bukidnon

2. Upon acceptance, units of the 11th, 31st, 71st, and 91st Divisions and attached personnel, on the Island of Luzon are assigned to the command of the Commanding General, North Luzon Force; those of the 51st Division and attached personnel, on the Island of Luzon to the command of the Commanding General, South Luzon Force; and those with station in the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Military Districts, to the command of Commanding Officer, Visayas-Mindanao Force

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MACARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t CARL H. SEALS
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

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Annex K

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Manila, P.I.

18 December 1941

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 46

1. Pursuant to provisions of the Proclamation of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941, all personnel of the Philippine Army on active duty and all active units of the Philippine Army, less personnel and units already accepted for service with the United States Army Forces, are hereby called into the service of the armed forces of the United States in the Far East, effective on the date of acceptance for the period of the existing emergency, and will be accepted for such service by officers in the service of the United States Army Forces in the Far East.

2. Personnel of the Philippine Army which may hereafter be called to active duty and units thereof which may hereafter be activated are hereby called into the service of the armed forces of the United States in the Far East, effective on the date of acceptance, and will be accepted for such service by officers in the service of the United States Army Forces in the Far East.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MACARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t CARL H. SEALS
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

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Annex L

HEDAQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
 Fort Mills, P.I.

26 February 1942

GENERAL ORDERS

NO. 33

1. There are hereby constituted effective March 3, 1942 the following commands with commanders and troops as shown below:

a. Visayan Force

Commander: Brigadier General Bradford G Chynoweth, (O-3499)

Troops: All elements of United States Forces in the Philippines in the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Military Districts and on the Islands of:

Marinduque
 Mindoro
 Palawan
 Masbate and Calamian Groups

b. Mindanao Force

Commander: Brigadier General William F Sharp (O-2183)

Troops: All elements of United States Forces in the Philippines in the 10th Military District.

2. Upon activation of the Visayan Force and the Mindanao Force, the following tactical command, heretofore constituted, is discontinued:
 Visayan- Mindanao Force

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MACARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
 Major General, GSC
 Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t CARL H SEALS
 Brigadier General, USA
 Adjutant General

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Annex M

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
 Fort Mills, P.I.

21 March 1942

GENERAL ORDERS
 NO. 1

DESIGNATION OF COMMAND _____	Section
ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND _____	I
	II

I. Pursuant to authority contained in War Department radio dated 20 March 1942, a command designated as United States Forces in the Philippines is hereby constituted.

This command includes all United States Forces in the Philippines and all forces of the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines inducted into the service of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines for the period of the existing emergency, and all such other forces which may be assigned to it. Headquarters is established at Fort Mills, Philippine Islands.

II. Pursuant to War Department radio dated 20 March 1942, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the United States Forces in the Philippines.

s/J. M. WAINWRIGHT
 t/J. M. WAINWRIGHT
 Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
 Commanding

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Annex N

R E S T R I C T E D

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARMY HEADQUARTERS
APO 501

10 December 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 245)

AWARD OF DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT STAR (POSTHUMOUS)

1. **Award of the Distinguished Conduct Star (Posthumous).** By direction of the President, under the provisions of Circular No. 86, this Headquarters, dated 22 July 1945, the Distinguished Conduct Star (posthumous) is awarded by the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, to the following-named officer:

LT COLONEL GUILLERMO NAKAR, O-88020 INF. For extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty during the period from January 1942 to 29 September 1942. Facing encirclement by the enemy in Bauang Bay, La Union. Lt Col Guillermo Nakar led his men across the Cordillera Mountains, and reached Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya 17 days later. Unable to join the USAFFE troops in Bataan, he organized the 14th Infantry, Philippine Army, under adverse circumstances. Following the fall of Corregidor, he refused to surrender to the enemy in order that he might continue resistance. When the ranking American Officer left the regiment, Lt Col Nakar assumed the command of the 14th Infantry, and kept intact the command in spite of great obstacles. He organized and led the foundations of an effective intelligence network in Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya and Pangasinan, Luzon, Philippine Islands. He was captured by the enemy on 29 September 1942. While a prisoner, he never gave into the Japanese demand that he should sign his surrender papers. In a stirring speech in ECHAGUE, Isabela, Lt Col Nakar defiantly denounced the cruelties, abuses, and brutalities of the Japanese. Despite this daring denunciation, the enemy persistently offered him his freedom if he would only sign surrender papers. All efforts of the enemy to make him sign failed when he bluntly said: "I cannot transfer my allegiance to Japan. I swore allegiance to the United States and to my country." Reliable information was to the effect that he was brought to Fort Santiago, Manila, and that he was executed after all efforts of the enemy failed to make him sign surrender papers.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

R. JALANDONJ
Brigadier General, PA
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

SGT LUIS RAMOS
Colonel, AGS
The Adjutant General

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OCMH, AFP 27/4/73/bay

Annex O

MILITARY ORDER

Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines are released from the service of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States, by section 2 (a) (12) of the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934 (48 Stat. 457), and by the corresponding provision of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby release from the service of the armed forces of the United States all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines called and ordered into the service of the armed forces of the United States pursuant to the Military Order of July 26, 1941.

The said Military Order of July 26, 1941, is hereby revoked.

This order shall take effect at 12:00 midnight June 30, 1946.

(SGD) HARRY S. TRUMAN

The White House
June 29, 1946

Reproduced at AGRD, 21 May 1951

Annex P

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Camp Murphy, Quezon City

PAXB4 300.4

23 June 1947

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 139

AWARD OF THE GOLD CROSS MEDAL

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Circulars 86 and 198, this Headquarters, dated 22 July 1945 and 27 December 1945, respectively, the Gold Cross Medal which is the Philippine Army decoration equivalent to the United States Army Silver Star Medal is hereby awarded to the following-named officer:

Brigadier General (then Colonel) MARIANO N CASTANEDA O-1032 PA. For gallantry in action against the enemy and for exceptional leadership in battle in Quinauan Point, Aglaloma Sector, Mariveles, Bataan on 26 January 1942. While serving as Regimental Commander of the 1st Infantry, PC, he led the attack against an enemy position inspiring and directing our troops in a successful defense. Through his gallant actions, directions and able leadership, he contributed in no small degree to the heroic defense of Bataan.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:

R. JALANDONI
Major General, PA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t LUIS FLORENTIN
Colonel, AGS
The Adjutant General

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Annex Q

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Camp Murphy, Quezon City

PAXB4 300.4

26 June 1947

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 146

AWARD OF THE GOLD CROSS MEDAL

By direction of the President, under the provisions of Circulars 86 and 198, this Headquarters, dated 22 July 1945 and 27 December 1945, respectively, the Gold Cross Medal which is the Philippine Army decoration equivalent to the United States Army Silver Medal Star is hereby awarded to the following-named officer:

Lt Col (then Captain) JOSE TANDO, O-1154 PA Infantry. For gallantry in action against the enemy at Anyasan Point during the period 5-11 February 1942. While serving as Commanding Officer 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, PC, Lt Colonel Tando in total indifference to his own personal safety, moved along the front line thus bolstering up the morale of his men and directed the advance against the enemy. As a result of his exemplary courage and conduct in the face of strong enemy resistance, his battalion was inspired to the point of crushing the enemy.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:

R. JALANDONI
Major General, PA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t LUIS FLORENTIN
Colonel, AGS
The Adjutant General

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Annex R

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES
Camp Murphy, Quezon City

8 March 1948

AGBE 200.4

GENERAL ORDERS

NUMBER 106

AWARD OF THE DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT STAR

By direction of the President, pursuant to paragraph 1, Section III, Circular Number 93, this Headquarters, S-47, the DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT STAR is hereby awarded to the following-named officers:

Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) DEOGRACIAS TENAZAS O-1131 Infantry, Armed Forces of the Philippines. For extraordinary heroism in action in the Southwest Pacific Area during the period 8 February to 17 February 1942. As commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 2d Regular Division, Philippine Constabulary, Colonel Tenazas displayed brilliant leadership and initiative in leading his unit throughout the ten days of continuous fighting against fanatical Japanese forces in Bataan Peninsula, Luzon, Philippine Islands, successfully eliminating a threatening enemy salient known as the "Tuol Pocket". Moving through forward areas, he personally inspired his men to their greatest efforts and through his heroic example and outstanding command ability, assisted materially in delaying the fall of Bataan. By his unflinching determination and aggressive combat leadership with complete disregard for his own safety, Colonel Tenazas played an important role in the heroic defense of Bataan.
Address: Hq Camp Murphy, Camp Murphy, Quezon City.

Major (then Lieutenant Colonel) SALVADOR A ABCEDE O-1520 Infantry, Armed Forces of the Philippines. For extraordinary heroism in action in the Philippine Islands from 8 July 1943 to 23 March 1945. Refusing to surrender when the major defense forces were overcome, Major Abcede assumed command of the scattered forces continuing resistance on the island of Negros. He effectively organized many dispersed elements throughout the island, held much stronger enemy forces continuously at bay, and denied them some of the resources of the country. He improvised tactics for effective warfare with limited means, and ingenious methods for supplying his men and their families. He persisted in this enterprise, although a large price was set on his head, and he was of necessity in constant proximity to the enemy. His courage and resourcefulness enabled him to avoid capture, to inspire in the people of Negros a will to resist, and to furnish the United States command with information of great military value.
Address: Headquarters, Philippine Ground Force
Floridablanca, Pampanga

First Lieutenant AMBROSIO P. PEÑA O-30114 Field Artillery, Armed Forces of the Philippines. For extraordinary heroism in action in Luzon, Philippine Islands, on 25 February 1945. Lieutenant Peña, commanding

an 81-mm. mortar section attached to a rifle company of the 3d Battalion, 121st Infantry, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon, skillfully established a position from which he directed and observed fire on the hostile garrison in Cervantes, Ilocos Sur, during the early phases of an attack against a strongly defended concrete schoolhouse. He conducted accurate concentrations of fire which destroyed vital enemy installations and drove hostile troops inside the building and when the defenders desperately attempted to break through his lines, moved forward into the town and from a position about 100 yards from school, led his men in delivering such devastating fire that the foe was repulsed in confusion. He gallantly continued his effective fires from an exposed position and knocked out of action or neutralized several enemy automatic weapons and mortars and when heavy machine gun fire from a church belfry pinned down a friendly rifle platoon, he then led a mortar crew along an exposed trail and set up the weapon in a field which he could both control and observe the results of his fire. Japanese fire was concentrated on his position, and although his crew was forced to leave the mortar and seek cover, Lieutenant Peña crawled forward in the face of the unrelenting fire and, alone and exposed, heroically operated the mortar until he scored a direct hit on the belfry and put the hostile machine gun and automatic rifle out of action. He continued firing the mortar with deadly effect until his ammunition was exhausted and the rifle platoon had resumed its fire on the fore. Through his indomitable leadership and inspiring personal example with utter disregard for his own safety, Lieutenant Peña provided vital support to the embattled infantrymen and upheld the finest traditions of the military service.
Address: Central Records Branch, OTAG, HNDF Camp Murphy, Quezon City.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:

R. JALANDONI
Major General, AFP
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/t LUIS FLORENTIN
Colonel, AGS
The Adjutant General

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Annex S

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES
Camp Murphy, Quezon City

21 August 1948

AGB6 300.4

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 376

	Section
AWARD OF THE GOLD CROSS MEDAL (Posthumous)	I
AWARD OF THE GOLD CROSS MEDAL	II
AWARD OF THE WOUNDED SOLDIER'S MEDAL	III
xxx	xxx

I. **Award of the Gold Cross Medal (Posthumous).** By direction of the President, pursuant to paragraph 1, Section III, Circular Number 93 this Headquarters, dated 6 October 1947, the Gold Cross Medal is hereby posthumously awarded by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines to:

Third Lieutenant CESAR M BASA (ASN Unknown) Air Corps, Philippine Army (now PAF, AFP). For gallantry in action in the vicinity of Batangas, Philippines, on 12 December 1941. When a force of fifty four (54) enemy bombers attacked his airplane, Lieutenant Basa was one of a formation of six (6) pilots who took off and unhesitatingly engaged the overwhelming hostile force. The fearlessness and suddenness of the attack by this small group of planes disorganized the enemy formation and caused his rout, thereby preventing possible casualties and damage to materiel in the vicinity of the airfield. This intrepid pilot was killed in the engagement. Next of Kin: Mrs. Rosario Basa, 1096 Burgos-Zamora, Rizal City.

x x x x x

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:

R. JALANDONI
Major General, AFP
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

SR LUIS FLORENTIN
Colonel, AGS
The Adjutant General

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Annex T

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
Camp Murphy, Quezon City

4 September 1950

AGC 7

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 242

	Section
AWARD OF THE GOLD CROSS MEDAL (Equivalent)	I
AWARD OF THE WOUNDED SOLDIER'S MEDAL (Equivalent)	II

I. **Award of the Gold Cross Medal (Equivalent).** By direction of the President, pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10, Section I, of AFPR 600-45, this Headquarters, dated 16 December 1948, the Gold Cross Medal (Equivalent) is hereby awarded by the Commanding General, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to the following-named officer:

MAJOR (then 1st Lt) VICTOR M OSIAS (O-1664 AC, AFP. For exemplary courage and gallantry in battle during a series of sustained operations against the enemy, at Aglaloma, Bataan, on 26 and 26 January 1942.

II. **Award of the Wounded Soldier's Medal (Equivalent).** By direction of the President, pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10, Section I, AFPR 600-45, this Headquarters, dated 16 December 1948, the Wounded Soldier's Medal (Equivalent) is hereby awarded by the Commanding General, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to the following-named officer:

LT COLONEL (then Captain) PEDRO Q MOLINA O-1563 AC, AFP. For wounds received in action against the enemy on 3 February 1942, at Quinauan Sector, Bataan.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:

M. N. CASTANEDA
Major General, AFP
Commanding General

OFFICIAL:

s/t J. A. ARAMBULO
Colonel, AGS
The Adjutant General

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